Hi Bruno >> >> >>But that can only be a 3-1 description. She handles the 1p by a >> >> >>maximization of the interests of the copies, and that is equivalent >> >> >>with the FPI, without naming it.
>> >>Funnily enough Bruno, if I was opportunistic I would just about accept >> >>that. I mean personally, I would argue that the vocabulary used is >> >>identical between you and Greaves and she explicitly denies your >> >>probability distribution from the first person perspective. >>I doubt this, as in the iterated self-duplication, her method get equivalent >>as justifying the "probability talk", even the usual boolean one. There is a difference between your account and the accounts of others mentioned. Theirs are attempts to over come charges of incoherence by positing some mechanism for deriving bare quantities that can act in the place of probability; yours is not. You write as if there genuinely are actual classical probabilities from the first person perspective. You don't appear to recognize that there is a problem in doing that. Even worse, you present the alleged existence of classical probability from the first person as some kind of surprising discovery. You try and turn a vice into a virtue. Any theory in which all outcomes definitely occur 'objectively' but only one gets experienced within any observation, though all outcomes are experienced in one observation or another, must have an account in which probabilities are derived in a non standard non classical way. Why? Because classically probability is based on the assumption of a disjunction between objective outcomes not a conjunction between objective outcomes. Alternatively, one can live with classical probability of 1 that all outcomes will be observed, and discuss how decisions would be made 'as if' the usual probabilities obtained. Either approach is just the first step in making a coherent account of probability in an Everetian picture or a TofE. But you don't do either. Ignoring a problem is not the same as solving it, surely? It seems to leave your account incomplete or perhaps even just incoherent. It looks to me as though Deutsch, Wallace, Saunders and Greaves are all on the train rushing towards the destination and you've been left on the platform going: 'Huh? Its just vocab isn't it?'. But its obvious that if you say Alice predicts spin up with a probability of 0.5 and others say she would predict spin up with probability 1, as Greaves does, even if she gets her 0.5 elsewhere, then there are most definitely structural differences between your accounts. Its not just vocab. Date: Wed, 12 Mar 2014 12:31:29 -0700 From: gabebod...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3 On Tuesday, March 11, 2014 10:38:23 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:OK. Me too. But modern physics has a strong mathematical flavor, and consciousness seems more to be an immaterial belief or knowledge than something made of particles, so, if interested in the mind body problem, the platonic perspective has some merit, especially taking into account the failure of Aristotelian dualism. That's an interesting topic, to be sure. Does comp actually help at all to solve the hard problem? When I think about it qualia, I have five main questions that I'd want a philosophy of mind to propose answers for. 1. What are qualia made of? 2. Why do patterns of ions and neurotransmitters crossing bilipid membranes in certain regions of the brain correlate perfectly to qualia? 3. How is a quale related to what it is about, under normal circumstances? What about when a quale is caused by artificially stimulated neurons, dreams, hallucinations, sensory illusions, mistakes in thought or memory, etc? 4. How can qualia affect the brain's processes, such that we can act on their information and talk and write about them? 5. How could we know that belief in qualia is justified? How could our instinctive belief in qualia be developed by correct and reliable brain processes? Chalmers' ideas, for example, involve answers to 1-3 that sound reasonable, but they stumble badly on 4-5. Comp and other mathematical Platonist ideas seem to me to give interesting answers to 2-4 but flub 1 and 5. -Gabe -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.