On 25 Jun 2014, at 17:06, John Clark wrote:
On Mon, Jun 23, 2014 at 2:03 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
>> Predictions are great for validating scientific theories but
predictions, good bad or ugly, have absolutely nothing to do with
establishing a sense of self.
> We use the usual sense of self defined by the "yes doctor".
Nobody does that, even you don't do that to define yourself except
when you're arguing philosophy on the internet.
?
We use that all the time. I do it just now to reply to you.
If you made a prediction yesterday about what would happen today
that turned out to be wrong you don't feel like you've ceased to
exist, you just feel like you made a mistake and continue to believe
you're Bruno Marchal because you still remember being Bruno Marchal
yesterday.
Exactly. But this amkes my point.
There is no way to define yourself from the present into the future,
you can only define yourself from the present into the past; you
know who you were but you don't know who you will be.
We need no more that to make sense to "I survive this or that
operation at the hospital".
>> And not that it matters but even your prediction is wrong; each
and every time you repeat your experiment Mr. You sees Moscow, not
half the time, ALWAYS.
> Just iterate the experiences.
There is no choice, if probability is to be derived its got to be
iterated, and no matter how often you iterate it Mr. You ALWAYS sees
Moscow only AND Mr. You ALWAYS sees Washington only;
This contradicts 2^n - 1 diaries (which by definition are the first
person discourses of the survivors).
The WWWWW-john Clark will be force to change its mind, unless he
confuse "him" see in the 3p view, and "him" as the owner of this or
that particular diary.
and a logician should know that this is not a paradox because Mr.
You HAS BEEN DUPLICATED. It's your thought experiment and you're the
one who invented the duplicating machine, but it's clear you
haven't thought through what that really means.
> Once done the W-guy admits seeing only W and [ blah blah]
There is no need for a "and", you already know all you need to know.
This entire exercise is about finding out what Mr. You will or will
not see, if Mr. W is not Mr. You then there is no point of even
asking what Mr. W sees, it's irrelevant. The fact that Bruno Marchal
thinks it would be productive to ask Mr. W anything at all logically
means that Bruno Marchal thinks that Mr. W is Mr. You; thus if Mr.
W ALWAYS sees Washington then the probability Mr. You will see
Washington is 1.0 not 0.5.
Both the W-person and the M-person are the H-person, but the question
was about what they can expect for there first person future, and here
W & M is refuted by both, and W v M is confirmed by both. Just look at
was is written in the diaries.
>> not M, and the M-guy admits having seen M, and not W. They wrote
each a different letter than the doppelganger.
> If you iterate the experiences 10 times, only one guy among the
2^10 one will say that has the story "MMMMMMMMMM".
And that one guy is Mr. You. Yes, it's perfectly true that other
guys have seen different sequences and those other guys are not each
other, but they are all Mr. You because they all remember being the
Helsinki Man even if different things have happened to them after
the duplication. But so what? As I keep saying this is a very odd
situation because we're not accustomed with dealing with duplicating
machines, but it is NOT a logical paradox because Mr. You HAS BEEN
DUPLICATED.
No doubt you will come back and say that if there are difficulties
in your theory the same ones exist in the MW interpretation of the 2
slit experiment but this is untrue for two reasons:
1) In the 2 slit experiment it's always crystal clear who Mr. You is,
I don't see that. In Everett, if I put you in the state M+W, you are
two persons in different simultaneous states.
but in Bruno Marchal's thought experiment the pronouns "You" and
"he" and "I" are thrown around like confetti (apparently Bruno just
can't stop himself) without giving a single thought to who those
personal pronouns refer to.
On the contrary, by making clear the 1-3 difference, every references
are crystal clear. And, yes, you can't predict with certainlty the
unique city you will see, but that is not paradoxal. many students
told me that they understood QM makes sense since they got the FPI.
2) The 2 slit experiment is about what a observer will see, Bruno's
thought experiment is about the sense of self of the observer.
Wrong. It is about what an observer will see. You push a button, and
open a door, and note which unique city you see. ypu might even been
unaware of the protocol. The majpority of copies will conclude they
have no means to predict what they will see. It is an indeterminacy in
a clear 3p deterministic situation, and which does not invoke quantum
mechanics.
And please don't come back with your standard "you confuse the 1p
from the 3P", I am not confused , I am saying that both the 1P and
the 3P are adjectives and I am saying that atoms are generic, so if
the arrangement of atoms are duplicated the adjectives are
duplicated too; in other words the machine duplicates the structure
and ALL the perspectives also, first second and third.
Non sense. Your helsinki state is duplicated and then subjected to the
"opening" door, and that can never give "I see W and M".
it gives in the 3p "I see W and i see M" (like the quantum
superposition W+M)
It gives in the 1p "I see only W", and "I see only M", and this refute
for the 1P the above prediction.
Asking me in adance to note tell you that you make that 1-3 confusion
shows that you are aware to do it to make your argupment. Of course
everyone can see that you do it, and I guess conclude that you bad
faith has just no bound.
If you want to argue against my ideas then say no machine can
duplicate the immortal soul, I think such an argument is wrong but
at least it's coherent, but please don't tell me that although I'm a
grown man and I'm smart enough to tie my shoes all by myself I have
never before noticed that there is a difference between the first
person and the third person point of view.
