On 28 May 2014, at 03:24, LizR wrote:
As far as I can see Bruno has a logical argument which happens to
segue into a theory of physics. To disprove it, one merely needs to
show that either his premises or his argument is wrong...
Not exactly. The premise can be wrong, true, or indeterminate, without
making the reasoning invalid. In fact, in the classical frame, a
refutation of the premise would make the reasoning vacuously valid.
Now that reasoning shows a means to refute the premise: basically:
compare the physics found in the head of all universal Turing machine,
and if it is contradicted by nature then the premise are false (or I,
or we, are dreaming or live in a second-order reality)
On 28 May 2014 14:12, <[email protected]> wrote:
On Wednesday, May 28, 2014 2:24:39 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:
As far as I can see Bruno has a logical argument which happens to
segue into a theory of physics. To disprove it, one merely needs to
show that either his premises or his argument is wrong...
I don't agree with you about that, but for point of order, I haven't
gone down that road anyway. He's wrong about falsification. I did
try to drop it. I shall probably try again.
Bruno may well be wrong about falsification. I haven't tried to
follow the arguments you and he have had on the subject, or not very
much. I know Bruno has said he does have a theory of everything,
which is subject to falsification... which it seems to me is an
awful lot to derive from the idea that consciousness arises from
computation ... but I guess some relatively simple idea can
sometimes lead to a huge theory ... maybe when (or if) I get to
grips with the MGA and the logic involved in deriving some features
of physics from comp, I might have something more sensible to say on
the matter,
It is always a relief to see that some people can stay rational on the
fundamental matter.
It is not always easy to distinguish genuine non understanding from
the nitpicking some philosophers seemed to be trained for.
Then ghibbsa seems to believe that computationalism is false, so he
wants it not even refutable, as it gives sense that it might be true.
I don't know.
John Clark is clearer in his "refutation" of step three, where
everyone can see that no matter he get his conclusion, at some point
he has to confuse the first person discourse with the third person
discourse (when seeing this, Clark usually said "don't come back on 1p
and 3p again (mixed with some vulgar word).
I can understand the comp "shock" for people unaware of Everett, but
in this list people are aware of Everett, or of QM without collapse.
Without the Everett embedding of the subject in the physical reality
is prolonged into a embedding of the subject in the arithmetical
reality.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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