On 22 Jun 2014, at 19:49, John Clark wrote:
On Sun, Jun 22, 2014 at 7:15 AM, LizR <lizj...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> the probability that Mr. He will see Moscow is 1.0 not 0.5 as
Bruno says.
> I agree,
Good.
> but
But? There is no "but", Bruno predicted 0.5, we observe 1.0, game
over.
OK. That would be a good exercise for Liz. Showing that there is a 1-3
confusion here (is it volontarily?).
I predict only "0.5" in most diaries. The prediction is about the
first person experience, as seen from the first person themselves,
which are the one writing either M, or W, and never both in their
histories. Bruno predicts 1.0 only in the 3p-diary.
I told you before, you don't do the thought experience. You put your
foot out of the shoes after the duplication. Both the W-guy and the M-
guy get one bit of information from their first person experience. If
a population of machines are duplicated, the FPI is locally third
person sharable, like in QM.
Bruno
> I don't see that it invalidates his argument. In practice Mr H and
the quantum physicist both assign probabilities retroactively,
Since they both involve probabilities the 2 experiments must be
repeated many times to test the underlying theoretical predictions,
the 2 slit experiment to test the MWI and Bruno's thought experiment
to test his Universal Dance Association theory. When you repeat the
2 slit experiment you find that sometimes the electron went through
slit X and sometimes it did not, but no matter how often you repeat
Bruno's thought experiment you ALWAYS find that Mr. You (or Mrs.
You) sees Moscow. The results of these experiments tell us that the
MWI might be true but Bruno's Universal Dance Association theory is
definitely wrong because it made the wrong prediction.
> I know that the MWI says I will do all sorts of bizarre things in
the next second
And Mrs. I will indeed do all sorts of bizarre things in the next
second.
> including spontaneously being teleported to Helsinki
True, although Mrs I also never saw Helsinki and was instead
spontaneously being teleported to Moscow. This would be a very odd
situation but it is NOT a logical paradox because Mrs. I HAS BEEN
DUPLICATED.
> but I act just as though I only have one future.
Acting as if you have only one future is not the same as having only
one future, that's why the MWI isn't intuitively obvious to everybody.
> The probability assignment question is only a psychological matter
Until about 90 years ago physicists would say that all probability
is just a psychological matter, it's just a measure of our
ignorance; then they said probability is inherent to the thing
itself, but if the MWI turns out to be true then probability goes
back to being subjective.
> Bruno is only using it to illustrate that duplication gives the
effect of apparent indeterminacy, just as it does in the MWI.
No, Bruno has said over and over that he has found some new sort of
indeterminacy that is fundamentally different from Turing style
indeterminacy or
Heisenberg style indeterminacy, I say it's just the same old
indeterminacy.
John K Clark
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