On 21 October 2014 17:58, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 20 Oct 2014, at 00:56, David Nyman wrote: > > On 19 October 2014 17:48, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> On 19 Oct 2014, at 15:26, David Nyman wrote: >> >> On 19 October 2014 02:10, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> Whether I find it satisfactory or not is a different question. The point >>> I was making is that people who find it satisfactory express this belief >>> idea by claiming that consciousness does not exist. >>> >> >> Assuming that you don't, in fact, find it satisfactory, I'd be interested >> in your reasons. Given the assumption of the exhaustive adequacy of >> physical reduction, Graziano would appear to be quite correct in his >> assessment that the idea of any "left over" phenomenon, after correlation >> of conscious states with the relevant physical processes, is "physically >> incoherent". On the same assumptions, we clearly cannot cite any >> *judgement* to the contrary as evidence of any such supernumerary >> phenomenon, as any such judgement must likewise be nomologically entailed >> by physical law. If so, what reason can you cite for believing that there >> is any such thing? >> >> Very good question, of course: the hard question. >> >> Note that up to some point, we can "eliminate consciousness" to, in >> appearance. >> > > Yes, because what is empirically available is restricted (by definition) > to the physics of appearance. > > > (I need to be technical on this, but I might try to translate latter, or > to simplify, or to criticize) > > Actually I was thinking about something else, like reducing the mind body > problem to the body problem, like in the UDA, and then extracting physics > from that problem (by finding the right statistic on the relative personal > diaries). > > This might have made sense, if the quantum logics were appearing in the > S4Grz1, Z 1or X1 logics, and forgetting all about the S4Grz1*, Z1*, and X1* > star. (I can argue this would have lead to solipsism (no first person > plural discourse) and to a Quantum mechanics with collapse, in fact > superposition would not be contagious to the *conscious* observer. This > would have led to a QM with a consciousness reducing the wave packet, but > only in the diaries, and that could be taken as an illusion in some > coherent way. > It is avery funny theory: it is a non-collapse QM, where consciousness > describe itself as the collapser of the wave. There is no collapse, only > because that consciousness does not exist! > (Not sure it makes sense for a non zombie tough!) > If QM appears only at S4Grz1the idea above would make some more sense, but > still hard to swallow for any non-zombie entity). The reason here is that > S4Grz1 = S4Grz1* > > But now the qualia and quanta appear at the star pov (Z1*, X1*, S4Grz1*), > and all the differences between S4Grz, Z, and X (and the comp one S4Grz1, > X1, Z1) come from the G/G* splitting, so the true non justifiable invites > itself in the picture, keeping the many nuances brought by those different > logics). > > In fact I revive some of your old critics of comp, like it can be > considered as eliminating consciousness too, because it might make logical > sense, in case physics did not appear exclusively in the star logic. A good > thing, because it makes Everett-QM confirming the sharing of the histories > by many people. This is better than Albert-Loewer theory, which get > multi-solipsist. > > > The default assumption, as Graziano succinctly notes, is that the details > of this apparent physical mechanism (at least in some ideal form) exhaust > both the ontological and the epistemological catalogues. > > > Only with actual infinite magic in the details. I guess you saw this, then > formally it is even clearer, but a bit of this could have been the case, if > physics appear in the non star logics. Not sure the computation can > interfere in that setting. We get all isolated in such setting, from each > others. > > > > > Consequently, in this sense, appeals to the putative existence of anything > over and above such an exhaustive account must be "physically incoherent". > If one takes a sufficiently hard line (and I do!) it becomes apparent that > this mode of explanation gobbles up competitors like some inexorable > flesh-eating microbe. Anything "meta-physical" (such as "computation", > under these assumptions) merely degenerates, under observation, into one or > another physical approximation. > > > Yes, and even physics is no more clear, because the theories use > explicitly arithmetical relations. Indeed in string theory you need to > believe that some infinite sum of all natural numbers is equal to -1/12, > independently of you, to get the right mass of the photon! > > Then computation is a notion which exists even more as it does not need > any axiom of infinity, and the existent computations are provably existent, > even