You do see it. you just dismiss it systematically in your "refutation"
of step 3.
> From their first person point of view, the 2^10 - 1 others knows
you were wrong
No they do not, not if they're logical;
You betray yourself here. You could have been more precise though,
and say:
No they do not, not if they are logical and talking about themselves
in the 3p view (on the 1-views, or bodies).
they know that they are not the only Mr. You around
No. They don't know that. They know only that they are in W (resp M),
and they believe that they have a doppelganger in M (resp W).
You confuse belief and knowledge, which is of coures natural when
confusing 3p and 1p, or []p and []p & p (in AUDA)..
and that although they personally may have seen only Moscow and not
Washington the Helsinki man has seen both. But then again I was sick
at home on the day my first grade English teacher explained the
difference between the first person and the third so no doubt I'm
confused about that.
> correct for the 3-view on the 1-views, but false for the 1-views
as see from that 1-view.
It is not false if the duplicating machine duplicates EVERYTHING
including duplicating the points views, and the views of the views,
and the views of the views of the views, and the ... All you need
to do to win this argument is to tell me what law of physics
prevents a duplication machine from doing that, even in theory.
See step 3, and use the definition given.
>> Are you talking about the first person in Helsinki, the first
person in Moscow or the first person in Washington?
> The prediction is done by the first person in Helsinki, before the
duplication.
Not that predictions are of the slightest importance in this matter
but if we're talking about the Helsinki Man (aka the man currently
seeing Helsinki) and the Helsinki Man is destroyed after the
duplication then the correct prediction about what the Helsinki Man
will see would obviously be absolutely nothing.
that would contradict step one, and step 0, which you have accepted.
But if the Helsinki Man is NOT destroyed after the duplication then
the correct prediction about what the Helsinki Man will see would be
Helsinki.
With probability 1/3. And it will be "~ Helsinki" with probability
2/3. As a simple count of the resulting diaries confirms.
If on the other hand we're talking about what Mr. You will see (and
yes from Mr. You's first person perspective) then the correct
prediction would be Moscow AND Washington and perhaps Helsinki.
Not from the 1-view. Just take the definition given of the 1-views
(the memory content, or the diary taken with them in the experiment).
> You keep asking me this, when this is made clear in the paper, in
the post, etc.
Clear? Even the referent to the many many personal pronouns in your
posts are not clear even though establishing who is who is key to
the entire business; you don't even try, I don't know if you're just
lazy or if you know that nebulous pronouns are the only thing that
holds your theory together. The only thing that is clear is that you
believe that there is *something* that a duplicating machine that
operates according to the laws of physics would fail to duplicate.
As for me I don't believe in the soul.
Rethorical truck to distract from the fact that I do provides the
nuances needed (notably the 1/3 distinction) to avoid any ambiguity.
>> It's true that Mr. M doesn't see both cities, and Mr. W doesn't
see both cities, but Mr. You does.
> In the 3p views
In ALL views! Does Mr. M have a 1-P view or does he not? John Clark
thinks yes.
Me too. That is indeed why he will say "M and NOT W".
> but as I said and explain with the diary, only mr M and mr W are
interviewed.
And as I explained Bruno Marchal must already believe that both Mr.
M and Mr. W are both Mr. You, otherwise there would be no point in
interviewing them.
Yes. this has been clear all long, and makes my point. That is why we
have to interview them both. if in Helsinki they predicted W & M, then
both are refuted, and so H prediction is refuted, as they get
respectively M and ∞ W, and W and ~M.
> You feel to be one in one city, and still be the guy you were in
Helsinki.
Yes, Mr. You in Moscow and Mr. You in Washington both feel that way.
And the 1p is defined by what they feel, or note in their diary. So
you agree that they see only once city, and they could have predit
thisin advance, making them impossible to predict which one in
particular, they will actually see.
> You
Who's that?
The John Clark, defined by its particular memories.
> write W, *or* M in your diary.
In who's diary? Mr. You has written W in Mr. You's diary AND Mr. You
has written M in Mr. You's diary; and if you don't believe me I can
prove it, both diaries are right here.
Exactly. It makes my point. None write "W and M".
> you confuse [...]
STOP, don't tell me let me guess, I confuse the 1-views and the 3-
view on the 1-views.
> [...] the 1-views and the 3-view on the 1-views
Yep I was right. So I guess that's it, that rubber stamp phrase
you've repeated in nearly every post you've ever written is the one
and only defense you have of your ideas. You actually believe that
there are human beings on this planet, in fact you're in
communication with one, who thinks the difference between the 1P and
the 3P is confusing. But are you really sure that's the best you can
come up with?
> You say "always M", what about the guy who see "always W"?
You tell me, what about the guy who only sees W ? If Mr. You has
been duplicated then it shouldn't be any great surprise that Mr. You
can see W only AND Mr. You can see M only.
Which makes my point, that you dismiss because you don't read the
diaries which are there, and which defines the current 1-view relevant
for the precise question asked to the guy in H.
Bruno
John K Clark
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
