On 14 June 2014 04:32, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > I thought I'd been pretty clear that it's ill defined, a point on which I > agree with Bruno. I tried to define it in the exchange with David, but he > seemed to reject my definition and just assumed everybody knows what it > means.
As I recall you proposed that physical might equate to sharable, in an operational sense, and indeed I wouldn't demur from that as an operational definition. But the question I was focusing on was the mode of derivation of that particular set of operationally definable entities and relations from whatever universe of possibility is postulated by the underlying theory. And it is here that I would contrast Bruno's approach with, say, string theory or the MUH, in that the mode of derivation relies on "epistemological logic" from the bottom up, as it were. This is why for me, if it can indeed be made to work, such an approach seems to take more than a step or two towards explicating the co-emergence of "matter" and "mind" from the computational universe of possibility. In many, if not most, other formulations, the latter is treated more like a metaphysical rabbit that is assumed to pop out of the hat "just in time", so to speak, purely as an epiphenomenon of physical processes. David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
