Dear Bruno, see my apology to LIZR - same here.
I want to reflect to only ONE phrase in you appreciated reply:
*" I think we should not make a theory more complex just by wishful
thinking"*
Reading your cautious distinctions about science and theories (not claiming
them to "true", only an agrred assumption and it's consequences) I pretend
my agnosticisim as more than just "wishful thinking". It may be the way to
open up so far un-considered ways that could provide further advancement to
our thinking -even if we don't know about them. I.O.W.: open up the mind
for better understanding of the world.
I am sure you do the same.
Thanks again
John M
On Mon, May 5, 2014 at 2:16 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
> On 04 May 2014, at 22:42, John Mikes wrote:
>
> Bruno, your 'scientific' logic supersedes me. Explaining ontology by
> existing and - I suppose - existing by the likes of 'ontology' (etc.) is
> more than what I buy.
>
>
> There is no metaphysics here. I am just saying that if you do a theory,
> you have to be clear on what we will agree to be primitively existing, and
> what we derive from that assumption.
>
>
>
>
> "We might still *stumble*" on truth, (or you do not?), what we may
> believe as "truth" and draw very important consequences upon OTHER concepts
> from it as well.
>
> In "my" agnostic vocabulary the 'real' includes lots of 'inconnues' that
> may change whatever we THINK is included - as historic examples show.
>
>
> Sure. That is why an (ideal) scientist will never pretend he has a true
> theory. It is not really is job, even when he tackles metaphysical or
> theological question, it will be under the form IF this THEN that, etc.
>
>
>
> I still hold mathematics an exorbitant achievement of the H U M A N mind
> so your formula (besides being hard to follow for me) is not convincing.
> The facts WE can calculate from Nature do not evidence a similar
> calculation how Nature arrived at them.
>
>
> The point is only that IF we are Turing emulable THEN physics is given by
> ... (and I give the equations).
> So we can test computationalism and move forward. Unfortunately, thanks to
> Gödel and Everett, comp is confirmed up to now.
>
>
>
>
> (See the early (even recent???) explanatory errors in our sciences). We
> are nowhere to decipher Nature's analogue(?) ways (if *'analogue' *covers
> them all, what I would not suggest).
>
>
> 'Analog' is compatible with computationalism, unless you mean that the
> brain uses very special infinities. They might exist, and thanks to the
> kind of reasoning I suggest we do, we can test this. But until such
> confirmation of non-comp (or refutation of comp), I think we should not
> make a theory more complex just by wishful thinking. We can be agnostic on
> comp, and still understand its consequences, so that we can test it, and
> perhaps refute it.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> John M
>
>
>
>
> On Sat, May 3, 2014 at 4:14 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
>>
>> On 03 May 2014, at 16:38, John Mikes wrote:
>>
>> Bruno (excuse me!) - what is the difference between
>> "* stable patterns of information, e.g. perception..."*
>> and::(your ontological existence?, 'explained' as):
>> * "the primitive objects that we agree to assume to solve or formulate
>> some problem, and the phenomenological, or epistemological existence,"????*
>> Ontology is a word. Existence another. So is Information and Perception.
>>
>>
>> I would say "ontology" is a word. But ontology is what exist, and that
>> can be a word in some theory but could be a giraffe or a dinosaur, or a
>> planet, or a number, in this or that other theory.
>>
>> The same for "existence", "information" and "perception", those are
>> words. But I don't see why information, perception and existence would be
>> word.
>>
>> (Later, in the math thread, I might denote the number 2 by s(s(0)), and
>> denote the sequence "s(s(0))" by the number 2^(code of s)*5^(code of "(";
>> ...., which will give a large number s(s(s(s(s(s(s(...(0)))...).
>> This is necessary to distinguish in arithmetic a number and a code for
>> that number.)
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Both definitions are based on ASSUMING.human ways of cognition/mentality.
>>
>>
>> We can work from the cognitive abilities of machines. Those abilities can
>> be defined in elementary arithmetic, or in any computer language.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Phenomenological in my vocabulary points to "as we perceive" something,
>> the
>> epistemological points to changes of the same. Within our mental
>> capabilities.
>>
>>
>> All right.
>>
>>
>> None cuts into anything " R E A L " .
>>
>>
>> You don't know that.
>>
>> WE CAN NOT.
>>
>>
>> You cannot know that too.
