On 10/16/2014 5:59 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 16 October 2014 13:31, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
If consciousness is merely a side-effect of conscious-like behaviour then
zombies
are impossible.
What do you mean by a side effect? Do you mean something that would necessarily be
"physically incoherent" (according to Graziano, and correctly so, given his
assumptions)? IOW, something-or-other that is over and above an exhaustive analysis of
physically-defined entities or processes? He clearly states that believing in such
things is unnecessary and wrong.
For example, increase in entropy?
I still maintain that the consciousness-deniers can't really think that
they're
unconscious since that would be absurd.
As to what consciousness-deniers can or cannot think, in this case why not take him at
his word? He clearly states that in his view and that of his colleagues *there is no
subjective impression*. What exists, in his view, are computations (or more correctly
their physical instantiations) and these are fully sufficient to account for all the
internal and external manifestations (including those labelled as "perceptions",
"thoughts" and "feelings") we naively take to be "subjective impressions". Consequently,
he concludes, there is no need whatsoever, on this basis, to believe in any such
impressions.
How does that last follow? Isn't our naively taking them to be "subjective" and
believing in them also nomologically entailed by the physical processes?
Seems to me it's a kind of empty theory; like saying "It's all computation" but without
saying why some computations seem to instantiate me and some don't.
Brent
I agree that this conclusion amounts to a reductio ad absurdum, but he clearly believes
it and at least he's done us the favour of making this abundantly clear.
David
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