On 16 October 2014 18:05, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
On 10/16/2014 5:59 AM, David Nyman wrote: > > On 16 October 2014 13:31, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote: > > If consciousness is merely a side-effect of conscious-like behaviour >> then zombies are impossible. >> > > What do you mean by a side effect? Do you mean something that would > necessarily be "physically incoherent" (according to Graziano, and > correctly so, given his assumptions)? IOW, something-or-other that is over > and above an exhaustive analysis of physically-defined entities or > processes? He clearly states that believing in such things is unnecessary > and wrong. > > > For example, increase in entropy? > I presume Graziano would say that what we mean by entropy is, in the final analysis, indistinguishable from the processes constituting what is so characterised, just as he claims that conscious states of the brain are indistinguishable from the processes constituting what is so characterised. To be consistent, his view would have to be that it is unnecessary and wrong to believe that either entropy or consciousness are anything over and above their exhaustively analysed physical bases. > > > > I still maintain that the consciousness-deniers can't really think >> that they're unconscious since that would be absurd. >> > > As to what consciousness-deniers can or cannot think, in this case why > not take him at his word? He clearly states that in his view and that of > his colleagues *there is no subjective impression*. What exists, in his > view, are computations (or more correctly their physical instantiations) > and these are fully sufficient to account for all the internal and external > manifestations (including those labelled as "perceptions", "thoughts" and > "feelings") we naively take to be "subjective impressions". Consequently, > he concludes, there is no need whatsoever, on this basis, to believe in any > such impressions. > > > How does that last follow? Isn't our naively taking them to be > "subjective" and believing in them also nomologically entailed by the > physical processes? > Yes, obviously. He's saying that this is *sufficient* (as opposed to merely necessary) to account for everything about consciousness that requires explanation, including all claims to the possession of "subjective impressions". Consequently, in his view, we shouldn't take our belief in our own subjectivity to be evidence of anything over and above the nomological entailment of certain physical processes. > Seems to me it's a kind of empty theory; like saying "It's all > computation" but without saying why some computations seem to instantiate > me and some don't. > Well, since he believes that we aren't conscious in the first place, perhaps he also thinks that some states of the brain are even more unconscious than others! David > > Brent > > I agree that this conclusion amounts to a reductio ad absurdum, but he > clearly believes it and at least he's done us the favour of making this > abundantly clear. > > David > >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
