Quentin, Again you confirm my contention, and confirm your inability to state any inconsistency between P-time and relativity whatsoever.
You can blubber forever and that will remain the same... Edgar On Monday, February 24, 2014 1:05:01 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > blablabla... genius. > > > > > 2014-02-24 19:01 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen <[email protected] <javascript:>>: > >> Quentin, >> >> The typical adolescent response of someone unable to even understand the >> post he is responding to. >> >> Edgar >> >> >> >> On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:57:17 PM UTC-5, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> >>> I prefer the Pasta theory of the universe... the universe is generated >>> with pasta... My pasta universe starts with the actual observable state >>> of the universe and works backward. That absolutely ensures that it is >>> correct by definition even before we might know what all of those actual >>> pastas are or exactly how they taste like. >>> >>> However we can say many things about my pasta universe. For example, one >>> thing we can say is it must be logically consistent and logically complete >>> because it always continues to output the current observable information >>> state of the universe with no problems whatsoever (tomatoes are the key to >>> falsifiability). >>> >>> My pasta theory conforms to standard scientific method in this respect >>> while yours does not. >>> >>> Quentin >>> >>> >>> >>> 2014-02-24 18:45 GMT+01:00 Edgar L. Owen <[email protected]>: >>> >>> Bruno, >>>> >>>> As I've stated on many occasions, computational reality is what >>>> computes the actual information states of the observable universe. It is >>>> what computes what science observes and measures, whatever that may be. >>>> >>>> Your comp starts with an abstract assumption without any empirical >>>> justification. There is not even any way to falsify your comp, and there >>>> is >>>> no reason to believe there is anyway it generates the actual observable >>>> universe. >>>> >>>> My computational universe starts with the actual observable state of >>>> the universe and works backward. That absolutely ensures that it is >>>> correct >>>> by definition even before we might know what all of those actual >>>> computations are or exactly how they work. >>>> >>>> However we can say many things about my computational universe. For >>>> example, one thing we can say is it must be logically consistent and >>>> logically complete because it always continues to output the current >>>> observable information state of the universe with no problems whatsoever. >>>> >>>> My computational theory conforms to standard scientific method in this >>>> respect while yours does not. >>>> >>>> Edgar >>>> >>>> >>>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 12:10:31 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 24 Feb 2014, at 15:10, Edgar L. Owen wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Craig, >>>>> >>>>> I agree too. Makes it sound low brow and pop culturish, like some >>>>> consumer product for housewives. But that's a good way to distinguish it >>>>> from my computational reality. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> But please tell us what it is. "computational" is a technical term. >>>>> Does your computational reality compute more or less than a computer or >>>>> any >>>>> (Turing) universal machine or numbers? >>>>> >>>>> Computation, like number is a notion far more elementary than any >>>>> mathematics capable of describing the precise relations of a physical >>>>> implementation of a computation. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> You did not answer my question about the relation between p-time and >>>>> 1-person. If I accept an artificial brain, and that clock of that >>>>> artigicial brain can be improved, I might have a subjective time scale >>>>> different from the other, so p-time is also subjectively relative it >>>>> seems >>>>> to me (with Mechanism Descartes name of "comp"). >>>>> >>>>> Mechanism and Materialism don't fit well together. >>>>> >>>>> Bruno >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> :-) >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Edgar >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:58:19 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Monday, February 24, 2014 8:16:00 AM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Craig, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Pardon me but what does CTM stand for? >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Computational Theory of Mind. >>>>>> >>>>>> Someone mentioned that they are tired of the word 'Comp', and I >>>>>> agree. Something about it I never liked. Makes it sound friendly and >>>>>> natural, when I suspect that is neither. >>>>>> >>>>>> Craig >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Edgar >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Sunday, February 23, 2014 9:55:27 AM UTC-5, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> This might be a more concise way of making my argument: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> It is my claim that CTM has overlooked the necessity to describe >>>>>>>> the method, mechanism, or arithmetic principle by which computations >>>>>>>> are >>>>>>>> encountered. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> My hypothesis, drawn from both direct human experience as well as >>>>>>>> experience with technological devices, is that "everything which is >>>>>>>> counted >>>>>>>> must first be encountered". Extending this dictum, I propose that >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> 1. There is nothing at all which cannot be reduced to an encounter, >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>> 2. That the nature of encounters can be described as aesthetic >>>>>>>> re-acquaintance, nested sensory-motive participation, or simply sense. >>>>>>>> 3. In consideration of 1, sense is understood in all cases to be >>>>>>>> pre-mechanical, pre-arithmetic, and inescapably fundamental. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> My challenge then, is for CTM to provide a functional account of >>>>>>>> how numbers encounter each other, and how they came to be separated >>>>>>>> from >>>>>>>> the whole of arithmetic truth in the first place. We know that an >>>>>>>> actual >>>>>>>> machine must encounter data through physical input to a hardware >>>>>>>> substrate, >>>>>>>> but how does an ideal machine encounter data? How does it insulate >>>>>>>> itself >>>>>>>> from data which is not relevant to the machine? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Failing a satisfactory explanation of the fundamental mechanism >>>>>>>> behind computation, I conclude that: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> 4. The logic which compels us to seek a computational or mechanical >>>>>>>> theory of mind is rooted in an expectation of functional necessity. >>>>>>>> 5. This logic is directly contradicted by the absence of critical >>>>>>>> inquiry to the mechanisms which provide arithmetic function. >>>>>>>> 6. CTM should be understood to be compromised by petito principii >>>>>>>> fallacy, as it begs its own question by feigning to explain macro >>>>>>>> level >>>>>>>> mental phenomena through brute inflation of its own micro level mental >>>>>>>> phenomena which is overlooked entirely within CTM. >>>>>>>> 7. In consideration of 1-6, it must be seen that CTM is invalid, >>>>>>>> and should possibly be replaced by an approach which addresses the >>>>>>>> fallacy >>>>>>>> directly. >>>>>>>> 8. PIP (Primordial Identity Pansensitivity) offers a >>>>>>>> trans-theoretical explanation in which the capacity for sense >>>>>>>> encounters is >>>>>>>> the sole axiom. >>>>>>>> 9. CTM can be rehabilitated, and all of its mathematical science >>>>>>>> can be redeemed by translating into PIP terms, which amounts to >>>>>>>> reversing >>>>>>>> the foundations of number theory so that they are sense-subordinate. >>>>>>>> 10. This effectively renders CTM a theory of mind-like simulation, >>>>>>>> rather than macro level minds, however, mind-simulation proceeds from >>>>>>>> PIP >>>>>>>> as a perfectly viable cosmological inquiry, albeit from an impersonal, >>>>>>>> theoretical platform of sense. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>>> >>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy >>> Batty/Rutger Hauer) >>> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] <javascript:>. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]<javascript:> >> . >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> > > > > -- > All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy > Batty/Rutger Hauer) > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
