Dear Bruno, see my apology to LIZR - same here. I want to reflect to only ONE phrase in you appreciated reply: *" I think we should not make a theory more complex just by wishful thinking"* Reading your cautious distinctions about science and theories (not claiming them to "true", only an agrred assumption and it's consequences) I pretend my agnosticisim as more than just "wishful thinking". It may be the way to open up so far un-considered ways that could provide further advancement to our thinking -even if we don't know about them. I.O.W.: open up the mind for better understanding of the world.
I am sure you do the same. Thanks again John M On Mon, May 5, 2014 at 2:16 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 04 May 2014, at 22:42, John Mikes wrote: > > Bruno, your 'scientific' logic supersedes me. Explaining ontology by > existing and - I suppose - existing by the likes of 'ontology' (etc.) is > more than what I buy. > > > There is no metaphysics here. I am just saying that if you do a theory, > you have to be clear on what we will agree to be primitively existing, and > what we derive from that assumption. > > > > > "We might still *stumble*" on truth, (or you do not?), what we may > believe as "truth" and draw very important consequences upon OTHER concepts > from it as well. > > In "my" agnostic vocabulary the 'real' includes lots of 'inconnues' that > may change whatever we THINK is included - as historic examples show. > > > Sure. That is why an (ideal) scientist will never pretend he has a true > theory. It is not really is job, even when he tackles metaphysical or > theological question, it will be under the form IF this THEN that, etc. > > > > I still hold mathematics an exorbitant achievement of the H U M A N mind > so your formula (besides being hard to follow for me) is not convincing. > The facts WE can calculate from Nature do not evidence a similar > calculation how Nature arrived at them. > > > The point is only that IF we are Turing emulable THEN physics is given by > ... (and I give the equations). > So we can test computationalism and move forward. Unfortunately, thanks to > Gödel and Everett, comp is confirmed up to now. > > > > > (See the early (even recent???) explanatory errors in our sciences). We > are nowhere to decipher Nature's analogue(?) ways (if *'analogue' *covers > them all, what I would not suggest). > > > 'Analog' is compatible with computationalism, unless you mean that the > brain uses very special infinities. They might exist, and thanks to the > kind of reasoning I suggest we do, we can test this. But until such > confirmation of non-comp (or refutation of comp), I think we should not > make a theory more complex just by wishful thinking. We can be agnostic on > comp, and still understand its consequences, so that we can test it, and > perhaps refute it. > > Bruno > > > > > John M > > > > > On Sat, May 3, 2014 at 4:14 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> On 03 May 2014, at 16:38, John Mikes wrote: >> >> Bruno (excuse me!) - what is the difference between >> "* stable patterns of information, e.g. perception..."* >> and::(your ontological existence?, 'explained' as): >> * "the primitive objects that we agree to assume to solve or formulate >> some problem, and the phenomenological, or epistemological existence,"????* >> Ontology is a word. Existence another. So is Information and Perception. >> >> >> I would say "ontology" is a word. But ontology is what exist, and that >> can be a word in some theory but could be a giraffe or a dinosaur, or a >> planet, or a number, in this or that other theory. >> >> The same for "existence", "information" and "perception", those are >> words. But I don't see why information, perception and existence would be >> word. >> >> (Later, in the math thread, I might denote the number 2 by s(s(0)), and >> denote the sequence "s(s(0))" by the number 2^(code of s)*5^(code of "("; >> ...., which will give a large number s(s(s(s(s(s(s(...(0)))...). >> This is necessary to distinguish in arithmetic a number and a code for >> that number.) >> >> >> >> >> Both definitions are based on ASSUMING.human ways of cognition/mentality. >> >> >> We can work from the cognitive abilities of machines. Those abilities can >> be defined in elementary arithmetic, or in any computer language. >> >> >> >> >> Phenomenological in my vocabulary points to "as we perceive" something, >> the >> epistemological points to changes of the same. Within our mental >> capabilities. >> >> >> All right. >> >> >> None cuts into anything " R E A L " . >> >> >> You don't know that. >> >> WE CAN NOT. >> >> >> You cannot know that too. >> >> What we cannot do, is express that we can. But we can't express that we >> cannot do it either. >> We