On 19 Oct 2014, at 15:26, David Nyman wrote:
On 19 October 2014 02:10, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]>
wrote:
Whether I find it satisfactory or not is a different question. The
point I was making is that people who find it satisfactory express
this belief idea by claiming that consciousness does not exist.
Assuming that you don't, in fact, find it satisfactory, I'd be
interested in your reasons. Given the assumption of the exhaustive
adequacy of physical reduction, Graziano would appear to be quite
correct in his assessment that the idea of any "left over"
phenomenon, after correlation of conscious states with the relevant
physical processes, is "physically incoherent". On the same
assumptions, we clearly cannot cite any *judgement* to the contrary
as evidence of any such supernumerary phenomenon, as any such
judgement must likewise be nomologically entailed by physical law.
If so, what reason can you cite for believing that there is any such
thing?
Very good question, of course: the hard question.
Note that up to some point, we can "eliminate consciousness" to, in
appearance.
Take the UDA: the first person, there (unlike AUDA) admit a pure third
person description: the content of the diary that the person takes
with her in the multiplication (in arithmetic or in the QM universal
matrix, whatever).
The magic is described in the diaries, the person get information (in
shannon sense) from apparently nowhere (they don't feel the split).
To share that information with other, we need the first person plural,
and the hope that the computations which makes us interact are among
the winning one. That might already suggest universal group like the
unitary group.
But up to now, this picture does not yet address the hard question,
despite it explains the content of the personal diaries.
What will specifically address that question is the Theatetus idea. By
definition, the owner of the diary has the content of the diary as
experience, making them true at that self-observation level: it
guatantie the link between provability and truth, but by
incompleteness, you have to make explicit in the definition of the
"knowability" even for the correct prover/believer (which is an
amazing consequence of Gödel Löb theorems). This entails the splitting
between the truth accessible to the machine from its perspective, and
its ability to see that too, which is the case for machines believing
in some induction axioms. That splitting entails also the very
existence of all the nuances between the (8) points of view. The
ideally correct universal machine is born in arithmetic with already
psychological and theological internal conflicts. But the more it
introspects, the more it get the picture of the abyssalness of its
ignorance, making it naturally humble in front of the possible truth,
and humble in front of the bridges between truth, belief,
observation, sensations, and knowledge.
UDA pers se address only the hard matter appearance problem, I think
from some of your post you understood that AUDA does address the hard
question, and gives perhaps the most we can hope for when assuming
computation: the theory of consciousness and person is similar as the
theory of god: it is a negative theory: you are not this, nor that, etc.
Bruno
Bruno
David
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