On 04 Oct 2014, at 13:55, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:
what about Tegmarks' statement that consciousness is another form of
matter.
It contradicts computationalism. It runs against its own paper showing
that the brain can't exploit quantum coherence. I think makes also
Everett QM less likely, as computationalism marries very well with
Everett QM.
Assuming computationalism, and taking into account computer science,
and its most fundamental axiom, equivalent with Church thesis: it
exists a universal machine. (This makes all known one, even provably
so in PA, truly universal), we have
1) truth (truth of the arithmetical propositions, and we can
"represent "the" god from "outside" by the set of Gödel numbers of
the true first order logical arithmetical relations". Note that this
is far bigger than what any machine can figure out. Then we can define
2) the "man", the "man" is defined by the löbian universal number, and
extensionally they correspond to the sigma_1 complete set of
arithmetical sentences (universal machines),except that by Löbianity,
the set contains also the very fact that they are sigma_1 complete.
With comp, those days of good faith, you can know that you belong
there (at least, that is even in a sense which does not really depend
of comp, really). The man is the definition of PA in PA language, or
of any universal number in arithmetic (or a Turing equivalent theory).
here, if we do the things technically, we need to choose between the
calculus of the SK combinators + an induction axioms on cominators, or
the integers with induction, or the natural numbers + laws (add,
mult.) + induction, and we have to deffine that universal machine/
number explicilty, and that is what I denote by "[]", as the modal
logic G will formalize the correct provable (and non provable) logic
of that modality and its dual [], and <>). Here that set of truth
separate into the provable part by the machine, and the true part for
that machine, completely axiomatized at the propositional modal level
by G and G* respectively (by Solovay Theorem). You can see "[]" as a
rational scientist, at the G-view (3p by the machine, and divine 3p,
at the G* view)
3) that separation between the provable and the truth, does not just
separate proof and truth, it separates the accessible and justifiable
truth by (and about) the machine, and the knowable one. It makes the
rational scientist "[]" into a believer, always on the verge of saying
an idiocy, or in the kripke semantics, always able to fall into a cul-
de-sac world. But then this separates the logic of []p and the logic
of "[]p & p", and indeed the second one obey S4, and is axiomatized by
S4Grz. So we get a knower attach to all those Löbian number.
4) ... and it separates the knowledge coming from accessing a state,
from accessing a true state, but also from accessing a consistent
state, which is pretty for having a probability "one" notion ([]p &
<>p). The probability is one if all possible measurements gives the
same outcome, like "the cup of coffee" in the WM-duplication. A modal
box fomalize the probability one when it verifies []p -> <>p. That can
seen as a weakening of getting the truth (which usually entails the
possible in the context where the box entails the lozenge).
It is the points of view of the universal machines on itself:
p
[]p
[]p & p
[]p & <>p
[]p & <>p & p
There are others, and the second one ([]p) makes possible to tranlate
all the corresponding discourses ([]p &p, etc.) in arithmetical terms,
and testable, as the logic of the observable (the lattice of Hilbert
Space, or von Neuman algebra) is what you need to obtain with the []p
& p, []p & <>p, []p & <>p & p with p sigma_1.
Truth, including physics, is in your head. With comp, truth, including
physics, is in the head of any universal numbers, and the löbian one
are able to grasp the beginning of it, and to compare with theirr most
probable neighborhood.
If there is a discrepancy, this could mean diverse things:
- that we are failed by other digital entities in normal worlds (like
Boström type of simulation by descendent, or matrix,
- or we are "failed", or "processed" by non digital entities, that
is: classical comp is wrong
-or "classical" must be weakened, in which case the discrepancy can
disappear by some improvement of changes in the comp axioms. (But I am
not sure this make sense).
Bruno
-----Original Message-----
From: Richard Ruquist <[email protected]>
To: everything-list <[email protected]>
Sent: Sat, Oct 4, 2014 6:53 am
Subject: Re: generalizations_of_islam
"Nobody worships matter"
But many worship nature.
I do not see much difference.
Richard
On Fri, Oct 3, 2014 at 4:55 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
On 10/3/2014 10:20 AM, 'Chris de Morsella' via Everything List wrote:
>>A lot of evidence for some God (like the god Matter), is not a
proof of its existence, still less so in front of complex open
problems.
I have been having a very long argument -- on another list - with a
man whose intellect and mind I very much respect, but who is
irrationally attached to the notion of the god Matter. It has gone
on for over fifty back and forth posts and this person - who is
intelligent and very aware of events in the world and in the mind...
a man who has had deep spiritual experiences and is someone I
generally respect.
But my questioning of the "need" for actual real stuff in the
universe and my pointing out that fundamentally all we know about
the universe is information we can measure about it and that it is
information itself (and information processes - i.e. computation)
that seems to be - and arguably could be - fundamental... it hit a
brick wall in his brain. There is just no budging him on it and he
has become quite heated in his insistence on the existence of - as
you put it god Matter. It keeps creeping up in the arguments he
puts forth as a given.
It is a difficult problem to even get someone to question whether
or not this "god Matter" is even necessary for the formulation of
an explanation for reality.
Matter is something not very well defined, even in physics. It's
roughly fermions. But fermions are thought to be excitations of a
more fundamental field. That's why physicists like Max Tegmark are
led to propose it's math all the way down.
But it's pejorative to refer to it as "god". Nobody worships
matter. Physics textbooks don't have moral prescriptions derived
from QED. To call it "god" is to give into Bruno's desire to make
all fundamental science "theology".
Brent
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