On 2 July 2014 01:24, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: >> Well, I was trying to be short, hence "to put it simply". Would you >> take issue with the preceding statement that "The point, again in >> principle at least, is that nothing *above* the level of the basic >> ontology need be taken into account in the evolution of states defined >> in terms of it."? And if so, what essential difference would your >> specific disagreement make to the point in question? > > I agree with that.
Good, that's the essential premise I've been reasoning from. >> I'm saying that comp uses its basic ontological assumptions to >> motivate an epistemology - i.e. a theory of knowledge and knowers. > > Well, it assumes one; although I'm not sure how the ontology of arithmetical > realism motivated it. It assumes that provable+true=known. I don't think > this is a good axiom in the sense of "obviously true". It's subject to > Gettier's paradox. I don't think this is the right way to think about it. Take, for example, the truth of what I see (i.e. the truth-consequence of my "visual belief system"). The truth of what I see is incorrigible and quite distinct from any interpretations that may subsequently be imposed on it (as we can intuit from demonstrations of how easily our visual belief system can be fooled). Since the primary truth of what I see is simply what I see (i.e. it is incorrigible) it can't be subject to Gettier's paradox. I can't be right about what I see for the wrong reasons because what I see is constitutively true. To the contrary, the irreducible relation between truth and belief in this sense may point towards a resolution of a different and more intractable paradox, the POPJ. I think the thrust of Bruno's argument is that the truth of what I see and the logic of my visual beliefs (both of which, as manifested physically, I take to be represented in my neurology) converge on the same referents by means of distinct epistemological logics. More crudely, they represent the same thing under two different ways of knowing. By contrast it is difficult to see how any theory relying on a reductionist ontology without recourse to an explicit epistemology can avoid the POPJ. My judgements about what I see cannot be a consequence of what I see, since ex hypothesi both what I see and my judgements about it are "really" my neurology (as in the case of "one part of the brain monitoring another"). At least, that's the conventional take on the paradox. More stringently, one might say that under reductionism (as I think Stathis has, in effect, suggested) the POPJ is eliminated in the same move as the phenomena and the judgements. Whether this outcome is an improvement is, I guess, a matter of taste. > But there's nothing wrong with assuming a model and > seeing where it leads. My point exactly. And my argument, in general, has been that where a model can lead may fundamentally be delimited by the explanatory strategy adopted at the outset. Specifically, if a theory lacks an explicit epistemological strategy then, in despite of any success in elucidating the structure of appearance, it may in the end tend to obfuscate, rather than illuminate, fundamental questions pertaining to the knowledge of such appearances. What is interesting, at the very least, is that Bruno has presented some general grounds for hoping that a suitably developed "general theory of epistemology" may be capable of illuminating both. >> I disagree. I'm using epistemological in the sense of what is >> consequential on an explicit theory of knowledge and knowers. AFAIK >> physics deploys no such explicit theory and relies on no such >> consequences; in fact it seeks to be independent of any particular >> such theory, which is tacitly regarded as being irrelevant to what is >> to be explained. That is my criterion for distinguishing the two types >> of theory I had in mind. > > OK. Although, physics does struggle with that it means to observe something > because observation is never as a superposition. It is assumed that we need > to know about how humans work to answer this in detail. Is that true? In what way do the collapse hypothesis or Everett's interpretation depend on how human beings work in detail? >> However, you seem to be saying that >> you personally favour theories of the first type and that you suppose >> the effect of the continuing success of such an approach will be to >> eliminate discussion, or possibly even recognition, of any remaining >> "explanatory gap". Is that accurate? > > Almost. I think the explanatory gap will remain, just as true but unprovable > theorems of arithmetic will remain. But it will be a side issue, not a > subject of scientific research. I agree that you may well be right in your prediction, but I think it may be an inevitable consequence of the explanatory strategy adopted. A model that succeeds, even spectacularly, in answering its chosen questions can still fail catastrophically in the face of certain others. It can be tempting then to say that what isn't knowable by the chosen means can't be known at all. But I don't believe that the equivalence implied by your use of "just as" above is necessarily justified, as I've argued. I think that comp gives us some grounds for hope that further exploration of the relation between belief and truth, as in the example of visual belief and truth I suggested earlier, may ultimately be quite fruitful in closing such a gap, whilst at the same time elucidating why it may not be completely eliminable. >> Do