On 14 June 2014 12:26, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > On 6/13/2014 4:48 PM, LizR wrote: > > On 14 June 2014 10:01, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> Consequently, neither computation, nor the epistemological states it >>> emulates, are dispensable (i.e. fully reducible) in this schema. >>> >> >> It's not clear what "emulates" means. I think Bruno proposes that >> arithmetical computation actually instantiates modal states like belief. >> But I think that may be stretching the meaning of "belief". If belief is >> defined in terms of propensity to act certain ways in certain contexts, >> then it seems it can be physically instantiated too. >> > > Yes, as a propensity to act in a certain way, a belief is doubtless a > complex data structure. (But if comp is correct it's a finite one.) > > Of course saying "physically instantiated" is assuming what you're > trying to prove. > > > Proof is for logicians and mathematicians who come armed with assumptions > they call "axioms". >
That's right, which is why maths and logic appear to be the only things we can know about for sure. The question is whether that has any ontological implications. I don't know of any way to prove that it does or doesn't, which is why I remain agnostic. > > "Physically instantiated" isn't even a sentence, so you must be referring > to "If belief is defined in terms of propensity to act certain ways in > certain contexts, then it seems it can be physically instantiated too." I > don't think that's just an assumption, it's an inductive inference given > some ostensive definitions. > Do you want me to wear my fingers out? Obviously I'm referring to the quote immediately above, that's why it's there! Anyway, if that's an inductive inference it appears to be one that assumes the materialist position, unless you are being explicitly agnostic on what "physically" means (but most people who use it like that aren't, so I'd expect you to say so). The materialist position is the starting point of comp, so it will trip over the reversal unless you can point out where Bruno's gone wrong. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
