On 16 October 2014 13:31, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote:

If consciousness is merely a side-effect of conscious-like behaviour then
> zombies are impossible.
>

What do you mean by a side effect? Do you mean something that would
necessarily be "physically incoherent" (according to Graziano, and
correctly so, given his assumptions)? IOW, something-or-other that is over
and above an exhaustive analysis of physically-defined entities or
processes? He clearly states that believing in such things is unnecessary
and wrong.

I still maintain that the consciousness-deniers can't really think that
> they're unconscious since that would be absurd.
>

As to what consciousness-deniers can or cannot think, in this case why not
take him at his word? He clearly states that in his view and that of his
colleagues *there is no subjective impression*. What exists, in his view,
are computations (or more correctly their physical instantiations) and
these are fully sufficient to account for all the internal and external
manifestations (including those labelled as "perceptions", "thoughts" and
"feelings") we naively take to be "subjective impressions". Consequently,
he concludes, there is no need whatsoever, on this basis, to believe in any
such impressions. I agree that this conclusion amounts to a reductio ad
absurdum, but he clearly believes it and at least he's done us the favour
of making this abundantly clear.

David

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