On 18 Aug 2014, at 19:31, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/18/2014 1:35 AM, LizR wrote:
On 18 August 2014 20:10, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 18 August 2014 14:24, LizR <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 18 August 2014 15:49, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]>
wrote:
>>
>> I think that a sustained stream of consciousness will probably
be part of
>> a computation that instantiates physics - instantiates a whole
universe
>> complete with physics.
>
> It would need to instantiate a stable enough universe that
something capable
> of computation can evolve there, I imagine. Certainly if one
assumes that
> the comp reversal doesn't happen.
I was thinking of the case where the comp reversal does happen. If it
doesn't happen, then I don't think comp can be true.
I thought the comp reversal indicates that the computations don't
instantiate a universe (although they do instantiate the appearance
of one), so taking this comment together with your first comment
quoted above, you're "having your cake and eating it" here. Either
comp is false in which case computations can instantiate a universe
plus physics, or comp is true and they instantiate consciousness,
and physics somehow appears as a result. Isn't that right?
>> However, the point that I wanted to make was that if computation
can
>> instantiate consciousness then there is nothing to stop a
recording, a
>> Boltzmann Brain, a rock and so on from doing so; for these
possibilities
>> have been used as arguments against computationalism or to
arbitrarily
>> restrict computationalism.
>>
> As I think Brent has pointed out previously, any process can be
defined as a
> computation - this is another form of the Chinese room, I think,
the idea
> that since just about anything can be treated as performing a
computation if
> looked at in the rignt way, there is no way to get any meaning
into a
> computation - it's pure syntax without semantics.
The computation or brain creates its own meaning if it is the type of
computation or brain that generates consciousness.
Yes, the meaning has to be internal to the computation, it's a 1p
thing as we like to say around here, rather than 3p.
> I'm not sure how this restricts comp, however, because according
to comp
> there are an infinite number of abstract computations backing up
each moment
> of consciousness, and if you add to these a few computations
performed by
> rocks or Boltzmann brains (or ordinary brains) you aren't
actually adding
> anything to the existing infinity.
That's right. The restriction on comp is to say, for example, that
only computational devices with the right kind of counterfactual
behaviour can generate consciousness, which would negate step 8 of
the
UDA.
Yes, I still haven't had a satisfactory answer on what that would
mean for a computation - i.e. what physically differentiates
identical computations with different counterfactual add-ons that
don't actually get used.
It's confusing because comp assumes computation is done by classical
physics, but real physics is QM.
Comp assumes classical arithmetic, with classical in the usual boolean/
platonist sense. But QM assumes it too, and comp assumes no more
(except for the act of faith "yes doctor", at the meta-level).
Then you *assume* that there is a "real physics", which I guess mean
for you "primitive physics", and you assume it is QM, but with comp,
you can't assume that. It is an open problem, even if we know it is
already quantum like.
In QM the existence of possibilities that aren't realized affect
outcomes,
That are not realized in your branch, but still realized in the other
branches of some superposition.
just look up the Elitzur-Vaiman bomb detector. The Everett
interpretation of this is that those possibilities are realized in
other branches, and branches can interfere with one another.
OK. But it what the SWE describes literally.
Of course with comp that question becomes meaningless because
'physical" becomes secondary, and all computations passing through
a moment of consciousness are equivalent, whether in a brain, a
rock etc.
I'm not even sure what a computation passing through means. A I
understand it the UD can be thought of as an expanding number of
copies of some canonical Turing machine executing all possible
programs. So in total this array of computations will never repeat
the same state.
That is correct, for the UD, but the same (exactly the same) Turing
machine will be emulated an infinity of time, if only by more and more
complex universal machine implementing them. saying that it go through
the same state must be taken in the same sense that your states will
go to the same state in Washington and in Moscow, when you are at the
moment just before opening the door(s). It means a state close enough
to your relevant 3p states, which makes sense with comp.
The Turing machines are all the same so if two machines are in the
same state and their tapes are in the same state (and note that "at
the same time" is meaningless) then they will each do the same
computation. So the computations instantiating some "moment of
consciousness" must be different at some lower "microscopic" level;
otherwise they couldn't diverge in later steps.
OK. But a priori, this does not need the notion of microscopic level,
the same program can be implemented in Fortran, Lisp, Robinson
Arithmetic, combinators, and the UD execute them all, including a
dovetailing on all inputs and oracle (through their finite portion).
This entails many possibilities of divergence, even convergence, and
statistical interferences. Then the probability one ([]p & <>t)
provides a quantum logic when p is restricted to the UD* (when p is
sigma_1).
(Of course comp assumes there IS such a thing as a definable moment
of consciousness, by the nature of computation.)
I don't think it has to be sharply defined. If you assume the brain
instantiates consciousness, it's pretty clear that the brain is a
distributed asynchronous computer so computations are distributed in
both space and time and what corresponds to a "moment of
consciousness" (an atom of thought?) has duration corresponding to
what would be many computational steps in a digital emulation.
OK. Consciousness is related to an infinity of true arithmetical
relations, most about "you", in the 3p and 1p mode. In fact
consciousness here and now is related plausibly to an open set of
computational states. Some semantics for S4 and S4Grz can make this
more precise. It is not a coincidence that Brouwer was good in both
topology and intuitionistic logic. The first person is a sort of
topological object. S4Grz was discovered, by Grzegorczyk, in the
context of topological interpretation of intuitionist logic. S4Grz
provides an arithmetical interpretation of intuitionist logic, like
S4Grz1, Z1*, X1* provides an arithmetical interpretation of quantum
logic.
Consciousness is never attached to a computational state of some
machine, but to a complex mathematical reality surrounding that
states, and its relation with universal numbers. Infinitely of them
below its substitution level, and finitely many of them above. I think.
Bruno
Brent
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