On Sunday, August 17, 2014, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:

>  On 8/16/2014 10:16 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> On 16 August 2014 10:16, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
> > On 8/15/2014 4:34 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> > > I think these sorts of considerations show that the physical states
> cannot
> > > be responsible for generating or affecting consciousness.
> >
> >
> > How do they show that?  I thought they only showed that CC and
> environmental
> > reference were necessary to consciousness.  Are you assuming that the
> > playback of a recording IS conscious?
>
> If it is true that a recording is conscious or the random states of a rock
> are conscious then I think that does imply that physical states are
> irrelevant to consciousness. But the argument goes that this irrelevance of
> physical states is absurd, so some restriction is imposed on what can be
> conscious in order to avoid the absurdity. One possible restriction is that
> consciousness only occurs if the computations are implemented relative to
> an environment, another is that the counterfactuals be present. But these
> are ad hoc restrictions, no better than saying that consciousness can only
> occur in a biological substrate.
>
> > > The immediate objection to this is that physical changes in the brain
> *do*
> > > affect consciousness. But if physical states cannot be responsible for
> > > generating or affecting consciousness, there can be no evidence for a
> > > separate, fundamental physical world. What we are left with is the
> platonic
> > > reality in which all computations are realised and physical reality is
> a
> > > simulation. It is meaningless to ask if consciousness supervenes on the
> > > computations implemented on the simulated rock or the simulated
> recording.
> >
> >
> > It's not meaningless to ask if there must be simulated physics for the
> > simulated consciousness to supervene on.  Do you think you could be
> > conscious of a world with no physics?
>
>  Both consciousness and physics supervene on the computations, which
> exist necessarily. Consciousness does not supervene on the physics.
>
>
> Yes, I agreed to that.  The question was can consciousness supervene on
> computations that do not instantiate any physics?  I think not.
>

I think that a sustained stream of consciousness will probably be part of a
computation that instantiates physics - instantiates a whole universe
complete with physics. However, the point that I wanted to make was that if
computation can instantiate consciousness then there is nothing to stop a
recording, a Boltzmann Brain, a rock and so on from doing so; for these
possibilities have been used as arguments against computationalism or to
arbitrarily restrict computationalism.

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