On Sun, Jun 22, 2014 at 7:15 AM, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: >> the probability that Mr. He will see Moscow is 1.0 not 0.5 as Bruno >> says. >> > > > I agree, >
Good. > but > But? There is no "but", Bruno predicted 0.5, we observe 1.0, game over. > I don't see that it invalidates his argument. In practice Mr H and the > quantum physicist both assign probabilities retroactively, > Since they both involve probabilities the 2 experiments must be repeated many times to test the underlying theoretical predictions, the 2 slit experiment to test the MWI and Bruno's thought experiment to test his Universal Dance Association theory. When you repeat the 2 slit experiment you find that sometimes the electron went through slit X and sometimes it did not, but no matter how often you repeat Bruno's thought experiment you ALWAYS find that Mr. You (or Mrs. You) sees Moscow. The results of these experiments tell us that the MWI might be true but Bruno's Universal Dance Association theory is definitely wrong because it made the wrong prediction. > > I know that the MWI says I will do all sorts of bizarre things in the > next second > And Mrs. I will indeed do all sorts of bizarre things in the next second. > including spontaneously being teleported to Helsinki > True, although Mrs I also never saw Helsinki and was instead spontaneously being teleported to Moscow. This would be a very odd situation but it is NOT a logical paradox because Mrs. I HAS BEEN DUPLICATED. > but I act just as though I only have one future. > Acting as if you have only one future is not the same as having only one future, that's why the MWI isn't intuitively obvious to everybody. > The probability assignment question is only a psychological matter > Until about 90 years ago physicists would say that all probability is just a psychological matter, it's just a measure of our ignorance; then they said probability is inherent to the thing itself, but if the MWI turns out to be true then probability goes back to being subjective. > Bruno is only using it to illustrate that duplication gives the effect of > apparent indeterminacy, just as it does in the MWI. > No, Bruno has said over and over that he has found some new sort of indeterminacy that is fundamentally different from Turing style indeterminacy or Heisenberg style indeterminacy, I say it's just the same old indeterminacy. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
