On 30 May 2014, at 02:53, Russell Standish wrote:
On Wed, May 28, 2014 at 08:15:30PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 28 May 2014, at 03:24, LizR wrote:
As far as I can see Bruno has a logical argument which happens to
segue into a theory of physics. To disprove it, one merely needs
to show that either his premises or his argument is wrong...
Not exactly. The premise can be wrong, true, or indeterminate,
without making the reasoning invalid. In fact, in the classical
frame, a refutation of the premise would make the reasoning
vacuously valid. Now that reasoning shows a means to refute the
premise: basically: compare the physics found in the head of all
universal Turing machine, and if it is contradicted by nature then
the premise are false (or I, or we, are dreaming or live in a
second-order reality)
This last qualification is disturbing, as it would appear remove the
possibility of falsification of COMP.
I see you did not follow my thread with Quentin (or Brett Hall a much
longer time ago). No problem. It is a delicate point.
But it is also a relatively "trivial" (conceptually simple) point,
embedded already in the "Dream argument" and that "lucidity" is a
relative notion, even a graded one, like in "Inception" (a less nice
movie by the author of "the prestige" (in my opinion and taste)).
But before we go that far, why would COMP predict a different sort of
physics for "dreaming" or "second order reality"?
If only to account of dreams and video games. If comp is true, and the
level enough high, I can emulate you in a computer together with an
environment disobeying the physical laws.
Suppose now that you want to test if you are in my video game, (second
order dream) or in the physical reality (first order "dream", the one
emerging from *all* computations going through your state. Well, if
the laws of physics that you can "observe" in the virtual environment
differs from the one you extract from comp, you can know that you
belong to a second order simulation (like a dream of video game), or
you can also abandon comp. Those do not obey physics, but you keep
existing (with the normal probability) in them, because they inherit
the normality of first order physical reality which comes from *all*
worlds/computations (which obey S4Grz1, or Z1*, or X1*).
If not, we would not been able to play with a video game, the
consistency selection would eliminate *all* white rabbits, even the
one in Alice in Wonderland!
So if QL differs from comp-QL, which is testable, we know that we are
in a Bostrom-like simulation or that comp is false, or that the
classical theory/definition of knowledge is false (which I am not sure
makes sense).
But this is true for all physical tests. We can only say that the LARC
has confirmed the existence of the boson, or we are dreaming or in an
emulation of the standard theory in some unknown "real theory". So it
is not a so big weakening of the falsification of comp, as it is
implicit in all experimental science. It is related to the fact that
with respect to the normal computations, the universal beings emerging
from that can still lie to each others.
The way QL differs from the comp-QL(s) might provide some information
on how to proceed to decide if comp is false, or if we belong to a
virtual machine made by our descendents, à-la Boström.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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