On 14 May 2014 13:29, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > On 5/13/2014 6:11 PM, LizR wrote: > > On 14 May 2014 11:15, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On 5/13/2014 4:06 PM, LizR wrote: >> >> On 14 May 2014 06:29, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On 5/12/2014 9:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> Turing **emulation** is only meaningful in the context of emulating one >>> part relative to another part that is not emulated, i.e. is "real". >>> >>> If you say so. We can still listen to the machine, and compare with >>> nature. >>> >>> When we compare with nature we find that some things exist and some >>> don't. >>> >> >> Like other worlds don't exist, or atoms don't exist ... the question >> about what exists hasn't been answered yet. Or indeed the question about >> what it means for something to exist. >> >> So is it your view that no matter what comp predicts it's not falsified >> because it may be true somewhere else? >> > > I find it hard to read that into what I wrote. (Unless "no matter what > comp predicts" is a slightly awkward, but potentially rather funny, pun?) > > But anyway, no that isn't my view. Either comp is true or it isn't, > which is to say, either consciousness is Turing emulable at some level, or > it isn't. And if it is, either there is some flaw in what Bruno derives > from that assumption, or there isn't. > > But the question is about how to test comp. Bruno has offered that we > should compare its predictions to observed physics. My view is that this > requires predictions about what happens here and now, where some things > happen and some don't. "Predictions" that something happens somewhere in > the multiverse don't satisfy my idea of testable. >
OK, fair enough. I only made my comment because ISTM that your earlier statement "some things exist and some don't" is applying a circular argument, because comp is all about what can be considered to exist. Back on topic, then, I believe Bruno has stated that comp retrodicts some parts of physics, but that he hasn't been able to extend it to the entirety of physics. So maybe that is the place to start, by extending it further and seeing if continues to retrodict known physics. That would act as a first stage test, at least (it would be nice if string theory could reach that point, for example). Assuming it got to the point where it retrodicted significant chunks of known physics, hopefully we'd then be in a position to see if it makes surprising predictions about the unknown parts. Comp isn't really a theory, so testing it is a bit problematic. It's "just" a logical argument which purports to show the consequences of taking seriously the idea that brains are Turing emulable. In that sense, it's more like the MWI, which purports to show the consequences of taking seriously the idea that nothing collapses the wave function. So they might be better described as meta-theories (or something). The question is whether meta-theories have any use. (I guess meta-theories include the "external reality hypothesis" so maybe the answer is yes, in some cases...well, assuming you guys really exist.) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
