Hi Bruno

>> >> >>But that can only be a 3-1 description. She handles the 1p by a 
>> >> >>maximization of the interests of the copies, and that is equivalent 
>> >> >>with the FPI, without naming it.


>> >>Funnily enough Bruno, if I was opportunistic I would just about accept 
>> >>that. I mean personally, I would argue that the vocabulary used is 
>> >>identical between you and Greaves and she explicitly denies your 
>> >>probability distribution from the first person perspective.


>>I doubt this, as in the iterated self-duplication, her method get equivalent 
>>as justifying the "probability talk", even the usual boolean one.

There is a difference between your account and the accounts of others 
mentioned. Theirs are attempts to over come charges of incoherence by positing 
some mechanism for deriving bare quantities that can act in the place of 
probability; yours is not. You write as if there genuinely are actual classical 
probabilities from the first person perspective. You don't appear to recognize 
that there is a problem in doing that. Even worse, you present the alleged 
existence of classical probability from the first person as some kind of 
surprising discovery. You try and turn a vice into a virtue.

Any theory in which all outcomes definitely occur 'objectively' but only one 
gets experienced within any observation, though all outcomes are experienced in 
one observation or another, must have an account in which probabilities are 
derived in a non standard non classical way. Why? Because classically 
probability is based on the assumption of a disjunction between objective 
outcomes not a conjunction between objective outcomes. Alternatively, one can 
live with classical probability of 1 that all outcomes will be observed, and 
discuss how decisions would be made 'as if' the usual probabilities obtained. 
Either approach is just the first step in making a coherent account of 
probability in an Everetian picture or a TofE. But you don't do either. 
Ignoring a problem is not the same as solving it, surely? It seems to leave 
your account incomplete or perhaps even just incoherent.

It looks to me as though Deutsch, Wallace, Saunders and Greaves are all on the 
train rushing towards the destination and you've been left on the platform 
going: 'Huh? Its just vocab isn't it?'. But its obvious that if you say Alice 
predicts spin up with a probability of 0.5 and others say she would predict 
spin up with probability 1, as Greaves does, even if she gets her 0.5 
elsewhere, then there are most definitely structural differences between your 
accounts. Its not just vocab.



Date: Wed, 12 Mar 2014 12:31:29 -0700
From: gabebod...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Tegmark and UDA step 3

On Tuesday, March 11, 2014 10:38:23 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:OK. Me too. 
But modern physics has a strong mathematical flavor, and consciousness seems 
more to be an immaterial belief or knowledge than something made of particles, 
so, if interested in the mind body problem, the platonic perspective has some 
merit, especially taking into account the failure of Aristotelian dualism.
That's an interesting topic, to be sure.  Does comp actually help at all to 
solve the hard problem?  When I think about it qualia, I have five main 
questions that I'd want a philosophy of mind to propose answers for.
1. What are qualia made of?
2. Why do patterns of ions and neurotransmitters crossing bilipid membranes in 
certain regions of the brain correlate perfectly to qualia?
3. How is a quale related to what it is about, under normal circumstances?  
What about when a quale is caused by artificially stimulated neurons, dreams, 
hallucinations, sensory illusions, mistakes in thought or memory, etc?
4. How can qualia affect the brain's processes, such that we can act on their 
information and talk and write about them?
5. How could we know that belief in qualia is justified?  How could our 
instinctive belief in qualia be developed by correct and reliable brain 
processes?

Chalmers' ideas, for example, involve answers to 1-3 that sound reasonable, but 
they stumble badly on 4-5.  Comp and other mathematical Platonist ideas seem to 
me to give interesting answers to 2-4 but flub 1 and 5.

-Gabe





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