And <> ?
On Fri, May 16, 2014 at 3:12 AM, Dennis Ochei <[email protected]>wrote: > What are these boxes [] supposed to mean? > > > On Fri, May 16, 2014 at 3:06 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> On 16 May 2014, at 05:23, meekerdb wrote: >> >> On 5/15/2014 5:10 PM, LizR wrote: >> >> On 16 May 2014 10:25, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On 5/15/2014 2:57 PM, LizR wrote: >>> >>>> Comp and the capsule theory of memory (and "Memento") suggest that a >>>> "person" is a series of person-moments, each of which is considered to last >>>> somewhere around 1/10th of a second (it could be longer or shorter and the >>>> idea would still hold) and assumed be the same person due to being linked >>>> by memories. >>>> >>> >>> I think there's an implicit assumption here that 'person-moments' >>> refers only to conscious thoughts. Subconscious thoughts, e.g. information >>> processing, may take longer and overlap and occur in different parts of the >>> brain. Just because they are not conscious thoughts, I don't think we can >>> ignore them. After all, acting from habit, "without thinking", is part of >>> a person's character. >> >> >> There isn't particularly an implicit assumption, because at some point >> the subconscious thoughts have conscious consequences, and *those* are >> part of the "person moment". The rest is like memory retrieval, for example >> - at some point the memory becomes conscious, and contributes to a PM. >> >> The implicit assumptions are that there is something important about >> consciousness (i.e. eliminative materialism >> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eliminative_materialism>is wrong), plus >> the idea that a PM (or OM) is a well defined notion. (Personally I'm >> agnostic on these points.) >> >> Generally this is considered to be because of physical continuity, but >>> comp-style thought experiments, at least, can deconstruct that idea. The >>> question is whether physical continuity has some bearing on identity, or is >>> just incidental (i.e. nature hasn't found any other way to do it). The >>> usual argument against the importance of physical continuity is that we >>> replace our cells - even our brain cells, apparently - every few >>> hours/days/years/whatever. >>> >> >> I don't think we replace our brain cells, but even if we do, isn't the >>> fact that they are replaced and the replacements are functionally similar >>> important to who we are? >>> >>> We do, apparently. >> http://www.theguardian.com/science/neurophilosophy/2012/feb/23/brain-new-cells-adult-neurogenesis >> >> (I know I could do with some new ones ... or do I mean "neurones" ?) >> >> I'm not sure why you asked that question, however. What would make you >> think that this ISN'T important to who we are? Obviously the capsule theory >> of identity says that functional similarity is important to who we are and >> that it's important on a far shorter timescale than brain cell replacement. >> (Or is this just another of those "buts" you like to throw in occasionally >> when not actually disagreeing? :) >> >>> >>> And more specifically, the atoms involved in a thought might go on to >>>> do something else - take part in a different thought, form a memory, pay a >>>> visit to the big toe... they're constantly being moved around, even without >>>> being lost from the system. >>>> >>> >>> Replacing atoms is not problematic since we think any two of the same >>> species are strictly identical. The question is whether the brain could be >>> implemented in some completely different medium and still instantiate the >>> same consciousness. I think it could only do so approximately - so it >>> might be close enough to fool your friends but still not be exactly you. >>> But does this imply, per Bruno's MGA, that no physical instantiation is >>> needed at all - just the existence in Platonia of those computations is >>> enough? I think the argument only proves that there could be another >>> world, in which you are instantiated in whatever is the physics of that >>> world, e.g. Turing machine computations. >>> >>> Imho this depends on whether comp and the capsule theory are correct >> - i.e. whether "yes doctor" is a good bet. It can only be a good bet if >> there is nothing supernatural involved, if physical continuity isn't >> important (which requires that eliminativism is wrong, I think), and if >> there aren't any infinities getting in the way of perfect duplication (e.g. >> if space-time is a continuum then exact duplication is unlikely, even in an >> infinite universe). >> >> >> And the doctor chooses the right level of substitution. Certainly we >> don't need exact substitution; we're not exactly the same from day to day, >> much less year to year. But I think we need to be embedded in a physical >> environment with which we interact. >> >> >> I think you need some reference to truth (p) or to some reality (<>t), >> but that is what is given in the nuance []p & p and []p & <>p. And if comp >> is true, that will provide your (probable) environment. If not, you are >> using "physical" as a kind of magic. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> If exact duplication of a conscious person is possible at any level, then >> it should be possible to instantiate the same person in other parts of an >> infinite universe, in other parts of the multiverse, in computer >> simulations, >> >> >> I agree, assuming that there is enough "world" also instantiated around >> him - which I suspect is A LOT. >> >> >> Even enough world*S*! >> >> >> >> and in Platonia (the last one assuming Bruno knows what he is talking >> about and computations exist in some useful sense in Platonia). >> >> >> I think that's technically true, but misleading because in the Platonia >> instantiation there will have to be a "world" instantiated there to. >> >> >> In the good proportion, we can hope. But in Platonia, you have also the >> brains in the vat, the dreams, etc. We must do the math to justify the >> "stable worlds" are winning the measure conficts.. >> >> >> >> >> >> I don't think a consciousness can exist in isolation (at least not >> without falling into do-loop) and so then we will have a simulated world >> with the instantiated consciousness in Platonia. But how is that different >> from a world outside Platonia? How is it different from this world? >> "Simulated" doesn't really denote any distinction when it refers to a whole >> world (ever read Stanilaw Lem's "The Cyberiad"?). >> >> >> Good point, and that is why we can start of arithmetic or of the UD*. But >> we must still justify the "worlds" and their stability. It works, as we get >> quickly non trivial proposition physical law of the observable. >> >> I realize that you argument for environment is quite similar to the move >> from []p to p or <>p. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> Brent >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the >> Google Groups "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this topic, visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/S5Qi3Q_2TTI/unsubscribe >> . >> To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to >> [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > > > -- > Dennis Ochei > Baylor College of Medicine '18 > Duke University '13 > Neuroscience/Computer Science, Music 3♭ > -- Dennis Ochei Baylor College of Medicine '18 Duke University '13 Neuroscience/Computer Science, Music 3♭ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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