already in RA. No need of induction axiom. > > In fact, for a logician, to believe in the physical laws, together with > the belief that they apply here and now, is equivalent with a *very* strong > induction axiom. Induction are self-limitation axiom. When you define an > object per induction, like defining the number by 0 is a number, and if x > is a number s(x) is a number, and then you want to say that only those > things are number, and nothing else: you can add induction axioms, up to > make the notion haing a unique interpretation, but in that case you will > need to induce on transfinities of object, and the theory is no more > proof-checkable. In some context you can been led to contradiction. may be > the primitive universe is a contradictory notion, even without comp. > > Sorry for being perhaps too much technical, but it helps me to think a bit > aloud, inspired by your remark. > > With comp, asserting the existence of a reality leads to a contradiction, > in case there is a reality! > > Only religion studies or assume realities, and as such are contradictory > with comp at the start. But the original theologian were not assuming a > reality, only interrogating it, and that is present in many part of > religion, but usually not at the per-authority mainstream levels (for > historical reasons). > > > > >> Take the UDA: the first person, there (unlike AUDA) admit a pure third >> person description: the content of the diary that the person takes with her >> in the multiplication (in arithmetic or in the QM universal matrix, >> whatever). >> >> The magic is described in the diaries, the person get information (in >> shannon sense) from apparently nowhere (they don't feel the split). >> >> To share that information with other, we need the first person plural, >> and the hope that the computations which makes us interact are among the >> winning one. That might already suggest universal group like the unitary >> group. >> >> But up to now, this picture does not yet address the hard question, >> despite it explains the content of the personal diaries. >> >> What will specifically address that question is the Theatetus idea. By >> definition, the owner of the diary has the content of the diary as >> experience, making them true at that self-observation level: >> > > So there is, as it were, a primary "level of truth" - that of > self-observation itself - that is given *by definition*? > > > The truth is always the truth of one or more arithmetical proposition, > interpreted in the "well known" (N, 0, +, *) structure. > > Now, the machine (a 3p notion, definable in arithmetic) can refer to > itself, and to computable transformation of itself. This is explained by > the Dx = "xx" method, or relies on Kleene's recursion theorem. All this > correspond to 3p truth, and indeed provable by theories like PA or ZF, and > satisfied in their model (but for ZF the notion of standard model is more > doubtful, ZF might be believing already too much. > > But what happen now, is that the machine cannot link in a general way, the > justifiable 3p truth ([]p), with the truth of p, that with the fact that p. > So []p and []p & p does not obey the same logic. It makes the "[]p" into a > belief, but it makes also the []p & p" into a knowledge, or subjective > truth, having no definition available for the machine (only a fuzzy > pointer, like "I" or "God", or "Universe", etc.) > > > > I mean a level that is, in itself, distinct from whatever relative truths > may be implied by the content, or what-is-observed. > > > It is more elementary I think. It is the truth of arithmetical > proposition, and machine uttering or accessing such proposition. When true, > the corresponding "[]p & p" (the knower associate to the machine) obeys a > different logic than the logic of the utterer as seen from a 3p point of > view. Accepting classical ancient definition: self-referential machines > have soul. >
Yes indeed. What I had in mind was that the level of the utterer/knower corresponds to something like a first-personal (incontrovertible) truth, with a logic bound up with, but distinct from, that of any third-personal correlative mechanism. The denial of this level of truth is essentially the view that the expressed beliefs of such utterers have no actual referent. There is no knower: there is essentially nothing whatsoever beyond the mechanisms themselves nor anyone to know about it. In point of fact, this is what Graziano wants us to accept: that there is, finally, no "us". His slogan is: let mechanism stand by itself. The problem with this view, however, is that, without an explicit epistemology, no "mechanism" can even hold itself together. Whatever may have been putatively accepted, at the outset, as a mechanism can no longer, absent an explicit point-of-view, be meaningfully particularised. What's left is merely the postulated ontological base. As you remarked, even comp, on this basis, would