On 13 Oct 2014, at 02:13, meekerdb wrote:

On 10/12/2014 2:31 PM, LizR wrote:
On 12 October 2014 16:11, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
Just like I have a problem with Bruno's theory because it imputes consciousness to information processing like DNA, the "nothing but information processing" theory needs to explain what is different about my conscious information processing and the great majority of my information processing which is subconscious. Is there "awareness" associated with that subconscious information processing that is just not *my* awareness?

Exactly. I believe Mr Dennett has an explanation for this, along the lines of awareness being "a user illusion, like a desktop".

That seems to assume user who is having the illusion. And that may just be a view we're "tricked" into taking by our language, but it still leaves the question of exactly what kind of information processing produces a "user illusion"? I think Bruno's idea is too expansive. I've offered my own idea: that it's producing an internal narrative journal for purposes of learning and future reference.

But that is equal to mine, just less precise. A universal machine is a machine with some tape, and internal narrative (like the "[] defined in RA).

But from this you get the truncation, and the FPI problem, etc.It is not an answer, but a question.

Oops I have to go. Bye.

Bruno




Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Reply via email to