you see no merit in the second type of theory? Do you disagree that >> one can usefully differentiate theories by the kinds of question they >> set out to answer? > > No, I agree. But usefully differentiating a theory is not the same as > differentiating a useful theory. I can differentiate theory that asks, > "What does God command us to do." from a theory that asks, "What ethics > makes for a satisfying society." and only one of them is useful. Of course, the proof of the pudding, etc. But my point was just that theories can be so differentiated, and we agree on this at least. And my further point is that if comp ultimately proves useful, it may well be in elucidating questions that systematically elude, or are trivialised by, other models. > "God did it" is the most comprehensive explanation. Deutsch never really > defines what makes a good explanation - except that leads to theories that > are better at prediction. "God did it" may be comprehensive but not terribly enlightening, I fear. I think that a good explanation is one that allows us to fruitfully elucidate a broader spectrum of questions. We should expect this to lead to better predictions, of course, but over a broader and deeper range than that accessible by less comprehensive explanations. David > On 7/1/2014 4:42 PM, David Nyman wrote: >> >> On 1 July 2014 22:33, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: >> >>>> The point, again in principle at least, is that nothing *above* >>>> the level of the basic ontology need be taken into account in the >>>> evolution of states defined in terms of it; put simply, there is no >>>> top-down causality. >>> >>> Actually, causality, except in the no-spacelike influence, doesn't enter >>> into fundamental physics. Models are generally time-symmetric. >> >> Well, I was trying to be short, hence "to put it simply". Would you >> take issue with the preceding statement that "The point, again in >> principle at least, is that nothing *above* the level of the basic >> ontology need be taken into account in the evolution of states defined >> in terms of it."? And if so, what essential difference would your >> specific disagreement make to the point in question? > > > I agree with that. > > >> >>>> It is for this reason that I've been pointing out >>>> that whatever "levels" are posited above the basic ontology cannot >>>> possess, in terms of the theory, any independent ontological >>>> significance. >>> >>> And are you saying that is different for comp? That there's top-down >>> causality in comp? What's "top"? >> >> I'm saying that comp uses its basic ontological assumptions to >> motivate an epistemology - i.e. a theory of knowledge and knowers. > > > Well, it assumes one; although I'm not sure how the ontology of arithmetical > realism motivated it. It assumes that provable+true=known. I don't think > this is a good axiom in the sense of "obviously true". It's subject to > Gettier's paradox. But there's nothing wrong with assuming a model and > seeing where it leads. > > >> Hence I'm suggesting that from this point on that the consequences of >> this epistemology become irreducible to the original ontology; > > > ?? I don't think I can parse that. The consequences of an epistemology are > things known. An ontology is things that exist. So you're saying, things > known become irreducible to things that exist? Were they reducible before, > i.e. before the ontological assumption motivated the epistemology? > > >> instead >> the theory must hinge thereafter on the principled relations that can >> be established between such knowers and the putative objects of their >> knowledge. > > > OK. > > >> >>>> Rather, what we *can* say is that such macroscopic, or composite, >>>> phenomena as temperature or, for that matter, the neural correlates of >>>> consciousness, are *explanatorily* relevant. We might go so far as to >>>> describe these phenomena as epistemological integrations over the >>>> ontological fundamentals. But if we do that the problem should become >>>> painfully obvious: the theory in which we are working has no explicit >>>> epistemological component. >>> >>> I think you're confusing "epistemological" and "subjective". >> >> I disagree. I'm using epistemological in the sense of what is >> consequential on an explicit theory of knowledge and knowers. AFAIK >> physics deploys no such explicit theory and relies on no such >> consequences; in fact it seeks to be independent of any particular >> such theory, which is tacitly regarded as being irrelevant to what is >> to be explained. That is my criterion for distinguishing the two types >> of theory I had in mind. > > > OK. Although, physics does struggle with that it means to observe something > because observation is never as a superposition. It is assumed that we need > to know about how humans work to answer this in detail. > > >> >>>> In the first case the goal is >>>> to create a mathematical model of appearance (i.e. physics), on the >>>> assumption (should this be considered at all) that the phenomena of >>>> perception and cognition will fall out of it at some later stage. In >>>> the second case the goal is to justify from first principles the >>>> existence, in the first place, of perceivers and cognisers and, in the >>>> second place, the appearances that manifest to them; then to show that >>>> the latter constitute, amongst other things, an accurate model of >>>> physics. >>> >>> Ok, I may have missed that. That's why I say once conscious-like >>> behavior >>> is