On 21 June 2014 16:00, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote: > On Fri, Jun 20, 2014 at 9:14 PM, LizR <lizj...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> >>> >>> that doesn't actually alter the logic of the argument, which is >>>> only concerned with what he reports in his diary. >>>> >>> >>> >> He? 3 people are keeping a diary, one writes "I'm still here in >>> Helsinki and nothing has happened, maybe the matter transmitting machine >>> broke down". Another writes in his diary "I'm in Moscow and it's dark and >>> snowing". And the third writes in his diary "I'm in Washington and it's >>> bright and sunny". So which one is Mr. He? >>> >>> > They all are, surely? >> > > If so then the probability that Mr. He will see Moscow is 1.0 not 0.5 as > Bruno says. >
I agree, but I don't see that it invalidates his argument. In practice Mr H and the quantum physicist both assign probabilities retroactively, and from that perspective 0.5 makes sense. Hence they both reason (incorrectly) that the probability must have been 0.5 beforehand, because they have what I suppose could be called a common sense intuition that "they" will only end up in one branch. This is wrong, according to the MWI, but it's very hard not to think like that. For example I know that the MWI says I will do all sorts of bizarre things in the next second, including spontaneously being teleported to Helsinki - but I act just as though I only have one future. However I don't see how any of this invalidates Bruno's argument. The probability assignment question is only a psychological matter, not something that has any fundamental importance to Bruno's thesis. As far as I can see Bruno is only using it to illustrate that duplication gives the effect of apparent indeterminacy, just as it does in the MWI. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
