On 9/21/2014 9:46 PM, LizR wrote:
Surely Bruno doesn't think /anything /capable of (or having the potential for) computation is conscious? That includes my PC....which I must admit has been reluctant to open the DVD drive bay doors recently... not to mention that someone with a pencil, paper and a lot of time could by this definition create a conscious being.

I think that's exactly what he's saying:

"When you say "Bruno make's consciousness a potentiality of an axiomatic system", it would be more correct to say, that I attribute an actual conscious state, very raw, to the machine having that universal potentiallity. "

" I "really" (currently) tend to think that RA has a raw (even statical) form of consciousness, close to the consciousness of all babies, animal and perhaps plants."

"That raw basic consciousness is shared by my and yours laptop, it is the same consciousness, and it can differentiate maximally on all computational histories."

Brent:  Is it conscious no matter what program it's executing?
Bruno:  Yes.

That's why he can say consciousness is all-or-nothing (potentialities are all-or-nothing). That's why he thinks an infant is more conscious than an adult - it has more potential (but less realization). That's why he thinks losing all your memories would leave you with the same consciousness.

That's all follows from his definition and it's OK, although it's not the common meaning of "conscious". What's not OK is to then rely on the intuition that everybody knows what consciousness is and that no one can seriously doubt it's existence. Those statements are true of common usage of "conscious", but not necessarily true of Bruno's definition.

Brent


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