engineered, talk about percievers and cognisers will seem to be quaint >>> questions, like "Where is the elan vital in a virus?" >> >> I'm afraid I fail to see the logical connection between "I may have >> missed that" and "That's why...". However, you seem to be saying that >> you personally favour theories of the first type and that you suppose >> the effect of the continuing success of such an approach will be to >> eliminate discussion, or possibly even recognition, of any remaining >> "explanatory gap". Is that accurate? > > > Almost. I think the explanatory gap will remain, just as true but unprovable > theorems of arithmetic will remain. But it will be a side issue, not a > subject of scientific research. > > >> >> Do you see no merit in the second type of theory? Do you disagree that >> one can usefully differentiate theories by the kinds of question they >> set out to answer? > > > No, I agree. But usefully differentiating a theory is not the same as > differentiating a useful theory. I can differentiate theory that asks, > "What does God command us to do." from a theory that asks, "What ethics > makes for a satisfying society." and only one of them is useful. > > >> >>>>> As I noted in another post, any explanation is going to be >>>>> "exhaustively >>>>> reductive" or it's going to be "reduction with loss". You can't have it >>>>> both ways. >>>> >>>> I don't agree that these alternatives exclude each other. >>> >>> What's in between explaining everything and leaving somethings >>> unexplained? >> >> Forgive me, I could more accurately have said that I didn't consider >> them to be at odds. IOW, when I've used the term exhaustively >> reductive, what I mean is that the 3p reduction is intended to exhaust >> what is to required be explained in terms of the theory, but that this >> cannot be without loss because the first-person is thereby >> trivialised, eliminated, or rendered hopelessly mysterious. >> >>>> My argument has also been that Bruno's theory, >>>> whatever else its merits or demerits, is not reductive in the relevant >>>> sense; so far I haven't seen you respond directly to these points. >>> >>> But it does "lose consciousness" in the sense of self-reflective >>> consciousness. That's in the unprovable truth. >> >> I don't know why you say that it "loses consciousness" when a >> principled relation between proof and unprovable truth is an essential >> goal of the technical and conceptual resources of the theory. > > I don't see that the "principled relation" is any more than a working > assumption. > > > >> In >> particular, it's this relation that may lead to a resolution of the >> notorious "paradox of phenomenal judgement", by distinguishing the >> specific logics by which 3p and 1p accounts can justifiably be said to >> refer to the "same" phenomena. > > > Maybe. But I don't see why the paradox should not have a cognitive > neuroscience resolution as well. One part of the brain monitors another > part and enters this into the stream of conscious narration. > > >> >>> And non-self-reflective >>> consciousness can be accounted for by neurophysiology. >> >> Only by "losing" it in the first-person sense, since neurophysiology >> is vulnerable to "exhaustive" reduction. > > > Right. Science is, by design, about third person knowledge. > >> >>> I think you have >>> unrealistic ideas of what is explained and what is "lost". >> >> Perhaps, but nevertheless I tend to agree with Bruno that it is >> premature to say that the only adequate answer to certain questions >> is, in effect, "don't ask". >> >>> In a sense >>> *nothing* is explained by physics. It provides models that are >>> successful >>> at prediction. The models may be looked on as "explanations", but that's >>> a >>> kind of psychological comfort we get form them depending on how familiar >>> we >>> are with the form of explanation. >> >> This is a little too positivist or indeed post-modern for my taste, >> I'm afraid. I'm can't be satisfied by a purely operational approach of >> this kind. I tend to side with David Deutsch in believing that we are >> motivated to look for the most comprehensive explanations, not merely >> the most successful predictions. > > > "God did it" is the most comprehensive explanation. Deutsch never really > defines what makes a good explanation - except that leads to theories that > are better at prediction. > > Brent > > >> ISTM in any case that predictions, >> rather like "data", already tacitly presuppose some more comprehensive >> explanatory framework in terms of which predictions or data can be >> isolated and interpreted. Of course I'm perfectly ready to concede >> that it is hard to escape the influence of our personal predilections. >> That said, I must say my own predilections in this regard have >> undergone fairly comprehensive revision as a result of my encounters >> with comp. >> >> David >> >> >>> On 7/1/2014 1:32 PM, David Nyman wrote: >>>> >>>> On 1 July 2014 19:24, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: >>>> >>>>> I think you have created a strawman "exhaustively-reducible physical or >>>>> material ontology". Sure, physicists take "forces" and "matter" as >>>>> working >>>>> assumptions - but they don't say what they are. They are never >>>>> anything >>>>> other than "elements of a mathematical model which works well." And >>>>> what >>>>> does it mean to work well? It means to explain appearances - exactly >>>>> the >>>>> same thing you put forward as a uniquely different goal of comp. >>>> >>>> Firstly, I'm