>>
>> What we cannot do, is express that we can. But we can't express that we
>> cannot do it either.
>> We cannot pretend having stumble on some truth, but we
>> might still stumble on some truth. Why not?
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thu, May 1, 2014 at 4:17 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On 30 Apr 2014, at 21:06, meekerdb wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> So what does "existence" mean besides stable patterns of information,
>>> e.g. perception of the Moon, landing on the Moon, tidal effects of the
>>> Moon,...
>>>
>>>
>>> I distinguish the ontological existence, which concerns the primitive
>>> objects that we agree to assume to solve or formulate some problem, and the
>>> phenomenological, or epistemological existence, which are the appearance
>>> that we derive at some higher "emergent" level.
>>>
>>> With comp we need to assume a simple basic Turing complete theory (like
>>> Robinson arithmetic, or the SK combinator). And we derive from them the
>>> emergence of all universal machines, their interactions and the resulting
>>> first person statistics, which should explains the origin and development
>>> (in some mathematical space) of the law of physics.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I like when David Mermin said once: "Einstein asked if the moon still
>>> exist when nobody look at it. Now we know that the moon, in that case,
>>> definitely not exist".
>>>
>>> Well, that was a comp prediction, with the difference that the moon
>>> doesn't exist even when we look at it.
>>> Only the relative relations between my computational states and
>>> infinitely many computations exists.
>>>
>>>
>>> Thus completely eviscerating the meaning of "exist".
>>>
>>>
>>> ?
>>> Are you not begging the question?
>>> I would say that comp does not eviscerate the meaning of "exists". The
>>> meaning is provides by the standard semantics of predicate logic, where
>>> "exists" is a quantifier.
>>>
>>>
>>> But that is quite a different sense of "exist".
>>>
>>>
>>> It is most basic one, used at the ontic level. May be you *assume* a
>>> notion of primitive physical existence. Then indeed, with comp we assume
>>> only a simple notion of arithmetical existence (on which most scientists
>>> agree) and derive the physical reality from an epistemological type of
>>> existence.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> It just means satisfying axioms and inferences from those axioms.
>>>
>>>
>>> It means more, as we work in a theory which is supposed to be a theory
>>> of everything. It is not pure logic or pure math. It is theology or TOE.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Depending on the axioms and the rules of inference you can prove that
>>> something exists or that it cannot exist or that it might exist but can't
>>> be proven.
>>>
>>>
>>> We work in the comp frame. It presuppose you agree with sentences like
>>> "it exist a number equal to the successor of the successor of 0", etc.
>>>
>>> We want explain complex phenomena, from particles interactions to
>>> conscious awareness, from simple basic assumption.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> The choosing arithmetic as the base universal theory,
>>>
>>>
>>> And choosing Christianity as the base universal theory.... And choosing
>>> Marxism as the base universal theory....
>>>
>>>
>>> I have never met a christian, nor a marxist, believing that elementary
>>> arithmetic is false or useless.
>>> I have met arithmeticians doubting Christianity and/or Marxism.
>>> Elementary arithmetic is a "scientific" theory (even a sub-theory of
>>> most applied scientific theories).
>>> Christianity is a fuzzy and vague corpus of hope and belief,
>>> presupposing too arithmetic.
>>> To oppose or compare Christianity and arithmetic is no better than
>>> opposing Christianity and Evolution Theory.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> only number exists, some number functions and relation exists in a
>>> related but slightly different sense, and then physical existence is
>>> precisely define by the "existence" used in the modal context.
>>> Roughly speaking, we have the intelligible existence the "E" of
>>> arithmetic, then the modal existence:
>>> with [i]p = []p & p, or []p & <>t, or []p & <>t & p, we have different
>>> notion of existence of the type
>>> [i]Ex([i]p(x) and also, (quantized existence) [i]<i>Ex([i]<i>p(x)). Of
>>> course this needs the first order modal logic extending the current
>>> propositional hypostases.
>>> More on this in the math thread.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> If my consciousness can survive a physical digital substitution, then
>>> it survives an arithmetical digital substitution, and what we call the moon
>>> has to be recovered as a stable pattern emerging from an infinity of
>>> computations in arithmetic,
>>>
>>>
>>> But only, I think, in a different digital universe in which "we" are
>>> also stable patterns of relations.
