On 21 Aug 2014, at 21:38, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Aug 21, 2014 at 3:44 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
>> intelligence and consciousness would need to be unrelated for a
smart zombie to exist, but if that were the case then Evolution
could never have produced a conscious being and yet I know for a
fact that it did as least once. Therefore unlike fire breathing
dragons philosophical zombies are not only nonexistent but are also
logically contradictory.
> Proof?
I have explained 6.02*10^23 times why Evolution could have never
produced consciousness if it wasn't linked to intelligence; if you
disagree with some aspect of my argument then say so and we'll
thrash it out, but don't just mindlessly squawk "proof?".
> With comp, both *matter appearances* [...]
Who cares, I don't give a hoot in hell about "comp".
Boring repetitive rethorical trick. By definition you believe in comp,
as your quote above illustrates very well (your argument assumes comp,
but neither evoloution, nor anything 3p can prove that comp is
correct, so that philosophical zombies are logically conceivable. Not
really plausible, yet logically conceivable.
What you mean is that you believe that there is a flaw in UDA, but
your many attemps has been debunked many times, by many people on this
list.
> I still wait your solution to the exercise in my last post to you.
Huh, what exercise?
> Do you agree with the answer given (by Liz and others)?
I honestly have no idea what you're talking about.
I alluded to my reply to you that I made the 07 Aug 2014, and that I
called "August Exam", and which you have not yet answered.
Let me copy it below, to save your time:
=========
Hi all,
This is my reply to John Clark. You can skip toward the last paragraph
as it happens that the post ends with an exercise for everybody.
A test of your understanding of the First Person Indeterminacy (FPI).
It should not be difficult. It is the Exam Surprise of August :)
On 05 Aug 2014, at 18:27, John Clark wrote:
On Mon, Aug 4, 2014 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> the comp FPI is the simplest and strongest form of indeterminacy.
Well good for "comp" and good for the Foreign Policy Initiative.
> It does not need the quantum physics assumption
And quantum physics most assuredly does not need it!
Everett QM needs it.
> the real question is: do you accept that the indeterminacy on what
you (the H-guy) can expect
No I do not,
Could you quote the entire paragraph?
the question has a precise answer
Yes, you gave it in your preceding post. It was "I don't know", and
that is the FPI. We moved to step 4.
and does not require probability, but before I can give you that
precise answer I need to know what you mean by "the H-guy". Does it
mean:
1) John Clark?
2) The fellow currently experiencing Helsinki?
Now you regress again, and we will cycle. Just consult sane04, the
step 3 protocol is clear and has never change since the beginning.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
3) The fellow currently experiencing Moscow?
This looks like a precision, but is not.
4) The fellow currently experiencing Washington?
5) Any of the copies who remembers experiencing Helsinki?
You have agreed enough about identity to say that comp entails we
survive teleportation. So, you know the answer.
We ask you, John Clark, and the question is asked to you some moment
before you push the button.
And yes, we know that you John Clark, will be in both city, after the
experience is completed. But this does not answer the question, which
is about what you expect your life will turn in. We know also, as we
assume comp, that it will not turn into "I have the superposed
experience of being in the two city at once". It can only be "I have
the feeling of being in a precise city x". x is not ambiguous, it is
undetermined before you push the button and open the door.
If it's #1 the answer is Moscow and Washington. If it's #2 the
answer is oblivion. If it's #3 the answer is Moscow. If it's #4 the
answer is Washington. If it's #5 the answer is Moscow and
Washington. So the moral is, ask me a precise question and be
careful with the ambiguous pronouns and I will give you a precise
answer without any need of probabilities.
I answer by an exercise for everybody.
You are on Earth, and you need, for some reason, to go urgently on
Mars. Bad luck, you can't really afford the 100% secure quantum
classical teleportation channel Earth-Mars, but you have enough money
to take a channel where it is known that the probability of
eavesdropping is 1/4.
Now there will be two questions, according to the fact that the
eavesdropping is destructive, or not.
The eavesdropping is destructive when Eve, the "pirate", intercepts
the message, and prevents it to attain Mars.
The eavesdropping is non-destructive when Eve intercepts the message,
copies it, and let it attain Mars.
In both question the probability of eavesdropping is 1/4, and it is
supposed that Eve reconstitutes you in Hell, or some bad place.
You are on Earth, just before pushing the button. How do you evaluate
your chance to find yourself in hell?
a) with a destructive eavesdropping?
b) with a non-destructive eavesdropping?
Bruno
===============
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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