not really persuaded by your contention that forces and >>>> matter, to use your example, are merely "elements of a mathematical >>>> model which works well". Rather, in terms of that very model, such >>>> elements are precisely those that (at least in principle) are supposed >>>> to comprise a fully-sufficient bottom-up ontology for the theory as a >>>> whole. The point, again in principle at least, is that nothing *above* >>>> the level of the basic ontology need be taken into account in the >>>> evolution of states defined in terms of it; put simply, there is no >>>> top-down causality. >>> >>> >>> Actually, causality, except in the no-spacelike influence, doesn't enter >>> into fundamental physics. Models are generally time-symmetric. >>> >>> >>>> It is for this reason that I've been pointing out >>>> that whatever "levels" are posited above the basic ontology cannot >>>> possess, in terms of the theory, any independent ontological >>>> significance. >>> >>> >>> And are you saying that is different for comp? That there's top-down >>> causality in comp? What's "top"? >>> >>> >>>> Rather, what we *can* say is that such macroscopic, or composite, >>>> phenomena as temperature or, for that matter, the neural correlates of >>>> consciousness, are *explanatorily* relevant. We might go so far as to >>>> describe these phenomena as epistemological integrations over the >>>> ontological fundamentals. But if we do that the problem should become >>>> painfully obvious: the theory in which we are working has no explicit >>>> epistemological component. >>> >>> >>> I think you're confusing "epistemological" and "subjective". >>> >>> >>>> It is in fact explicitly designed to render >>>> a principled account of the relevant phenomena in the absence of any >>>> particular epistemological assumptions. >>>> >>>> Secondly, I think you may have missed the distinction I was attempting >>>> to make between a theory having the fundamental goal of "seeking to >>>> explain what appears" and one that "seeks to explain why and how >>>> appearance manifests to its subjects". In the first case the goal is >>>> to create a mathematical model of appearance (i.e. physics), on the >>>> assumption (should this be considered at all) that the phenomena of >>>> perception and cognition will fall out of it at some later stage. In >>>> the second case the goal is to justify from first principles the >>>> existence, in the first place, of perceivers and cognisers and, in the >>>> second place, the appearances that manifest to them; then to show that >>>> the latter constitute, amongst other things, an accurate model of >>>> physics. >>> >>> >>> Ok, I may have missed that. That's why I say once conscious-like >>> behavior >>> is engineered, talk about percievers and cognisers will seem to be quaint >>> questions, like "Where is the elan vital in a virus?" Comp has an >>> explanation of why some questions about consciousness are unanswerable, >>> on >>> pain of logical contradiction; and in that respect it is an improvement >>> over >>> more vague philosophizing such as Darwin's musing that if the brain were >>> simple enough enough to understand itself would not be powerful enough to >>> understand itself. >>> >>> >>>>> Although I think comp is an interesting theory and worthy of study, I >>>>> think >>>>> I look at it differently than Bruno. I look at it as just another >>>>> mathematical model, one whose ontology happens to be computations. >>>> >>>> But I have already said why I think comp can be distinguished from >>>> other theories in this respect. I may well be mistaken, but I don't >>>> see you have actually addressed the points I sought to make. >>>> >>>>> As I noted in another post, any explanation is going to be >>>>> "exhaustively >>>>> reductive" or it's going to be "reduction with loss". You can't have it >>>>> both >>>>> ways. Bruno's theory explicitly defines the "loss", i.e. unprovable >>>>> truths >>>>> of arithmetic. That may be a feature, or it may be a bug. >>>> >>>> I don't agree that these alternatives exclude each other. >>> >>> >>> What's in between explaining everything and leaving somethings >>> unexplained? >>> >>> >>>> In fact, >>>> I've been trying to point out that an exhaustively reductive physical >>>> theory cannot avoid "losing consciousness". Hence the stipulation >>>> "without loss" is only tenable when that unfortunate consequence is >>>> ignored or trivialised. My argument has also been that Bruno's theory, >>>> whatever else its merits or demerits, is not reductive in the relevant >>>> sense; so far I haven't seen you respond directly to these points. >>> >>> >>> But it does "lose consciousness" in the sense of self-reflective >>> consciousness. That's in the unprovable truth. And non-self-reflective >>> consciousness can be accounted for by neurophysiology. I think you have >>> unrealistic ideas of what is explained and what is "lost". In a sense >>> *nothing* is explained by physics. It provides models that are >>> successful >>> at prediction. The models may be looked on as "explanations", but that's >>> a >>> kind of psychological comfort we get form them depending on how familiar >>> we >>> are with the form of explanation. When people heard Newton's theory of >>> gravity they though it was missing something because it didn't explain >>> how >>> the force got from here to there. I don't see that Comp is better. >>> >>> Brent >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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