On Wednesday, October 15, 2014, David Nyman <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 13 October 2014 16:05, Bruno Marchal <[email protected] > <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');>> wrote: > > That is the difference between []p and []p & p. The difference is null, >> extensionally, from the point of view or the arithmetical truth. But the >> difference is huge from both the body and soul points of view. Neither []p >> nor []p & p will ever justify or know that []p and []p & p define the same >> set of beliefs or knowledge. True, but unjustifiable. >> > > Graziano writes: > > "But the argument here is that there is no subjective impression; there is > only information in a data-processing device. When we look at a red apple, > the brain computes information about color. It also computes information > about the self and about a (physically incoherent) property of subjective > experience. The brain’s cognitive machinery accesses that interlinked > information and derives several conclusions: There is a self, a me; there > is a red thing nearby; there is such a thing as subjective experience; and > I have an experience of that red thing. Cognition is captive to those > internal models. Such a brain would inescapably conclude it has subjective > experience." > > If I understand you correctly, what he is describing above is []p. What is > missing from his account is []p & p, presumably because he has concluded > that a belief in p is sufficient in the absence of p! Note that he states > (correctly) that p is "physically incoherent", which gives a clue to his > prior ontological commitments. Of course []p is a necessary component of > the account, but it is not sufficient. Indeed the fact that it is necessary > is often incompletely grasped (e.g. in Craig's theory) but it's > insufficiency can also be elusive, especially for those in the grip of a > dogma. If it were indeed sufficient, then neither matter nor arithmetic > could entail more than a wilderness of zombies. > > What bamboozles this kind of reductionism is that p cannot be > propositionally justified. It is not another proposition but rather the > truth of the propositions that correctly refer to it. Hence its absence > would force rejection of the veracity of all claims to its possession. It > would force not only the conclusion that the propositionally-correct claims > of others are false, but that our own are equally in error. In other words, > that both they and we are zombies. This is, in effect, what Graziano is > claiming, however absurdly, in the above passage. I don't agree with > Stathis that he is really making a claim of epiphenomenalism; he is clear > enough that "the argument here is that there is no subjective impression". > He really is claiming that there are only zombies despite all propositional > claims to the contrary. > I guess he would say, as Dennett does, that zombies are impossible. > One might think that, stated as baldly as this, such a conclusion would be > as effective a reductio as one could wish. After all, "When one has > eliminated the impossible......etc." However, when one has a prior > commitment to third-person absolutism (to cite Professor Dennett's personal > epithet) it may only be acceptable to believe that "whatever remains, > however improbable, must be the truth". Such a position might seem to be > unsustainable in practice without resorting to what one might call > metaphysical and conceptual grand larceny. In other words, it's pretty much > impossible for discussion of such a schema to proceed without constant > reference to first-personal phenomena and concepts (beginning with "we" and > "our") that can have no ultimate validity in its own terms. > > I've been re-reading Patricia Churchland recently in a sincere attempt to > understand this kind of position in a more nuanced way, and her view is > that, in terms of some ultimate neuroscience, all such first-person > concepts will be completely eliminable. That is, she believes that a future > neuroscience will be capable of fully characterising a mechanism that > "computes" the existence of first-person phenomena when "in reality" they > are entirely fictitious. The theory of such a mechanism, in her view, will > simply eliminate our current "folk theory" of the first-person much as the > modern theory of combustion has replaced that of phlogiston. This seems > pretty close to what Graziano is saying in this piece. It's at least a > mercy that Churchland thinks that such a goal lies beyond any current > conceptual horizon and hence a long way in the future, so we may get to > linger here a little longer before the grin disappears with the rest of the > cat. > > Frankly, I conclude that there's no arguing with some people. > > David > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','everything-list%[email protected]');> > . > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');>. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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