degenerate to mere arithmetical relations. After our recent discussions, I think we concur on this. > > > >> it guatantie the link between provability and truth, >> > > Guarantee in what sense? > > > In a very naïve sense, that by defining knowledge, not just by its company > with truth (after all, as we limit ourself to correct machine, this would > again make []p and ([]p when p) the same, but by its formal company with > truth, making the individual []p into the non definable (by the machine) > []p & p. This obeys a very different logic, which describes well the > phenomenological account of the first person (no name, the owner of a body, > its S4 knowledge logic, ...). > > The machine cannot say "I know that snow is white", but the machine can > say "snow is white, and I believe that snow is white". For each individual > she can assert such knowledge, and as we know she is correct (assuming > arithmetic, of course) we can see that this obeys a different logic than > the 3p-correct-justifiability, and indeed a knower logic, even an non > definable knower logic. > Is this consistent with what I say above? > > >> but by incompleteness, you have to make explicit in the definition of the >> "knowability" even for the correct prover/believer (which is an amazing >> consequence of Gödel Löb theorems). This entails the splitting between the >> truth accessible to the machine from its perspective, and its ability to >> see that too, >> > > Do you mean: to see that the accessible truth is restricted to its (the > machine's) particular perspective? > > > I mean that the machine is made unable to see that she is a machine. She > can bet she is a machine proving a theorem, but she cannot related its > "truth feeling" for that theorem, with any description of the 3p way used > to get that theorem. > > Graziano seems to talk like he knew the substitution level (in UDA term). > We can't know that. By betting on a substitution level, we equate the []p > and the []p & p, acting like our own G*, but we can't justify our > correctness, which would be needed for doing this scientifically. > > Graziano is dangerous, because he seems to believe that we could offer > artificial brain to a patient guarantying the survive, where in fact it has > to be always a bet. The choice of a level, is a religion instantiating > computationalism. > Computationalism will split into two main forms; the low-level-ist and the > high-level-list. That will mirror the non-comp/comp division, but also the > materialist and the mystic (which here will means those saying yes to the > doctor, because they are attached to the material reality, and those saying > no to the doctor, because they want take some rest. That is for tomorrow. > > > > > >> which is the case for machines believing in some induction axioms. >> > > What axioms in particular? > > > If 0 is even, and if (n is even implies that s(n) is even), then all > numbers n are even. > > If y = 1 is the derivative of y = x, and if (the derivative of x^n is > n*(x^(n-1) implies that the derivative of x^(n+1) =(n+1)*(x^n)), then the > derivative of y = x^n is equal to (x^(n-1) for all n). > > That is all the formula of the type > > [ P(0) & (P(n) -> P(n+1)) ] -> for all n P(n). With P a property > definable in the language of the machine. > > It is not inductive inference, but the mathematical induction axioms. > > We can get non computable "theories" or "super-machine" by allowing > stringer form of induction axiom. We get the "arithmetical god" formally by > replacing the P(n) above by S(n) with the meaning that is an arbitrary set > of numbers S. In that case, the theorems is no more a mechanically > generable set, and we are out the working hypothesis. In fact when we do > that we do analysis, or second order arithmetic. That remain Löbian, but is > no more machine. of course Löbian machine can do theories about that, like > us, and arithmetic contains a lot of those no-machine entities. They are > like Oracle machines, super-machine, etc. They exist in arithmetical truth, > but above the sigma_1 level (the machine accessible level). > I agree with John Clark that such things are not really plausible on the > physical plane, but that is an obvious complex open problem. Actually, > machine cannot distinguish gods from machine much more complex than > themselves. Like spudboy suggested, we can't distinguish a god with an > alien much more advanced than us, in case he want play with us.. > > > > > > > >> That splitting entails also the very existence of all the nuances between >> the (8) points of view. The ideally correct universal machine is born in >> arithmetic with already psychological and theological internal conflicts. >> > > Can you make a distinction here between what you consider psychological, > and what theological? > > > Accepting that the psyche is mainly the same as the soul, the > psychological is included properly in the theological. The theological