On 2 July 2014 22:04, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: >> Since the primary truth of what I >> see is simply what I see (i.e. it is incorrigible) it can't be subject >> to Gettier's paradox. I can't be right about what I see for the wrong >> reasons because what I see is constitutively true. > > But is it incorrigble? An optical illusion can cause you to see "A is > bigger than B" even though A is smaller than B. Of course you can say, > "Well, it's still incorrigbly true that A *appeared* bigger than B." but > that's different.
Well, it isn't different to my point, which is precisely that what I see (i.e. the 1p part) corresponds in the first instance to the truth content of my visual belief system (i.e. the 3p part). Note that "there is nothing I can do about it". Hence in this case belief and truth are necessarily, constitutively, or analytically, equivalent. Only in the second instance are they vulnerable to correction. One might say that belief and truth in this first sense are incorrigibly bound together in a common vulnerability to secondary, or empirical, error. > What you literally *saw* was that A was bigger than B, > i.e. that is the immediate perception > and it only later that you are > persuaded that it was "mere" appearance. > So the perception that your brain > forms is really creating a model based on sensory input Yes, that's the "first instance" to which I refer above.. > and it can be wrong Yes, primary belief, though necessarily incorrigible in the first instance, is nonetheless vulnerable in the second instance to correction or reinterpretation. Just as well, really. > In other words > there is no "seeing at all without interpretation"; There is no "simply what > I see". I think you have been conflating two different senses of "interpretation" that I specifically intended to distinguish. The first corresponds to the immediate perception associated with the visual belief system and the second with subsequent correction or reinterpretation. Only the first sense is incorrigible. > But that's not the point of Gettier's paradox. Gettier's paradox is that > you may believe something that is true by accident, e.g. with no causal > connection to the facts that make it true. Under Theaetetus's definition > this counts as knowledge, but not under a common sense understanding. I think you may now see that this doesn't contradict my point. If the visual belief system and its associated truth content are constitutively equivalent, there is no question of "truth by accident" in the first instance. Of course any second-order reinterpretation of such first-order beliefs may be empirically "true" by accident, or wholly untrue for that matter, but that is a different question. >> Specifically, if a theory lacks an >> explicit epistemological strategy then, in despite of any success in >> elucidating the structure of appearance, it may in the end tend to >> obfuscate, rather than illuminate, fundamental questions pertaining to >> the knowledge of such appearances. > > "May tend" is fairly weak criticism in face to enormous success. The success > is because science "closes the loop" by testing its theories. The > "epistemological strategy" is to pass those tests. But "science" and comp are not in opposition. To the contrary, if comp as an explanatory strategy is to have any hope of being successful it must *become* "science" and hence pass all empirical tests that are thrown at it. And in any case I'm not criticising the success of the current paradigm, I'm merely speculating, on grounds that I've argued, as to whether that same success can ultimately extend to questions which were, in a certain sense, deliberately sidelined at the start. But such apparently "subsidiary" questions may ultimately expose an explanatory Achilles' heel. Time will tell, I guess. >> Is that true? In what way do the collapse hypothesis or Everett's >> interpretation depend on how human beings work in detail? > > They depend on human thought being quasi-classical, even though humans > are (presumably) made of quantum systems. This is just part of the bigger > question of how does the appearance of the classical world arise from a > quantum substrate. OK, thanks, I see what you mean. But I suppose you didn't mean to say that this implies a dependency on any theory of knowledge in particular, other than it be capable of being represented quasi-classically. Is that accurate? David > On 7/2/2014 8:51 AM, David Nyman wrote: >> >> On 2 July 2014 01:24, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: >> >>>> Well, I was trying to be short, hence "to put it simply". Would you >>>> take issue with the preceding statement that "The point, again in >>>> principle at least, is that nothing *above* the level of the basic >>>> ontology need be taken into account in the evolution of states defined >>>> in terms of it."