On 8/20/2014 4:03 PM, LizR wrote:
On 21 August 2014 03:13, Bruno Marchal <[email protected] 
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:

    On 18 Aug 2014, at 19:31, meekerdb wrote:
    On 8/18/2014 1:35 AM, LizR wrote:
    Yes, I still haven't had a satisfactory answer on what that would mean for a
    computation - i.e. what physically differentiates identical computations 
with
    different counterfactual add-ons that don't actually get used.
    It's confusing because comp assumes computation is done by classical 
physics, but
    real physics is QM.
    Comp assumes classical arithmetic, with classical in the usual 
boolean/platonist
    sense. But QM assumes it too, and comp assumes no more (except for the act 
of faith
    "yes doctor", at the meta-level).


Surely comp assumes, to start with, that consciousness arises from a classical computation in the brain? This is where Brent's objections come in, if it isn't a classical computation but a quantum one, then comp fails at step 0 - unless a QC can be emulated by a CC, of course. Which I think maybe it can?

Yes, it can - although very slowly. My objection is based on the wholistic entanglement that would implied by quantum aspects of brain consciousness. It seems that the counterfactuals to be considered in step 8 would expand to essentially include the whole world so you would end up showing that the consciousness was instantiated by a simulation *relative to* a simulated world. This doesn't seem to be the absurdity needed to reject the premise - in fact it seems like what you might expect.

Brent

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