>>>
>>>
>>> By the FPI, we are distributed in infinitely many computations (making
>>> the real universe appearance a non digital and unique (yet multiversal)
>>> reality a priori).
>>>
>>>
>>> And in THAT universe what "we" call "the Moon" is what "we" can fly
>>> too and and on.
>>>
>>>
>>> OK, then. but I was using the arithmetic TOE(*), and we have to be
>>> clear on all the different notions of existence which emerge in it.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>> (*) the TOE chosen is Robinson arithmetic. Precisely, it is predicate
>>> logic + the non logical following axioms:
>>>
>>> 0 ≠ s(x)
>>> s(x) = s(y) -> x = y
>>> x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y))
>>> x+0 = x
>>> x+s(y) = s(x+y)
>>> x*0=0
>>> x*s(y)=(x*y)+x
>>>
>>> An observer is a believer in the axioms above + some induction axioms.
>>>
>>>
>>> IF you can build a world out of those, THEN an a believer in those
>>> axioms is an observer in THAT world. But that's a long way from showing
>>> it's true of THIS world.
>>>
>>>
>>> The term "world" is ambiguous. In our case, we derive a many-world
>>> structure from those axioms.
>>>
>>> The goal consists in explaining complex things from simple principle.
>>> The physicalist string theory tries to do that too, but, as I explained,
>>> has some issue with the mind-body problem.
>>>
>>> I comment your other posts here:
>>>
>>> The point is that "what we call the Moon" IS the Moon.
>>>
>>>
>>> The question is: *what* is the moon, in the fundamental TOE (that we
>>> derive from comp, for example).
>>>
>>> If not, you become instrumentalist, and just abandon the idea of
>>> searching a fundamental theory.
>>>
>>>
>>> Not at all. The Moon is defined ostensively. But that doesn't mean I'm
>>> prevented developing a theory about what it's made of, how it formed, what
>>> effects it has, ... That's why I said you've been a logician to long; you
>>> mistake a definition for the thing itself and when it's defined you suppose
>>> nothing more can be said.
>>>
>>>
>>> Doing that confusion would mean that I have not been a logician long
>>> enough, as definition theory is part of logic. Such confusion are the
>>> object of study of the logician, which are supposed to be expert on this.
>>> You don't define the moon ostensively. You provide evidence for a
>>> possible repeatable and sharable experience, but that does not tell us what
>>> the moon is, what ontological and epistemological status it can have.
>>>
>>> I am not sure of your motivation here. It looks like "don't ask what is
>>> the fundamental nature of the things we talk about"?
>>> My point is that such nature will depend of the fundamental principle we
>>> agree on (if only for the sake of research: agreeing on axioms does not
>>> mean knowing they are true of course (pace Craig).
>>>
>>> I am just saying that if comp is true, existence of physical object must
>>> be explain by "machine's theology or self-referential logics".
>>>
>>>
>>> Sure. But why is that any more interesting than, "If theism is true,
>>> existence of physical objects must be explained by theist theology." ?
>>>
>>>
>>> That correct, but less interesting because man fight on the theist
>>> assumptions, which are hard to make precise. But comp is simpler, get a lot
>>> of evidence, is believed/assumed by most scientist, and machine's theology
>>> is a precise branch of math. Indeed we get testable consequences, which is
>>> not clearly the case for the current theist theology. The gain is there.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Note that any noun whatsoever can be inserted in place of "theism" and
>>> it's still a true sentence. That's the beauty, and the failure, of logic.
>>>
>>>
>>> Not really. Many people believe in comp *and* in primitive physical
>>> object. A priori that seems plausible, but the UDA shows that this is not
>>> plausible. It is not obvious that if comp is true, physics becomes reduced
>>> to intensional number theory. You need to study the comp mind-body problem
>>> to understand the necessity of that reduction, in that frame.
>>> Logic fails anyway, that is why we need non logical axioms, like 0+x =
>>> x, etc.
>>>
>>> Last post:
>>>
>>> That's why I wrote "what WE call the Moon". The meaning of terms in
>>> language depends on agreed understanding of speaker and hearer. You can't
>>> ostensively define the moon in your dreams to someone else.
>>>
>>>
>>> I can, to someone else I am dreaming too.
>>> I have no real problem with your "instrumentalist" definition of the
>>> moon, but it is not enough for solving or progressing in the mind-body
>>> problem, and in the question of the origin.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
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