? And if so, what essential difference would your >>>> specific disagreement make to the point in question? >>> >>> I agree with that. >> >> Good, that's the essential premise I've been reasoning from. >> >>>> I'm saying that comp uses its basic ontological assumptions to >>>> motivate an epistemology - i.e. a theory of knowledge and knowers. >>> >>> Well, it assumes one; although I'm not sure how the ontology of >>> arithmetical >>> realism motivated it. It assumes that provable+true=known. I don't >>> think >>> this is a good axiom in the sense of "obviously true". It's subject to >>> Gettier's paradox. >> >> I don't think this is the right way to think about it. Take, for >> example, the truth of what I see (i.e. the truth-consequence of my >> "visual belief system"). The truth of what I see is incorrigible and >> quite distinct from any interpretations that may subsequently be >> imposed on it (as we can intuit from demonstrations of how easily our >> visual belief system can be fooled). Since the primary truth of what I >> see is simply what I see (i.e. it is incorrigible) it can't be subject >> to Gettier's paradox. I can't be right about what I see for the wrong >> reasons because what I see is constitutively true. > > > But is it incorrigble? An optical illusion can cause you to see "A is > bigger than B" even though A is smaller than B. Of course you can say, > "Well, it's still incorrigbly true that A *appeared* bigger than B." but > that's different. What you literally *saw* was that A was bigger than B, > i.e. that is the immediate perception and it only later that you are > persuaded that it was "mere" appearance. So the perception that your brain > forms is really creating a model based on sensory input and it can be wrong > - which is why you're not usually aware of your blind spot. In other words > there is no "seeing at all without interpretation"; There is no "simply what > I see". > > But that's not the point of Gettier's paradox. Gettier's paradox is that > you may believe something that is true by accident, e.g. with no causal > connection to the facts that make it true. Under Theaetetus's definition > this counts as knowledge, but not under a common sense understanding. > > > >> >> To the contrary, the irreducible relation between truth and belief in >> this sense may point towards a resolution of a different and more >> intractable paradox, the POPJ. I think the thrust of Bruno's argument >> is that the truth of what I see and the logic of my visual beliefs >> (both of which, as manifested physically, I take to be represented in >> my neurology) converge on the same referents by means of distinct >> epistemological logics. More crudely, they represent the same thing >> under two different ways of knowing. >> >> By contrast it is difficult to see how any theory relying on a >> reductionist ontology without recourse to an explicit epistemology can >> avoid the POPJ. My judgements about what I see cannot be a consequence >> of what I see, since ex hypothesi both what I see and my judgements >> about it are "really" my neurology (as in the case of "one part of the >> brain monitoring another"). At least, that's the conventional take on >> the paradox. More stringently, one might say that under reductionism >> (as I think Stathis has, in effect, suggested) the POPJ is eliminated >> in the same move as the phenomena and the judgements. Whether this >> outcome is an improvement is, I guess, a matter of taste. >> >>> But there's nothing wrong with assuming a model and >>> seeing where it leads. >> >> My point exactly. And my argument, in general, has been that where a >> model can lead may fundamentally be delimited by the explanatory >> strategy adopted at the outset. Specifically, if a theory lacks an >> explicit epistemological strategy then, in despite of any success in >> elucidating the structure of appearance, it may in the end tend to >> obfuscate, rather than illuminate, fundamental questions pertaining to >> the knowledge of such appearances. > > > "May tend" is fairly weak criticism in face to enormous success. The success > is because science "closes the loop" by testing its theories. The > "epistemological strategy" is to pass those tests. > > >> What is interesting, at the very >> least, is that Bruno has presented some general grounds for hoping >> that a suitably developed "general theory of epistemology" may be >> capable of illuminating both. > > > Maybe. But Bruno also wants to reach empirical tests. Otherwise it's > armchair philosophizing - as was so common and unproductive among the > scholastics. > > >> >>>> I disagree. I'm using epistemological in the sense of what is >>>> consequential on an explicit theory of knowledge and knowers. AFAIK >>>> physics deploys no such explicit theory and relies on no such >>>> consequences; in fact it seeks to be independent of any particular >>>> such theory, which is tacitly regarded as being irrelevant to what is >>>> to be explained. That is my criterion for distinguishing the two types >>>> of theory I had in mind. >>> >>> OK. Although, physics does struggle with that it means to observe >>> something >>> because observation is never as a superposition. It is assumed that we >>> need >>> to know about how humans work to answer this in detail. >> >> Is that true? In what way do the collapse hypothesis or Everett's >> interpretation depend on how human beings work in detail? > > > They depend on human thought being quasi-classical, even though humans are > (presumably) made of quantum systems. This is just part of the bigger > question of how does the appearance of the classical world arise from a > quantum substrate. > > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. 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