On 19 Aug 2014, at 00:27, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 18 August 2014 18:35, LizR <[email protected]> wrote:
On 18 August 2014 20:10, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 18 August 2014 14:24, LizR <[email protected]> wrote:
On 18 August 2014 15:49, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]>
wrote:
I think that a sustained stream of consciousness will probably
be part
of
a computation that instantiates physics - instantiates a whole
universe
complete with physics.
It would need to instantiate a stable enough universe that
something
capable
of computation can evolve there, I imagine. Certainly if one
assumes
that
the comp reversal doesn't happen.
I was thinking of the case where the comp reversal does happen. If
it
doesn't happen, then I don't think comp can be true.
I thought the comp reversal indicates that the computations don't
instantiate a universe (although they do instantiate the appearance
of one),
so taking this comment together with your first comment quoted
above, you're
"having your cake and eating it" here. Either comp is false in
which case
computations can instantiate a universe plus physics, or comp is
true and
they instantiate consciousness, and physics somehow appears as a
result.
Isn't that right?
I'm not entirely clear on Bruno's argument on this last point. The way
I see it, if a brain is simulated by a computer program, what is being
simulated is the physics; and if comp is true, that means that
simulating the physics will also reproduce the brain's consciousness.
I'm not sure about computations instantiating consciousness without
instantiating physics, and I'm not sure how instantiating the
appearance of physics is different to instantiating (virtual) physics.
This depends on the level. If the level is high (neuronal level,
perhaps with the glials chemical wave communication, but without the
details of the biochemical implementation of those wave), then you can
implement it without going into a simulation of the physics. In fact,
comp prevents you to do that, as below your level, you have the FPI on
the infinite works of the UD, which is a priori not emulable, (a point
endangered by the existence of the quantum computer, somehow, but we
have to verify this with Z1*).
Like you can emulate a computer by hand, without ever emulating the
electronic happening in a transistor.
Once you bet on a level, you might run it on any universal machine,
and in arithmetic, few of them will have any relation with the
quantum. The quantum would be what emerge on *all* machines below your
substitution level.
If we have quantum brain, the image is more subtle, as it means, with
comp, that we use already the logic of the FPI in our brain process.
In that case, the quantum "level" is by itself a priori above the
subst level, and this would entail that nature does not obey QM. QM
would be an approximation. I doubt this is the case, but who knows).
Bruno
However, the point that I wanted to make was that if computation
can
instantiate consciousness then there is nothing to stop a
recording, a
Boltzmann Brain, a rock and so on from doing so; for these
possibilities
have been used as arguments against computationalism or to
arbitrarily
restrict computationalism.
As I think Brent has pointed out previously, any process can be
defined
as a
computation - this is another form of the Chinese room, I think,
the
idea
that since just about anything can be treated as performing a
computation if
looked at in the rignt way, there is no way to get any meaning
into a
computation - it's pure syntax without semantics.
The computation or brain creates its own meaning if it is the type
of
computation or brain that generates consciousness.
Yes, the meaning has to be internal to the computation, it's a 1p
thing as
we like to say around here, rather than 3p.
I'm not sure how this restricts comp, however, because according
to comp
there are an infinite number of abstract computations backing up
each
moment
of consciousness, and if you add to these a few computations
performed
by
rocks or Boltzmann brains (or ordinary brains) you aren't actually
adding
anything to the existing infinity.
That's right. The restriction on comp is to say, for example, that
only computational devices with the right kind of counterfactual
behaviour can generate consciousness, which would negate step 8 of
the
UDA.
Yes, I still haven't had a satisfactory answer on what that would
mean for a
computation - i.e. what physically differentiates identical
computations
with different counterfactual add-ons that don't actually get used.
Of
course with comp that question becomes meaningless because 'physical"
becomes secondary, and all computations passing through a moment of
consciousness are equivalent, whether in a brain, a rock etc.
(Of course comp assumes there IS such a thing as a definable moment
of
consciousness, by the nature of computation.)
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