On 22 Sep 2014, at 01:11, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/21/2014 2:30 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>> And I also know for a fact that those very same chemicals
degrade my ability to behave intelligently, and that's exactly what
you'd expect if Darwin was right.
> Again, all I believe that can be said about this is that these
chemicals change the contents of your experience.
ALL?!! If you subtract the contents of your experience from your
consciousness there is nothing remaining.
Ever tried an isolation tank?
Here's the crux of the equivocation on "conscious" that bothers me.
Bruno apparently wants to define consciousness as a
potentiality for self-reference (a fixed point of reference).
Sorry, but you should read the post or the papers. I have never made
an attempt to define consciousness, nor numbers. For the numbers I ask
only to agree on PA, say. For consciousness, you understand what I
mean by that when I say that this is what the comp-practitioners will
keep when saying yes to the doctor, in the case that comp is true.
Then in AUDA, eventually consciousness is that things the machine
realize that 99% can be explained, but not a remaining 1% which is
absolutely "mystical", and indeed what is needed for having any
genuine first person experience.
This easily maps into theorems of provability in axiomatic systems.
Not that easily. The first person obeys S4, and self-reference
provability obeys G. You need Theaetetus, the dream argument, etc.
But then you have the miracle, that Gerson could not see, the meta
formal Theaetetus []p & p, leads to a meta-formalization on a notion
NON formalizable by the machine. This makes the first person knower
being a non propositional object. It admits no representation. The
most crazy thing, yet intuitively obvious, defended by all serious
phenomenologist is a theorem for the (correct) machines.
And that's fine. BUT he then also wants to say everybody knows what
consciousness is and it's existence is indubitable.
It is indubitable from the first person point of view. Descartes, the
(re)founder of Mechanism made that point clear. You cannot doubt
consciousness, because a genuine "doubt" needs to be a conscious
experience.
Raw consciousness, with comp, seems to be unconscious doubt, but that
is another topic, yet related to my previous post to you today.
Those two don't got together.
You make an implicit confusion between
1) third person (the correct machine, the provability system), that is
mainly what is defined in arithmetic by []p (p arithmetical
proposition, and "[]" Gödel's provability predicate).
2) the first person (the owner of knowledge, that we got with the []p
& p, and which is not really a machine, but only, in the eyes of God,
a filtration of God in particular realities. It has no name, and no
identity card possible.
Ramana Marhasi path consist in meditating on the question "Who am I",
which is what I ask to the machine, somehow, when defining in
arithmetic the hypostases or the universal-points-of-view.
The theory explains why those two things got together, and why they
seem, rightly not going together.
It is a key point. It is here that John Mikes should love the machine,
as the honest one are agnostic, even on comp, and realize their
modesty in communication, and possible infinite richness in
experiences. It is this points which somehow make mechanism the less
reductionist philosophy, for the human and Löbian affairs.
Hume remarked that whenever he was aware he was aware of some content.
I agree. That is the amazing thing in a complete amnesia. The raw
consciousness, when unfiltrated by the memories and complex relations,
has still a content, even an amazingly familiar content, which we
can't keep (completely) in the mundane state of consciousness for some
reason.
It quite possible to doubt that there is any such thing as direct of
experience of consciousness without content.
I agree. There is always a content. It is not that astonishing. The
content of memories can be seen as added to an initial content which
reflect our quality of universal Turing machine and person, even if
devoided of any particular memories. Computer science illustrated that
this is not trivial. The price of sigma_1 completeness is the pi_1
incompleteness. <>t is pi_1.
With computationalism, theology becomes a very hard part of arithmetic/
computer science, but this could have been expected.
That axiomatic systems admit such reference is a feature of language
which can seem to refer to itself.
I agree. Computer science illustrates this. It invites us to interview
the machine, in the scientific third person way, about its 3p self,
and about its soul (when we conjunct that 3p self with truth, or/and
consistency, etc.).
Bruno
Brent
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