is > concerned with the first person or third person truth that we cannot > communicate, or only with special caution (like I explained once with the > notion of consistency). > > Basically the psychological is in both G and G*, S4Grz, Z and Z*. > > The proper theological part is in G* \ G (the set subtraction of G from > G*, truth minus provability), and its intensional variant, Z* \ Z, X* \ X. > > Crazily enough S4Grz* \ S4Grz is empty. It is not obvious to prove, but as > Boolos says, it corroborates some intutionistic confusion between proof and > truth. It is the solipsist condition of the soul of the correct machine, > apparently. > > > > > > >> But the more it introspects, the more it get the picture of the >> abyssalness of its ignorance, making it naturally humble in front of the >> possible truth, and humble in front of the bridges between truth, belief, >> observation, sensations, and knowledge. >> > > Its ignorance can hardly be more abysmal than my own! > > > yeah ... > With computationalism, you need to come back to math. It is needed for the > computer science. > > (I guess that is the bad news). > > > >> UDA pers se address only the hard matter appearance problem, I think from >> some of your post you understood that AUDA does address the hard question, >> and gives perhaps the most we can hope for when assuming computation: the >> theory of consciousness and person is similar as the theory of god: it is a >> negative theory: you are not this, nor that, etc. >> > > Yes, I have some sense of how the "something over and above" can be > intelligibly situated in terms of AUDA, although I am painfully aware of > the limitations in my grasp of the detail. > > > I can try to sum up, but sane04 already sum it up in the second part of > the paper. > > The real bomb here are the discovery of the (Turing) universal machine, > and Church's thesis, and the closure of the semi-computable for > diagonalization, then Gödel's theorem, and then to get at least the > soundness theorem of G and G* for formal theories or correct machines (the > easy part of Solovay theorem). > > I recommend Boolos 1979, but it needs some course in logic before. But you > don't need to understand all the details. Only a part of it. Ask any > question. (But I am in teaching period, so expect delays) > > > > Paradoxically (or perhaps not so much) what has helped me is sticking to a > hard line on physicalist, or (which is the same) physical-computationalist, > modes of explanation, because eventually it becomes so apparent that > "something over and above" is made incoherent by the limiting assumptions > of these schemas. For this reason, I find honest physicalists like > Graziano, or Churchland more helpful than those who fudge the issues and > hence make the contradictions harder to expose. > > > I like them for that too. They are clear and honest. Then they confirm > that physicalism is not coherent with the type of comp I describe, because > what I say needs the concept of consciousness: comp is mainly the idea that > my consciousness is invariant for some digital substitution. If > consciousness does not exist, then I can say yes to the doctor who suggests > to put *anything* at the place of my brain. > > But Graziano and Churchland illustrates also the danger of such view. It > makes the individual into a zombie. I don't like that at a time when > politician stop to invest in education, and makes laws which take away > responsibility or people. > > Many apology for getting technical, but that is what AUDA is, and I feel > its solved some possible critics you made. I just realize that all this is > indeed rather subtle, and I might need to say more on each hypostases. > > But if I am too clear, people will believe I do religion, when I am just > translating what machines explains when looking inward. > > Truth is in the head of all universal machine, and the Löbian are those > who somehow found it already. Of course they will never tell you, and they > want not talk about that, so you need to do some arithmetical surgery, or > to promise them that you will never claiming anything as true, which I do > with that "assuming comp", "limiting ourselves to correct machines", etc. > > There is a sort of theological trap when forgetting that we do theories. > We fall into it more than once with the human religions, and I think that a > lack of caution can make us fall again, even in the machine theology. > In arithmetic, it is also a fact that you have the dreams of the machines > which fall in the theological trap all the time. That lack of cautiousness > might be the reason why souls fall, in the neoplatonist theologies. I don't > know, of course. Is it temporary? Is it necessary? > > Bruno > > > > > > > > > David > > >> Bruno >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> David >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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