On 7/1/2014 4:42 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 1 July 2014 22:33, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
The point, again in principle at least, is that nothing *above*
the level of the basic ontology need be taken into account in the
evolution of states defined in terms of it; put simply, there is no
top-down causality.
Actually, causality, except in the no-spacelike influence, doesn't enter
into fundamental physics. Models are generally time-symmetric.
Well, I was trying to be short, hence "to put it simply". Would you
take issue with the preceding statement that "The point, again in
principle at least, is that nothing *above* the level of the basic
ontology need be taken into account in the evolution of states defined
in terms of it."? And if so, what essential difference would your
specific disagreement make to the point in question?
I agree with that.
It is for this reason that I've been pointing out
that whatever "levels" are posited above the basic ontology cannot
possess, in terms of the theory, any independent ontological
significance.
And are you saying that is different for comp? That there's top-down
causality in comp? What's "top"?
I'm saying that comp uses its basic ontological assumptions to
motivate an epistemology - i.e. a theory of knowledge and knowers.
Well, it assumes one; although I'm not sure how the ontology of arithmetical realism
motivated it. It assumes that provable+true=known. I don't think this is a good axiom in
the sense of "obviously true". It's subject to Gettier's paradox. But there's nothing
wrong with assuming a model and seeing where it leads.
Hence I'm suggesting that from this point on that the consequences of
this epistemology become irreducible to the original ontology;
?? I don't think I can parse that. The consequences of an epistemology are things known.
An ontology is things that exist. So you're saying, things known become irreducible to
things that exist? Were they reducible before, i.e. before the ontological assumption
motivated the epistemology?
instead
the theory must hinge thereafter on the principled relations that can
be established between such knowers and the putative objects of their
knowledge.
OK.
Rather, what we *can* say is that such macroscopic, or composite,
phenomena as temperature or, for that matter, the neural correlates of
consciousness, are *explanatorily* relevant. We might go so far as to
describe these phenomena as epistemological integrations over the
ontological fundamentals. But if we do that the problem should become
painfully obvious: the theory in which we are working has no explicit
epistemological component.
I think you're confusing "epistemological" and "subjective".
I disagree. I'm using epistemological in the sense of what is
consequential on an explicit theory of knowledge and knowers. AFAIK
physics deploys no such explicit theory and relies on no such
consequences; in fact it seeks to be independent of any particular
such theory, which is tacitly regarded as being irrelevant to what is
to be explained. That is my criterion for distinguishing the two types
of theory I had in mind.
OK. Although, physics does struggle with that it means to observe something because
observation is never as a superposition. It is assumed that we need to know about how
humans work to answer this in detail.
In the first case the goal is
to create a mathematical model of appearance (i.e. physics), on the
assumption (should this be considered at all) that the phenomena of
perception and cognition will fall out of it at some later stage. In
the second case the goal is to justify from first principles the
existence, in the first place, of perceivers and cognisers and, in the
second place, the appearances that manifest to them; then to show that
the latter constitute, amongst other things, an accurate model of
physics.
Ok, I may have missed that. That's why I say once conscious-like behavior
is engineered, talk about percievers and cognisers will seem to be quaint
questions, like "Where is the elan vital in a virus?"
I'm afraid I fail to see the logical connection between "I may have
missed that" and "That's why...". However, you seem to be saying that
you personally favour theories of the first type and that you suppose
the effect of the continuing success of such an approach will be to
eliminate discussion, or possibly even recognition, of any remaining
"explanatory gap". Is that accurate?
Almost. I think the explanatory gap will remain, just as true but unprovable theorems of
arithmetic will remain. But it will be a side issue, not a subject of scientific research.
Do you see no merit in the second type of theory? Do you disagree that
one can usefully differentiate theories by the kinds of question they
set out to answer?
No, I agree. But usefully differentiating a theory is not the same as differentiating a
useful theory. I can differentiate theory that asks, "What does God command us to do."
from a theory that asks, "What ethics makes for a satisfying society." and only one of
them is useful.
As I noted in another post, any explanation is going to be "exhaustively
reductive" or it's going to be "reduction with loss". You can't have it
both ways.
I don't agree that these alternatives exclude each other.
What's in between explaining everything and leaving somethings unexplained?
Forgive me, I could more accurately have said that I didn't consider
them to be at odds. IOW, when I've used the term exhaustively
reductive, what I mean is that the 3p reduction is intended to exhaust
what is to required be explained in terms of the theory, but that this
cannot be without loss because the first-person is thereby
trivialised, eliminated, or rendered hopelessly mysterious.
My argument has also been that Bruno's theory,
whatever else its merits or demerits, is not reductive in the relevant
sense; so far I haven't seen you respond directly to these points.
But it does "lose consciousness" in the sense of self-reflective
consciousness. That's in the unprovable truth.
I don't know why you say that it "loses consciousness" when a
principled relation between proof and unprovable truth is an essential
goal of the technical and conceptual resources of the theory.
I don't see that the "principled relation" is any more than a working
assumption.
In
particular, it's this relation that may lead to a resolution of the
notorious "paradox of phenomenal judgement", by distinguishing the
specific logics by which 3p and 1p accounts can justifiably be said to
refer to the "same" phenomena.
Maybe. But I don't see why the paradox should not have a cognitive neuroscience
resolution as well. One part of the brain monitors another part and enters this into the
stream of conscious narration.
And non-self-reflective
consciousness can be accounted for by neurophysiology.
Only by "losing" it in the first-person sense, since neurophysiology
is vulnerable to "exhaustive" reduction.