cannot pretend having stumble on some truth, but we >> might still stumble on some truth. Why not? >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Thu, May 1, 2014 at 4:17 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> On 30 Apr 2014, at 21:06, meekerdb wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> So what does "existence" mean besides stable patterns of information, >>> e.g. perception of the Moon, landing on the Moon, tidal effects of the >>> Moon,... >>> >>> >>> I distinguish the ontological existence, which concerns the primitive >>> objects that we agree to assume to solve or formulate some problem, and the >>> phenomenological, or epistemological existence, which are the appearance >>> that we derive at some higher "emergent" level. >>> >>> With comp we need to assume a simple basic Turing complete theory (like >>> Robinson arithmetic, or the SK combinator). And we derive from them the >>> emergence of all universal machines, their interactions and the resulting >>> first person statistics, which should explains the origin and development >>> (in some mathematical space) of the law of physics. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> I like when David Mermin said once: "Einstein asked if the moon still >>> exist when nobody look at it. Now we know that the moon, in that case, >>> definitely not exist". >>> >>> Well, that was a comp prediction, with the difference that the moon >>> doesn't exist even when we look at it. >>> Only the relative relations between my computational states and >>> infinitely many computations exists. >>> >>> >>> Thus completely eviscerating the meaning of "exist". >>> >>> >>> ? >>> Are you not begging the question? >>> I would say that comp does not eviscerate the meaning of "exists". The >>> meaning is provides by the standard semantics of predicate logic, where >>> "exists" is a quantifier. >>> >>> >>> But that is quite a different sense of "exist". >>> >>> >>> It is most basic one, used at the ontic level. May be you *assume* a >>> notion of primitive physical existence. Then indeed, with comp we assume >>> only a simple notion of arithmetical existence (on which most scientists >>> agree) and derive the physical reality from an epistemological type of >>> existence. >>> >>> >>> >>> It just means satisfying axioms and inferences from those axioms. >>> >>> >>> It means more, as we work in a theory which is supposed to be a theory >>> of everything. It is not pure logic or pure math. It is theology or TOE. >>> >>> >>> >>> Depending on the axioms and the rules of inference you can prove that >>> something exists or that it cannot exist or that it might exist but can't >>> be proven. >>> >>> >>> We work in the comp frame. It presuppose you agree with sentences like >>> "it exist a number equal to the successor of the successor of 0", etc. >>> >>> We want explain complex phenomena, from particles interactions to >>> conscious awareness, from simple basic assumption. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> The choosing arithmetic as the base universal theory, >>> >>> >>> And choosing Christianity as the base universal theory.... And choosing >>> Marxism as the base universal theory.... >>> >>> >>> I have never met a christian, nor a marxist, believing that elementary >>> arithmetic is false or useless. >>> I have met arithmeticians doubting Christianity and/or Marxism. >>> Elementary arithmetic is a "scientific" theory (even a sub-theory of >>> most applied scientific theories). >>> Christianity is a fuzzy and vague corpus of hope and belief, >>> presupposing too arithmetic. >>> To oppose or compare Christianity and arithmetic is no better than >>> opposing Christianity and Evolution Theory. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> only number exists, some number functions and relation exists in a >>> related but slightly different sense, and then physical existence is >>> precisely define by the "existence" used in the modal context. >>> Roughly speaking, we have the intelligible existence the "E" of >>> arithmetic, then the modal existence: >>> with [i]p = []p & p, or []p & <>t, or []p & <>t & p, we have different >>> notion of existence of the type >>> [i]Ex([i]p(x) and also, (quantized existence) [i]<i>Ex([i]<i>p(x)). Of >>> course this needs the first order modal logic extending the current >>> propositional hypostases. >>> More on this in the math thread. