OK looks like I will have to find more time to read the small print, i.e. all the posts on here, or give up trying. Well, unless you'd care to summarise the reasons you don't find Bruno's arguments very persuasive (On days with an "R" I could do with some support for my instinctive feeling that "That can't be right! But I can't see why not...")
On 14 June 2014 15:32, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > On 6/13/2014 5:45 PM, LizR wrote: > > On 14 June 2014 12:26, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On 6/13/2014 4:48 PM, LizR wrote: >> >> On 14 June 2014 10:01, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> Consequently, neither computation, nor the epistemological states it >>>> emulates, are dispensable (i.e. fully reducible) in this schema. >>>> >>> >>> It's not clear what "emulates" means. I think Bruno proposes that >>> arithmetical computation actually instantiates modal states like belief. >>> But I think that may be stretching the meaning of "belief". If belief is >>> defined in terms of propensity to act certain ways in certain contexts, >>> then it seems it can be physically instantiated too. >>> >> >> Yes, as a propensity to act in a certain way, a belief is doubtless a >> complex data structure. (But if comp is correct it's a finite one.) >> >> Of course saying "physically instantiated" is assuming what you're >> trying to prove. >> >> >> Proof is for logicians and mathematicians who come armed with >> assumptions they call "axioms". >> > > That's right, which is why maths and logic appear to be the only things > we can know about for sure. The question is whether that has any > ontological implications. I don't know of any way to prove that it does or > doesn't, which is why I remain agnostic. > >> >> "Physically instantiated" isn't even a sentence, so you must be referring >> to "If belief is defined in terms of propensity to act certain ways in >> certain contexts, then it seems it can be physically instantiated too." I >> don't think that's just an assumption, it's an inductive inference given >> some ostensive definitions. >> > > Do you want me to wear my fingers out? Obviously I'm referring to the > quote immediately above, that's why it's there! Anyway, if that's an > inductive inference it appears to be one that assumes the materialist > position, unless you are being explicitly agnostic on what "physically" > means (but most people who use it like that aren't, so I'd expect you to > say so). > > > I thought I'd been pretty clear that it's ill defined, a point on which I > agree with Bruno. I tried to define it in the exchange with David, but he > seemed to reject my definition and just assumed everybody knows what it > means. > > > The materialist position is the starting point of comp, so it will trip > over the reversal unless you can point out where Bruno's gone wrong. > > > I wrote several paragraphs on why I don't find Bruno's arguments very > persuasive. > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
