I'd be very grateful if you could elaborate. What precisely is comp? That the universe is computable? I take physicalism pretty seriously, but of course it could be wrong or incomplete, but i think it places a limit on what is knowable.
On Friday, May 16, 2014, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 16 May 2014, at 02:13, LizR wrote: > > On 16 May 2014 10:36, Dennis Ochei > <[email protected]<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');> > > wrote: > >> Right Liz, the question is, does the memory link actually signify the >> presence of the same local I? Or does each moment have its own I? Or do all >> moments everywhere share a single global I? If there are local I's, then >> how are their boundaries drawn? > > > Yes, those are indeed the questions. Especially the last one. I don't > think we're in a position to answer them (or if we ever will be...) > >> >> All of these questions are epiphenomenal from the point of view of >> physics so I fear there is no way for me to decide. All my observations and >> brain processes will be identical no matter which hypothesis is true. >> >> Only from physics which isn't derivable from psychology via comp, I > suspect, so Bruno may have something to say about this. > > > Not sure Dennis use seriously physicalism though, but in principle you are > right, and I already said something. > > Dennis Ochei seems to believe in primary physics (like all aristotelians), > and comp, but they does not work well together, and leads to person and > consciousness elimination (which I take as total nonsense). > > Bruno > > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to > [email protected]<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','everything-list%[email protected]');> > . > To post to this group, send email to > [email protected]<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');> > . > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the > Google Groups "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this topic, visit > https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/S5Qi3Q_2TTI/unsubscribe. > To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to > [email protected]<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','everything-list%[email protected]');> > . > To post to this group, send email to > [email protected]<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');> > . > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- Sent from Gmail Mobile -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
