Hi Spudboy100,
On 06 Oct 2014, at 13:31, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:
Ok, Bruno,
I follow, without true comprehension, despite the painstaking effort
you have made to educate me, sad to admit. Tegmark's comment is some
comprehensible, that it must sell, no matter how wrong it is. He
basically is saying, awareness and self-reflection is something
rather than nothing (in 4D space) as you, and the Australian
professor have presented (his Nothing book). I don't know how we can
Falsify either, to be honest.
Many people are on the right track. They might not know enough of
mathematical logic and computer science to see that with
computationalism, such approach becomes definite and testable, and
that machine can already explain some aspect of the quanta, *and* of
the qualia (accepting some definition and analysis of them, like from
Helmholtz to Mc Guinn or David Nyman, (you might re-read our posts on
this.
I am not sure where Clement Vidal stands on this-even though I
downloaded his Beginning and Ending book. I shall ask him, maybe.
Thanks.
I met him long years ago at the CLEA institute, which is in the
flemish part VUB of the ULB. The CLEA is a centrum for philosophical
talk and discussion in the honor of Leo Apostle (a logician). Our poor
university has split in two, following the political community
problems that happens in this country. I am not sure Vidal followed or
remember the talk I made there (I guess about 20 years ago). His book
seems nice in the questioning, but I have not the time now to study
it, and at first sight he is still unaware of the possible consequence
of computationalism. What he says might fit very well, but probably
not the basic ontology, I am not sure. I have downloaded it.
Best,
Bruno
Regards,
Mitch
-----Original Message-----
From: Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
To: everything-list <[email protected]>
Sent: Sun, Oct 5, 2014 12:37 pm
Subject: Re: generalizations_of_islam
On 04 Oct 2014, at 13:55, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:
what about Tegmarks' statement that consciousness is another form
of matter.
It contradicts computationalism. It runs against its own paper
showing that the brain can't exploit quantum coherence. I think
makes also Everett QM less likely, as computationalism marries very
well with Everett QM.
Assuming computationalism, and taking into account computer science,
and its most fundamental axiom, equivalent with Church thesis: it
exists a universal machine. (This makes all known one, even provably
so in PA, truly universal), we have
1) truth (truth of the arithmetical propositions, and we can
"represent "the" god from "outside" by the set of Gödel numbers of
the true first order logical arithmetical relations". Note that this
is far bigger than what any machine can figure out. Then we can define
2) the "man", the "man" is defined by the löbian universal number,
and extensionally they correspond to the sigma_1 complete set of
arithmetical sentences (universal machines),except that by
Löbianity, the set contains also the very fact that they are sigma_1
complete. With comp, those days of good faith, you can know that you
belong there (at least, that is even in a sense which does not
really depend of comp, really). The man is the definition of PA in
PA language, or of any universal number in arithmetic (or a Turing
equivalent theory). here, if we do the things technically, we need
to choose between the calculus of the SK combinators + an induction
axioms on cominators, or the integers with induction, or the natural
numbers + laws (add, mult.) + induction, and we have to deffine that
universal machine/number explicilty, and that is what I denote by
"[]", as the modal logic G will formalize the correct provable (and
non provable) logic of that modality and its dual [], and <>). Here
that set of truth separate into the provable part by the machine,
and the true part for that machine, completely axiomatized at the
propositional modal level by G and G* respectively (by Solovay
Theorem). You can see "[]" as a rational scientist, at the G-view
(3p by the machine, and divine 3p, at the G* view)
3) that separation between the provable and the truth, does not just
separate proof and truth, it separates the accessible and
justifiable truth by (and about) the machine, and the knowable one.
It makes the rational scientist "[]" into a believer, always on the
verge of saying an idiocy, or in the kripke semantics, always able
to fall into a cul-de-sac world. But then this separates the logic
of []p and the logic of "[]p & p", and indeed the second one obey
S4, and is axiomatized by S4Grz. So we get a knower attach to all
those Löbian number.
4) ... and it separates the knowledge coming from accessing a state,
from accessing a true state, but also from accessing a consistent
state, which is pretty for having a probability "one" notion ([]p &
<>p). The probability is one if all possible measurements gives the
same outcome, like "the cup of coffee" in the WM-duplication. A
modal box fomalize the probability one when it verifies []p -> <>p.
That can seen as a weakening of getting the truth (which usually
entails the possible in the context where the box entails the
lozenge).
It is the points of view of the universal machines on itself:
p
[]p
[]p & p
[]p & <>p
[]p & <>p & p
There are others, and the second one ([]p) makes possible to
tranlate all the corresponding discourses ([]p &p, etc.) in
arithmetical terms, and testable, as the logic of the observable
(the lattice of Hilbert Space, or von Neuman algebra) is what you
need to obtain with the []p & p, []p & <>p, []p & <>p & p with p
sigma_1.
Truth, including physics, is in your head. With comp, truth,
including physics, is in the head of any universal numbers, and the
löbian one are able to grasp the beginning of it, and to compare
with theirr most probable neighborhood.
If there is a discrepancy, this could mean diverse things:
- that we are failed by other digital entities in normal worlds
(like Boström type of simulation by descendent, or matrix,
- or we are "failed", or "processed" by non digital entities, that
is: classical comp is wrong
-or "classical" must be weakened, in which case the discrepancy can
disappear by some improvement of changes in the comp axioms. (But I
am not sure this make sense).
Bruno
-----Original Message-----
From: Richard Ruquist <[email protected]>
To: everything-list <[email protected]>
Sent: Sat, Oct 4, 2014 6:53 am
Subject: Re: generalizations_of_islam
"Nobody worships matter"
But many worship nature.
I do not see much difference.
Richard
On Fri, Oct 3, 2014 at 4:55 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 10/3/2014 10:20 AM, 'Chris de Morsella' via Everything List wrote:
>>A lot of evidence for some God (like the god Matter), is not a
proof of its existence, still less so in front of complex open
problems.
I have been having a very long argument -- on another list - with
a man whose intellect and mind I very much respect, but who is
irrationally attached to the notion of the god Matter. It has gone
on for over fifty back and forth posts and this person - who is
intelligent and very aware of events in the world and in the mind...
a man who has had deep spiritual experiences and is someone I
generally respect.
But my questioning of the "need" for actual real stuff in the
universe and my pointing out that fundamentally all we know about
the universe is information we can measure about it and that it is
information itself (and information processes - i.e. computation)
that seems to be - and arguably could be - fundamental... it hit a
brick wall in his brain. There is just no budging him on it and he
has become quite heated in his insistence on the existence of - as
you put it god Matter. It keeps creeping up in the arguments he
puts forth as a given.
It is a difficult problem to even get someone to question whether
or not this "god Matter" is even necessary for the formulation of
an explanation for reality.
Matter is something not very well defined, even in physics. It's
roughly fermions. But fermions are thought to be excitations of a
more fundamental field. That's why physicists like Max Tegmark are
led to propose it's math all the way down.
But it's pejorative to refer to it as "god". Nobody worships
matter. Physics textbooks don't have moral prescriptions derived
from QED. To call it "god" is to give into Bruno's desire to make
all fundamental science "theology".
Brent
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