On 04 Mar 2014, at 01:04, [email protected] wrote:
I don't have a great comprehension of UDA, but that the foundation
of everything must be arithmetic as you say.
If computationalism is correct, yes. And the base theory can be be any
logical specification or axiomatization of any universal system, and
arithmetic is enough.
The technical way to extract physics from arithmetic extends Gödel's
"extraction" of meta-arithmetic from arithmetic. I will explain this
(again) soon.
The more I read papers and research about the holographic universe,
the more it seems like consciousness might be a program (for want of
a better word) in physics, which somehow itself, emanates, from some
kind of 2D space, which I guess might be a...database?
That is interesting but not yet extracted from computationalism. There
are resemblance with the distinction between the UD, UD* (the infinite
running of the UD) and the first person indeterminacy domain (that is
his 3-1 view actually). But with computationalism we get an
explanation from a 0-dimensional theory of the way an Hilbert space
(infinitely dimensional, normally) appears, and the cosmology is more
difficult to extract.
Note that the goal is to solve the mind-body problem, not to propose a
new theory of physics. It just happens that explaining physics from a
theory of mind (comp) happens (by UDA) to be a necessary part of the
mind-body problem, and this makes also the comp hypothesis refutable/
testable.
Bruno
-----Original Message-----
From: Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
To: everything-list <[email protected]>
Sent: Mon, Mar 3, 2014 1:19 am
Subject: Re: consciousness questions bruno or anyone
On 02 Mar 2014, at 17:45, [email protected] wrote:
Just a hunch, is that we cannot separate consciousness from physics.
What do you mean by this? It is more that we can't separate physics
from consciousness.
Are you aware that if we (in the third person view) are machine,
then physics emerge from arithmetic?
Do you have a problem with the UD Argument, and if yes, which one?
Bruno
What this implies I shall leave for the truly, brainy.
-----Original Message-----
From: ghibbsa <[email protected]>
To: everything-list <[email protected]>
Sent: Sun, Mar 2, 2014 7:36 am
Subject: consciousness questions bruno or anyone
So, why do we get tired, and why is being tired like the way that
it is? If its exhaustion, maybe up a couple of days, why does it
stop being about motivation and becomes that we can't think
straight? ass
Why do we need to sleep? Why do we need to REM sleep in what looks
to be precise amounts, which we're not capable of losing ground on
(strong evidence when people are prevented REM sleep in the lab
over days, they begin to pass out more and more easily, and don't
return to normal until all the REM is made up for)
i
Why is it, mental fatigue has certain properties that ties fatigue
to specific mental activities but not other, equally challenging
ones? Why is this strongly correlated with how much time a specifc
kind of activity has already been focused on since last sleep? Such
that 'a change is as good as a rest'.
ion
If computation is intrinsically conscious why aren't we conscious
in the vast majority of our brains, where the vast majority of the
heavy lifting goes on? Why aren't we conscious in our other organs
where sigtinificant computation takes place, and is connected with
our brains. When I write a piece of code and run it, why aren't I
experiencing the consciousness of the code? What decides what
object and experiences what consciousness, and why is that stable?
If I lie down beside my twin, why don't I sometimes wake up him?
If computation is intrinsically conscious, where is consciousness
experienced? How is facilitated? If a computer is intrinsically
conscious, which hardware parts are consciousness, and/or which
hardwaerre parts are required by the conscious experience of
software, such that the experience is able to think the next
thought? The processor? RAM?
Given all this hardware is tightly controlled by processes running,
and given these processes, and their footprint through the hardware
can be precisely known, why is the old Turing needed, or should it
be updated to include predictions for what an emergent
consciousness would look like, its footprint, CPU use? If
computation is intrinsically consciousness why can we account for
the footprint of our code, purely in terms of, and exactly
of that code?
,
Why haven't these footprint iss9ues been heavily researched over
the past 50 years...why isn't there a hard theory? With nothing at
all having been done in this area, for all we know when the
computer runs slow and starts to ceize that isn't sometimes a
darling little consciousness flashing into existence and struggling
to survive, only to be broken on the wheel of the Norton
performance tuner? Why is even a chance of that acceptable...why
hasn't any work been done on the footprint issue?
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