On 5/13/2014 6:11 PM, LizR wrote:
On 14 May 2014 11:15, meekerdb <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 5/13/2014 4:06 PM, LizR wrote:
On 14 May 2014 06:29, meekerdb <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>
wrote:
On 5/12/2014 9:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Turing **emulation** is only meaningful in the context of emulating one
part
relative to another part that is not emulated, i.e. is "real".
If you say so. We can still listen to the machine, and compare with
nature.
When we compare with nature we find that some things exist and some
don't.
Like other worlds don't exist, or atoms don't exist ... the question about
what
exists hasn't been answered yet. Or indeed the question about what it means
for
something to exist.
So is it your view that no matter what comp predicts it's not falsified
because it
may be true somewhere else?
I find it hard to read that into what I wrote. (Unless "no matter what comp predicts" is
a slightly awkward, but potentially rather funny, pun?)
But anyway, no that isn't my view. Either comp is true or it isn't, which is to say,
either consciousness is Turing emulable at some level, or it isn't. And if it is, either
there is some flaw in what Bruno derives from that assumption, or there isn't.
But the question is about how to test comp. Bruno has offered that we should compare its
predictions to observed physics. My view is that this requires predictions about what
happens here and now, where some things happen and some don't. "Predictions" that
something happens somewhere in the multiverse don't satisfy my idea of testable.
Brent
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