Thanks, Professor Marchal, I shall be purchasing your newly, translated, book on Amazon, and a hat tip to professor Standish for the alert on this.
Mitch -----Original Message----- From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com> Sent: Tue, Mar 4, 2014 9:07 am Subject: Re: consciousness questions bruno or anyone On 04 Mar 2014, at 01:04, spudboy...@aol.com wrote: I don't have a great comprehension of UDA, but that the foundation of everything must be arithmetic as you say. If computationalism is correct, yes. And the base theory can be be any logical specification or axiomatization of any universal system, and arithmetic is enough. The technical way to extract physics from arithmetic extends Gödel's "extraction" of meta-arithmetic from arithmetic. I will explain this (again) soon. The more I read papers and research about the holographic universe, the more it seems like consciousness might be a program (for want of a better word) in physics, which somehow itself, emanates, from some kind of 2D space, which I guess might be a...database? That is interesting but not yet extracted from computationalism. There are resemblance with the distinction between the UD, UD* (the infinite running of the UD) and the first person indeterminacy domain (that is his 3-1 view actually). But with computationalism we get an explanation from a 0-dimensional theory of the way an Hilbert space (infinitely dimensional, normally) appears, and the cosmology is more difficult to extract. Note that the goal is to solve the mind-body problem, not to propose a new theory of physics. It just happens that explaining physics from a theory of mind (comp) happens (by UDA) to be a necessary part of the mind-body problem, and this makes also the comp hypothesis refutable/testable. Bruno -----Original Message----- From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com> Sent: Mon, Mar 3, 2014 1:19 am Subject: Re: consciousness questions bruno or anyone On 02 Mar 2014, at 17:45, spudboy...@aol.com wrote: Just a hunch, is that we cannot separate consciousness from physics. What do you mean by this? It is more that we can't separate physics from consciousness. Are you aware that if we (in the third person view) are machine, then physics emerge from arithmetic? Do you have a problem with the UD Argument, and if yes, which one? Bruno What this implies I shall leave for the truly, brainy. -----Original Message----- From: ghibbsa <ghib...@gmail.com> To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com> Sent: Sun, Mar 2, 2014 7:36 am Subject: consciousness questions bruno or anyone So, why do we get tired, and why is being tired like the way that it is? If its exhaustion, maybe up a couple of days, why does it stop being about motivation and becomes that we can't think straight? ass Why do we need to sleep? Why do we need to REM sleep in what looks to be precise amounts, which we're not capable of losing ground on (strong evidence when people are prevented REM sleep in the lab over days, they begin to pass out more and more easily, and don't return to normal until all the REM is made up for) i Why is it, mental fatigue has certain properties that ties fatigue to specific mental activities but not other, equally challenging ones? Why is this strongly correlated with how much time a specifc kind of activity has already been focused on since last sleep? Such that 'a change is as good as a rest'. ion If computation is intrinsically conscious why aren't we conscious in the vast majority of our brains, where the vast majority of the heavy lifting goes on? Why aren't we conscious in our other organs where sigtinificant computation takes place, and is connected with our brains. When I write a piece of code and run it, why aren't I experiencing the consciousness of the code? What decides what object and experiences what consciousness, and why is that stable? If I lie down beside my twin, why don't I sometimes wake up him? If computation is intrinsically conscious, where is consciousness experienced? How is facilitated? If a computer is intrinsically conscious, which hardware parts are consciousness, and/or which hardwaerre parts are required by the conscious experience of software, such that the experience is able to think the next thought? The processor? RAM? Given all this hardware is tightly controlled by processes running, and given these processes, and their footprint through the hardware can be precisely known, why is the old Turing needed, or should it be updated to include predictions for what an emergent consciousness would look like, its footprint, CPU use? If computation is intrinsically consciousness why can we account for the footprint of our code, purely in terms of, and exactly of that code? , Why haven't these footprint iss9ues been heavily researched over the past 50 years...why isn't there a hard theory? With nothing at all having been done in this area, for all we know when the computer runs slow and starts to ceize that isn't sometimes a darling little consciousness flashing into existence and struggling to survive, only to be broken on the wheel of the Norton performance tuner? Why is even a chance of that acceptable...why hasn't any work been done on the footprint issue? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
