On Mon, Jun 23, 2014 at 2:03 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
>> Predictions are great for validating scientific theories but >> predictions, good bad or ugly, have absolutely nothing to do with >> establishing a sense of self. >> > > > We use the usual sense of self defined by the "yes doctor". > Nobody does that, even you don't do that to define yourself except when you're arguing philosophy on the internet. If you made a prediction yesterday about what would happen today that turned out to be wrong you don't feel like you've ceased to exist, you just feel like you made a mistake and continue to believe you're Bruno Marchal because you still remember being Bruno Marchal yesterday. There is no way to define yourself from the present into the future, you can only define yourself from the present into the past; you know who you were but you don't know who you will be. > >> And not that it matters but even your prediction is wrong; each and >> every time you repeat your experiment Mr. You sees Moscow, not half the >> time, ALWAYS. >> > > > Just iterate the experiences. > There is no choice, if probability is to be derived its got to be iterated, and no matter how often you iterate it Mr. You ALWAYS sees Moscow only AND Mr. You ALWAYS sees Washington only; and a logician should know that this is not a paradox because Mr. You HAS BEEN DUPLICATED. It's your thought experiment and you're the one who invented the duplicating machine, but it's clear you haven't thought through what that really means. > > Once done the W-guy admits seeing only W and [ blah blah] > There is no need for a "and", you already know all you need to know. This entire exercise is about finding out what Mr. You will or will not see, if Mr. W is not Mr. You then there is no point of even asking what Mr. W sees, it's irrelevant. The fact that Bruno Marchal thinks it would be productive to ask Mr. W anything at all logically means that Bruno Marchal thinks that Mr. W is Mr. You; thus if Mr. W ALWAYS sees Washington then the probability Mr. You will see Washington is 1.0 not 0.5. > >> not M, and the M-guy admits having seen M, and not W. They wrote each a >> different letter than the doppelganger. >> > > > If you iterate the experiences 10 times, only one guy among the 2^10 > one will say that has the story "MMMMMMMMMM". > And that one guy is Mr. You. Yes, it's perfectly true that other guys have seen different sequences and those other guys are not each other, but they are all Mr. You because they all remember being the Helsinki Man even if different things have happened to them after the duplication. But so what? As I keep saying this is a very odd situation because we're not accustomed with dealing with duplicating machines, but it is NOT a logical paradox because Mr. You HAS BEEN DUPLICATED. No doubt you will come back and say that if there are difficulties in your theory the same ones exist in the MW interpretation of the 2 slit experiment but this is untrue for two reasons: 1) In the 2 slit experiment it's always crystal clear who Mr. You is, but in Bruno Marchal's thought experiment the pronouns "You" and "he" and "I" are thrown around like confetti (apparently Bruno just can't stop himself) without giving a single thought to who those personal pronouns refer to. 2) The 2 slit experiment is about what a observer will see, Bruno's thought experiment is about the sense of self of the observer. And please don't come back with your standard "you confuse the 1p from the 3P", I am not confused , I am saying that both the 1P and the 3P are adjectives and I am saying that atoms are generic, so if the arrangement of atoms are duplicated the adjectives are duplicated too; in other words the machine duplicates the structure and ALL the perspectives also, first second and third. If you want to argue against my ideas then say no machine can duplicate the immortal soul, I think such an argument is wrong but at least it's coherent, but please don't tell me that although I'm a grown man and I'm smart enough to tie my shoes all by myself I have never before noticed that there is a difference between the first person and the third person point of view. > > From their first person point of view, the 2^10 - 1 others knows you > were wrong > No they do not, not if they're logical; they know that they are not the only Mr. You around and that although they personally may have seen only Moscow and not Washington the Helsinki man has seen both. But then again I was sick at home on the day my first grade English teacher explained the difference between the first person and the third so no doubt I'm confused about that. > > correct for the 3-view on the 1-views, but false for the 1-views as see > from that 1-view. > It is not false if the duplicating machine duplicates EVERYTHING including duplicating the points views, and the views of the views, and the views of the views of the views, and the ... All you need to do to win this argument is to tell me what law of physics prevents a duplication machine from doing that, even in theory. >> Are you talking about the first person in Helsinki, the first person in >> Moscow or the first person in Washington? >> >> > > The prediction is done by the first person in Helsinki, before the > duplication. > Not that predictions are of the slightest importance in this matter but if we're talking about the Helsinki Man (aka the man currently seeing Helsinki) and the Helsinki Man is destroyed after the duplication then the correct prediction about what the Helsinki Man will see would obviously be absolutely nothing. But if the Helsinki Man is NOT destroyed after the duplication then the correct prediction about what the Helsinki Man will see would be Helsinki. If on the other hand we're talking about what Mr. You will see (and yes from Mr. You's first person perspective) then the correct prediction would be Moscow AND Washington and perhaps Helsinki. > > You keep asking me this, when this is made clear in the paper, in the > post, etc. > Clear? Even the referent to the many many personal pronouns in your posts are not clear even though establishing who is who is key to the entire business; you don't even try, I don't know if you're just lazy or if you know that nebulous pronouns are the only thing that holds your theory together. The only thing that is clear is that you believe that there is *something* that a duplicating machine that operates according to the laws of physics would fail to duplicate. As for me I don't believe in the soul. > >> It's true that Mr. M doesn't see both cities, and Mr. W doesn't see >> both cities, but Mr. You does. >> >> > > In the 3p views > In ALL views! Does Mr. M have a 1-P view or does he not? John Clark thinks yes. > > but as I said and explain with the diary, only mr M and mr W are > interviewed. > And as I explained Bruno Marchal must already believe that both Mr. M and Mr. W are both Mr. You, otherwise there would be no point in interviewing them. > > You feel to be one in one city, and still be the guy you were in > Helsinki. > Yes, Mr. You in Moscow and Mr. You in Washington both feel that way. > > You > Who's that? > write W, *or* M in your diary. > In who's diary? Mr. You has written W in Mr. You's diary AND Mr. You has written M in Mr. You's diary; and if you don't believe me I can prove it, both diaries are right here. > > you confuse [...] > STOP, don't tell me let me guess, I confuse the 1-views and the 3-view on the 1-views. > > [...] the 1-views and the 3-view on the 1-views > Yep I was right. So I guess that's it, that rubber stamp phrase you've repeated in nearly every post you've ever written is the one and only defense you have of your ideas. You actually believe that there are human beings on this planet, in fact you're in communication with one, who thinks the difference between the 1P and the 3P is confusing. But are you really sure that's the best you can come up with? > > You say "always M", what about the guy who see "always W"? > You tell me, what about the guy who only sees W ? If Mr. You has been duplicated then it shouldn't be any great surprise that Mr. You can see W only AND Mr. You can see M only. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