Right. Science is, by design, about third person knowledge.
I think you have
unrealistic ideas of what is explained and what is "lost".
Perhaps, but nevertheless I tend to agree with Bruno that it is
premature to say that the only adequate answer to certain questions
is, in effect, "don't ask".
In a sense
*nothing* is explained by physics. It provides models that are successful
at prediction. The models may be looked on as "explanations", but that's a
kind of psychological comfort we get form them depending on how familiar we
are with the form of explanation.
This is a little too positivist or indeed post-modern for my taste,
I'm afraid. I'm can't be satisfied by a purely operational approach of
this kind. I tend to side with David Deutsch in believing that we are
motivated to look for the most comprehensive explanations, not merely
the most successful predictions.
"God did it" is the most comprehensive explanation. Deutsch never really defines what
makes a good explanation - except that leads to theories that are better at prediction.
Brent
ISTM in any case that predictions,
rather like "data", already tacitly presuppose some more comprehensive
explanatory framework in terms of which predictions or data can be
isolated and interpreted. Of course I'm perfectly ready to concede
that it is hard to escape the influence of our personal predilections.
That said, I must say my own predilections in this regard have
undergone fairly comprehensive revision as a result of my encounters
with comp.
David
On 7/1/2014 1:32 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 1 July 2014 19:24, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
I think you have created a strawman "exhaustively-reducible physical or
material ontology". Sure, physicists take "forces" and "matter" as
working
assumptions - but they don't say what they are. They are never anything
other than "elements of a mathematical model which works well." And what
does it mean to work well? It means to explain appearances - exactly the
same thing you put forward as a uniquely different goal of comp.
Firstly, I'm not really persuaded by your contention that forces and
matter, to use your example, are merely "elements of a mathematical
model which works well". Rather, in terms of that very model, such
elements are precisely those that (at least in principle) are supposed
to comprise a fully-sufficient bottom-up ontology for the theory as a
whole. The point, again in principle at least, is that nothing *above*
the level of the basic ontology need be taken into account in the
evolution of states defined in terms of it; put simply, there is no
top-down causality.
Actually, causality, except in the no-spacelike influence, doesn't enter
into fundamental physics. Models are generally time-symmetric.
It is for this reason that I've been pointing out
that whatever "levels" are posited above the basic ontology cannot
possess, in terms of the theory, any independent ontological
significance.
And are you saying that is different for comp? That there's top-down
causality in comp? What's "top"?
Rather, what we *can* say is that such macroscopic, or composite,
phenomena as temperature or, for that matter, the neural correlates of
consciousness, are *explanatorily* relevant. We might go so far as to
describe these phenomena as epistemological integrations over the
ontological fundamentals. But if we do that the problem should become
painfully obvious: the theory in which we are working has no explicit
epistemological component.
I think you're confusing "epistemological" and "subjective".
It is in fact explicitly designed to render
a principled account of the relevant phenomena in the absence of any
particular epistemological assumptions.
Secondly, I think you may have missed the distinction I was attempting
to make between a theory having the fundamental goal of "seeking to
explain what appears" and one that "seeks to explain why and how
appearance manifests to its subjects". In the first case the goal is
to create a mathematical model of appearance (i.e. physics), on the
assumption (should this be considered at all) that the phenomena of
perception and cognition will fall out of it at some later stage. In
the second case the goal is to justify from first principles the
existence, in the first place, of perceivers and cognisers and, in the
second place, the appearances that manifest to them; then to show that
the latter constitute, amongst other things, an accurate model of
physics.
Ok, I may have missed that. That's why I say once conscious-like behavior
is engineered, talk about percievers and cognisers will seem to be quaint
questions, like "Where is the elan vital in a virus?" Comp has an
explanation of why some questions about consciousness are unanswerable, on
pain of logical contradiction; and in that respect it is an improvement over
more vague philosophizing such as Darwin's musing that if the brain were
simple enough enough to understand itself would not be powerful enough to
understand itself.
Although I think comp is an interesting theory and worthy of study, I
think
I look at it differently than Bruno. I look at it as just another
mathematical model, one whose ontology happens to be computations.
But I have already said why I think comp can be distinguished from
other theories in this respect. I may well be mistaken, but I don't
see you have actually addressed the points I sought to make.
As I noted in another post, any explanation is going to be "exhaustively
reductive" or it's going to be "reduction with loss". You can't have it
both
ways. Bruno's theory explicitly defines the "loss", i.e. unprovable
truths
of arithmetic. That may be a feature, or it may be a bug.
I don't agree that these alternatives exclude each other.
What's in between explaining everything and leaving somethings unexplained?
In fact,
I've been trying to point out that an exhaustively reductive physical
theory cannot avoid "losing consciousness". Hence the stipulation
"without loss" is only tenable when that unfortunate consequence is
ignored or trivialised. My argument has also been that Bruno's theory,
whatever else its merits or demerits, is not reductive in the relevant
sense; so far I haven't seen you respond directly to these points.
But it does "lose consciousness" in the sense of self-reflective
consciousness. That's in the unprovable truth. And non-self-reflective
consciousness can be accounted for by neurophysiology. I think you have
unrealistic ideas of what is explained and what is "lost". In a sense
*nothing* is explained by physics. It provides models that are successful
at prediction. The models may be looked on as "explanations", but that's a
kind of psychological comfort we get form them depending on how familiar we
are with the form of explanation. When people heard Newton's theory of
gravity they though it was missing something because it didn't explain how
the force got from here to there. I don't see that Comp is better.
Brent
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