On 16 May 2014, at 05:23, meekerdb wrote:
On 5/15/2014 5:10 PM, LizR wrote:
On 16 May 2014 10:25, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
On 5/15/2014 2:57 PM, LizR wrote:
Comp and the capsule theory of memory (and "Memento") suggest that
a "person" is a series of person-moments, each of which is
considered to last somewhere around 1/10th of a second (it could be
longer or shorter and the idea would still hold) and assumed be the
same person due to being linked by memories.
I think there's an implicit assumption here that 'person-moments'
refers only to conscious thoughts. Subconscious thoughts, e.g.
information processing, may take longer and overlap and occur in
different parts of the brain. Just because they are not conscious
thoughts, I don't think we can ignore them. After all, acting from
habit, "without thinking", is part of a person's character.
There isn't particularly an implicit assumption, because at some
point the subconscious thoughts have conscious consequences, and
those are part of the "person moment". The rest is like memory
retrieval, for example - at some point the memory becomes
conscious, and contributes to a PM.
The implicit assumptions are that there is something important
about consciousness (i.e. eliminative materialism is wrong), plus
the idea that a PM (or OM) is a well defined notion. (Personally
I'm agnostic on these points.)
Generally this is considered to be because of physical continuity,
but comp-style thought experiments, at least, can deconstruct that
idea. The question is whether physical continuity has some bearing
on identity, or is just incidental (i.e. nature hasn't found any
other way to do it). The usual argument against the importance of
physical continuity is that we replace our cells - even our brain
cells, apparently - every few hours/days/years/whatever.
I don't think we replace our brain cells, but even if we do, isn't
the fact that they are replaced and the replacements are
functionally similar important to who we are?
We do, apparently.
http://www.theguardian.com/science/neurophilosophy/2012/feb/23/brain-new-cells-adult-neurogenesis
(I know I could do with some new ones ... or do I mean "neurones" ?)
I'm not sure why you asked that question, however. What would make
you think that this ISN'T important to who we are? Obviously the
capsule theory of identity says that functional similarity is
important to who we are and that it's important on a far shorter
timescale than brain cell replacement. (Or is this just another of
those "buts" you like to throw in occasionally when not actually
disagreeing? :)
And more specifically, the atoms involved in a thought might go on
to do something else - take part in a different thought, form a
memory, pay a visit to the big toe... they're constantly being
moved around, even without being lost from the system.
Replacing atoms is not problematic since we think any two of the
same species are strictly identical. The question is
whether the brain could be implemented in some completely different
medium and still instantiate the same consciousness. I think it
could only do so approximately - so it might be close enough to
fool your friends but still not be exactly you. But does this
imply, per Bruno's MGA, that no physical instantiation is needed at
all - just the existence in Platonia of those computations is
enough? I think the argument only proves that there could be
another world, in which you are instantiated in whatever is the
physics of that world, e.g. Turing machine computations.
Imho this depends on whether comp and the capsule theory are
correct - i.e. whether "yes doctor" is a good bet. It can only be a
good bet if there is nothing supernatural involved, if physical
continuity isn't important (which requires that eliminativism is
wrong, I think), and if there aren't any infinities getting in the
way of perfect duplication (e.g. if space-time is a continuum then
exact duplication is unlikely, even in an infinite universe).
And the doctor chooses the right level of substitution. Certainly
we don't need exact substitution; we're not exactly the same from
day to day, much less year to year. But I think we need to be
embedded in a physical environment with which we interact.
I think you need some reference to truth (p) or to some reality (<>t),
but that is what is given in the nuance []p & p and []p & <>p. And if
comp is true, that will provide your (probable) environment. If not,
you are using "physical" as a kind of magic.
If exact duplication of a conscious person is possible at any
level, then it should be possible to instantiate the same person in
other parts of an infinite universe, in other parts of the
multiverse, in computer simulations,
I agree, assuming that there is enough "world" also instantiated
around him - which I suspect is A LOT.
Even enough worldS!
and in Platonia (the last one assuming Bruno knows what he is
talking about and computations exist in some useful sense in
Platonia).
I think that's technically true, but misleading because in the
Platonia instantiation there will have to be a "world" instantiated
there to.
In the good proportion, we can hope. But in Platonia, you have also
the brains in the vat, the dreams, etc. We must do the math to justify
the "stable worlds" are winning the measure conficts..
I don't think a consciousness can exist in isolation (at least not
without falling into do-loop) and so then we will have a simulated
world with the instantiated consciousness in Platonia. But how is
that different from a world outside Platonia? How is it different
from this world? "Simulated" doesn't really denote any distinction
when it refers to a whole world (ever read Stanilaw Lem's "The
Cyberiad"?).
Good point, and that is why we can start of arithmetic or of the UD*.
But we must still justify the "worlds" and their stability. It works,
as we get quickly non trivial proposition physical law of the
observable.
I realize that you argument for environment is quite similar to the
move from []p to p or <>p.
Bruno
Brent
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