It seems to me that you're just attacking a straw men... it's obvious in multivalued outcome, that probability doesn't mean only one outcome arise out of many... so as I said previously if that's what you mean and attacking us for, it's bad faith on your side.
Quentin 2014-03-13 1:18 GMT+01:00 chris peck <[email protected]>: > > Hi Bruno > > > > > > > > *>> >> >>But that can only be a 3-1 description. She handles the 1p by a > maximization of the interests of the copies, and that is equivalent with > the FPI, without naming it. >> >>Funnily enough Bruno, if I was > opportunistic I would just about accept that. I mean personally, I would > argue that the vocabulary used is identical between you and Greaves and she > explicitly denies your probability distribution from the first person > perspective. >>I doubt this, as in the iterated self-duplication, her > method get equivalent as justifying the "probability talk", even the usual > boolean one.* > > There is a difference between your account and the accounts of others > mentioned. Theirs are attempts to over come charges of incoherence by > positing some mechanism for deriving bare quantities that can act in the > place of probability; yours is not. You write as if there genuinely are > actual classical probabilities from the first person perspective. You don't > appear to recognize that there is a problem in doing that. Even worse, you > present the alleged existence of classical probability from the first > person as some kind of surprising discovery. You try and turn a vice into a > virtue. > > Any theory in which all outcomes definitely occur 'objectively' but only > one gets experienced within any observation, though all outcomes are > experienced in one observation or another, must have an account in which > probabilities are derived in a non standard non classical way. Why? Because > classically probability is based on the assumption of a disjunction between > objective outcomes not a conjunction between objective outcomes. > Alternatively, one can live with classical probability of 1 that all > outcomes will be observed, and discuss how decisions would be made 'as if' > the usual probabilities obtained. Either approach is just the first step in > making a coherent account of probability in an Everetian picture or a TofE. > But you don't do either. Ignoring a problem is not the same as solving it, > surely? It seems to leave your account incomplete or perhaps even just > incoherent. > > It looks to me as though Deutsch, Wallace, Saunders and Greaves are all on > the train rushing towards the destination and you've been left on the > platform going: 'Huh? Its just vocab isn't it?'. But its obvious that if > you say Alice predicts spin up with a probability of 0.5 and others say she > would predict spin up with probability 1, as Greaves does, even if she gets > her 0.5 elsewhere, then there are most definitely structural differences > between your accounts. Its not just vocab. > > > > ------------------------------ > Date: Wed, 12 Mar 2014 12:31:29 -0700 > From: [email protected] > To: [email protected] > Subject: Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3 > > > On Tuesday, March 11, 2014 10:38:23 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > OK. Me too. But modern physics has a strong mathematical flavor, and > consciousness seems more to be an immaterial belief or knowledge than > something made of particles, so, if interested in the mind body problem, > the platonic perspective has some merit, especially taking into account the > failure of Aristotelian dualism. > > > That's an interesting topic, to be sure. Does comp actually help at all > to solve the hard problem? When I think about it qualia, I have five main > questions that I'd want a philosophy of mind to propose answers for. > 1. What are qualia made of? > 2. Why do patterns of ions and neurotransmitters crossing bilipid > membranes in certain regions of the brain correlate perfectly to qualia? > 3. How is a quale related to what it is about, under normal > circumstances? What about when a quale is caused by artificially > stimulated neurons, dreams, hallucinations, sensory illusions, mistakes in > thought or memory, etc? > 4. How can qualia affect the brain's processes, such that we can act on > their information and talk and write about them? > 5. How could we know that belief in qualia is justified? How could our > instinctive belief in qualia be developed by correct and reliable brain > processes? > > Chalmers' ideas, for example, involve answers to 1-3 that sound > reasonable, but they stumble badly on 4-5. Comp and other mathematical > Platonist ideas seem to me to give interesting answers to 2-4 but flub 1 > and 5. > > -Gabe > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. 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