What are these boxes [] supposed to mean?
On Fri, May 16, 2014 at 3:06 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 16 May 2014, at 05:23, meekerdb wrote: > > On 5/15/2014 5:10 PM, LizR wrote: > > On 16 May 2014 10:25, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On 5/15/2014 2:57 PM, LizR wrote: >> >>> Comp and the capsule theory of memory (and "Memento") suggest that a >>> "person" is a series of person-moments, each of which is considered to last >>> somewhere around 1/10th of a second (it could be longer or shorter and the >>> idea would still hold) and assumed be the same person due to being linked >>> by memories. >>> >> >> I think there's an implicit assumption here that 'person-moments' refers >> only to conscious thoughts. Subconscious thoughts, e.g. information >> processing, may take longer and overlap and occur in different parts of the >> brain. Just because they are not conscious thoughts, I don't think we can >> ignore them. After all, acting from habit, "without thinking", is part of >> a person's character. > > > There isn't particularly an implicit assumption, because at some point > the subconscious thoughts have conscious consequences, and *those* are > part of the "person moment". The rest is like memory retrieval, for example > - at some point the memory becomes conscious, and contributes to a PM. > > The implicit assumptions are that there is something important about > consciousness (i.e. eliminative materialism > <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eliminative_materialism>is wrong), plus the > idea that a PM (or OM) is a well defined notion. (Personally I'm agnostic > on these points.) > > Generally this is considered to be because of physical continuity, but >> comp-style thought experiments, at least, can deconstruct that idea. The >> question is whether physical continuity has some bearing on identity, or is >> just incidental (i.e. nature hasn't found any other way to do it). The >> usual argument against the importance of physical continuity is that we >> replace our cells - even our brain cells, apparently - every few >> hours/days/years/whatever. >> > > I don't think we replace our brain cells, but even if we do, isn't the >> fact that they are replaced and the replacements are functionally similar >> important to who we are? >> >> We do, apparently. > http://www.theguardian.com/science/neurophilosophy/2012/feb/23/brain-new-cells-adult-neurogenesis > > (I know I could do with some new ones ... or do I mean "neurones" ?) > > I'm not sure why you asked that question, however. What would make you > think that this ISN'T important to who we are? Obviously the capsule theory > of identity says that functional similarity is important to who we are and > that it's important on a far shorter timescale than brain cell replacement. > (Or is this just another of those "buts" you like to throw in occasionally > when not actually disagreeing? :) > >> >> And more specifically, the atoms involved in a thought might go on to do >>> something else - take part in a different thought, form a memory, pay a >>> visit to the big toe... they're constantly being moved around, even without >>> being lost from the system. >>> >> >> Replacing atoms is not problematic since we think any two of the same >> species are strictly identical. The question is whether the brain could be >> implemented in some completely different medium and still instantiate the >> same consciousness. I think it could only do so approximately - so it >> might be close enough to fool your friends but still not be exactly you. >> But does this imply, per Bruno's MGA, that no physical instantiation is >> needed at all - just the existence in Platonia of those computations is >> enough? I think the argument only proves that there could be another >> world, in which you are instantiated in whatever is the physics of that >> world, e.g. Turing machine computations. >> >> Imho this depends on whether comp and the capsule theory are correct - > i.e. whether "yes doctor" is a good bet. It can only be a good bet if there > is nothing supernatural involved, if physical continuity isn't important > (which requires that eliminativism is wrong, I think), and if there aren't > any infinities getting in the way of perfect duplication (e.g. if > space-time is a continuum then exact duplication is unlikely, even in an > infinite universe). > > > And the doctor chooses the right level of substitution. Certainly we > don't need exact substitution; we're not exactly the same from day to day, > much less year to year. But I think we need to be embedded in a physical > environment with which we interact. > > > I think you need some reference to truth (p) or to some reality (<>t), but > that is what is given in the nuance []p & p and []p & <>p. And if comp is > true, that will provide your (probable) environment. If not, you are using > "physical" as a kind of magic. > > > > > > > > > If exact duplication of a conscious person is possible at any level, then > it should be possible to instantiate the same person in other parts of an > infinite universe, in other parts of the multiverse, in computer > simulations, > > > I agree, assuming that there is enough "world" also instantiated around > him - which I suspect is A LOT. > > > Even enough world*S*! > > > > and in Platonia (the last one assuming Bruno knows what he is talking > about and computations exist in some useful sense in Platonia). > > > I think that's technically true, but misleading because in the Platonia > instantiation there will have to be a "world" instantiated there to. > > > In the good proportion, we can hope. But in Platonia, you have also the > brains in the vat, the dreams, etc. We must do the math to justify the > "stable worlds" are winning the measure conficts.. > > > > > > I don't think a consciousness can exist in isolation (at least not without > falling into do-loop) and so then we will have a simulated world with the > instantiated consciousness in Platonia. But how is that different from a > world outside Platonia? How is it different from this world? "Simulated" > doesn't really denote any distinction when it refers to a whole world (ever > read Stanilaw Lem's "The Cyberiad"?). > > > Good point, and that is why we can start of arithmetic or of the UD*. But > we must still justify the "worlds" and their stability. It works, as we get > quickly non trivial proposition physical law of the observable. > > I realize that you argument for environment is quite similar to the move > from []p to p or <>p. > > Bruno > > > > > Brent > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the > Google Groups "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this topic, visit > https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/S5Qi3Q_2TTI/unsubscribe. > To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to > [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- Dennis Ochei Baylor College of Medicine '18 Duke University '13 Neuroscience/Computer Science, Music 3♭ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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