On 26 June 2014 12:03, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: > On 25 June 2014 16:52, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On 6/24/2014 2:29 AM, LizR wrote: >> >> On 24 June 2014 17:04, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>>> If primitive matter existed, and if it has a role for consciousness, or >>>> for consciousness instantiation, step 8, and the argument above, makes that >>>> role very mysterious, so much that it is not clear why we could still say >>>> yes to the doctor in virtue of correct digital rendering. >>>> >>> >>> You can still say yes to the doctor because he is going to use matter >>> to make your brain prosthesis. >>> >> >> Surely that will just be a copy that thinks it's you - it won't be you, >> so if you are destroyed in the process of making the digital copy, you >> really do die. While in comp the digital copy *is* you, by definition. >> >> ?? Comp is the theory that it will be you after the doctor gives you a >> prothesis for your brain (plus some other assumptions). It will be you >> even after you are duplicated (though it's troubling for JKC that "you" is >> both singular and plural). >> >> Yes, that's right. And primitive materialism would distinguish between > two identical versions of you, if only because they occupy different > positions (and due to no-cloning). So a PM copy could only ever be a "copy > that thinks it's you", while a comp copy would be one that actually is you > (assuming comp is correct, of course). >
I don't think "comp" necessarily includes the idea that the copy would be you, just that the copy would be conscious in the same way as you. Obviously it is *necessary* that the copy be conscious if it is also you, but whether it is *sufficient* is a further argument in the philosophy of personal identity. I think it is sufficient, but not everyone agrees. Derek Partfit's book "Reasons and Persons" discusses these questions. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