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> If my consciousness can survive a physical digital substitution, then >>> it survives an arithmetical digital substitution, and what we call the moon >>> has to be recovered as a stable pattern emerging from an infinity of >>> computations in arithmetic, >>> >>> >>> But only, I think, in a different digital universe in which "we" are >>> also stable patterns of relations. >>> >>> >>> By the FPI, we are distributed in infinitely many computations (making >>> the real universe appearance a non digital and unique (yet multiversal) >>> reality a priori). >>> >>> >>> And in THAT universe what "we" call "the Moon" is what "we" can fly >>> too and and on. >>> >>> >>> OK, then. but I was using the arithmetic TOE(*), and we have to be >>> clear on all the different notions of existence which emerge in it. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> (*) the TOE chosen is Robinson arithmetic. Precisely, it is predicate >>> logic + the non logical following axioms: >>> >>> 0 ≠ s(x) >>> s(x) = s(y) -> x = y >>> x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y)) >>> x+0 = x >>> x+s(y) = s(x+y) >>> x*0=0 >>> x*s(y)=(x*y)+x >>> >>> An observer is a believer in the axioms above + some induction axioms. >>> >>> >>> IF you can build a world out of those, THEN an a believer in those >>> axioms is an observer in THAT world. But that's a long way from showing >>> it's true of THIS world. >>> >>> >>> The term "world" is ambiguous. In our case, we derive a many-world >>> structure from those axioms. >>> >>> The goal consists in explaining complex things from simple principle. >>> The physicalist string theory tries to do that too, but, as I explained, >>> has some issue with the mind-body problem. >>> >>> I comment your other posts here: >>> >>> The point is that "what we call the Moon" IS the Moon. >>> >>> >>> The question is: *what* is the moon, in the fundamental TOE (that we >>> derive from comp, for example). >>> >>> If not, you become instrumentalist, and just abandon the idea of >>> searching a fundamental theory. >>> >>> >>> Not at all. The Moon is defined ostensively. But that doesn't mean I'm >>> prevented developing a theory about what it's made of, how it formed, what >>> effects it has, ... That's why I said you've been a logician to long; you >>> mistake a definition for the thing itself and when it's defined you suppose >>> nothing more can be said. >>> >>> >>> Doing that confusion would mean that I have not been a logician long >>> enough, as definition theory is part of logic. Such confusion are the >>> object of study of the logician, which are supposed to be expert on this. >>> You don't define the moon ostensively. You provide evidence for a >>> possible repeatable and sharable experience, but that does not tell us what >>> the moon is, what ontological and epistemological status it can have. >>> >>> I am not sure of your motivation here. It looks like "don't ask what is >>> the fundamental nature of the things we talk about"? >>> My point is that such nature will depend of the fundamental principle we >>> agree on (if only for the sake of research: agreeing on axioms does not >>> mean knowing they are true of course (pace Craig). >>> >>> I am just saying that if comp is true, existence of physical object must >>> be explain by "machine's theology or self-referential logics". >>> >>> >>> Sure. But why is that any more interesting than, "If theism is true, >>> existence of physical objects must be explained by theist theology." ? >>> >>> >>> That correct, but less interesting because man fight on the theist >>> assumptions, which are hard to make precise. But comp is simpler, get a lot >>> of evidence, is believed/assumed by most scientist, and machine's theology >>> is a precise branch of math. Indeed we get testable consequences, which is >>> not clearly the case for the current theist theology. The gain is there. >>> >>> >>> >>> Note that any noun whatsoever can be inserted in place of "theism" and >>> it's still a true sentence. That's the beauty, and the failure, of logic. >>> >>> >>> Not really. Many people believe in comp *and* in primitive physical >>> object. A priori that seems plausible, but the UDA shows that this is not >>> plausible. It is not obvious that if comp is true, physics becomes reduced >>> to intensional number theory. You need to study the comp mind-body problem >>> to understand the necessity of that reduction, in that frame. >>> Logic fails anyway, that is why we need non logical axioms, like 0+x = >>> x, etc. >>> >>> Last post: >>> >>> That's why I wrote "what WE call the Moon". The meaning of terms in >>> language depends on agreed understanding of speaker and hearer. You can't >>> ostensively define the moon in your dreams to someone else. >>> >>> >>> I can, to someone else I am dreaming too. >>> I have no real problem with your "instrumentalist" definition of the >>> moon, but it is not enough for solving or progressing in the mind-body >>> problem, and in the question of the origin. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
