Very well, and now we go to the primal. I am presuming, but who wrote the programs for computationalism, who thought the great thought, who made Plato's ideals? We see cause and effect in nature on our planet. What causes lightning and thunder, or droughts, or earthquakes, and so forth, however, these are local events, or apparently local, in the sense of this region of the universe. But laws, or programs are more subtle. Yet more profound. We have no indication, as of today, that life is prevalent in the universe. Not many scientists see panspermia as the dominating force, and what is life but a chain of programs governing chemical action? If a law or program is said to emerge, then what from, Planck Cells? How do planck cells produce programs. Is there a look up table, or akashic database to be read? How did this relational database evolve?
-----Original Message----- From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com> Sent: Sun, Oct 19, 2014 12:19 pm Subject: Re: Are We Really Conscious? (NYT Article today) On 18 Oct 2014, at 17:00, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote: Moreover, can consciousness be copied? Can we be duplicated mentally and how well can we. If, consciousness is a substance, as Tegmark asserts, then the pattern can be copied, right? If consciousness is a quantum substance, integrally, then it cannot be cloned. But then also, computationalism is false. Computationalism is that consciousness can be duplicated in the 3-1 view, like in the WM-duplication experiment. Consciousness cannot be duplicated in the 1-view, though, that is why there is a first person indeterminacy to begin with. But it is only relative (like in QM, actually). But then, assuming comp, we have also that the physical substance, the apparent primitive matter cannot be cloned, as it is a sum of infinities. This must be weakened by the renormalization needed to hunt the white rabbit away, and which is already consistent with the observable-logic extracted from classical comp (comp + Theaetetus). Keep in mind that once we assume computationalism, we cannot refer to the current physics in the argument, for logical reason. that elimiantes consciousness with or without saying. With computationalism, it is also equivalent with using God in a scientific explanation in theology. We can't do that, independently of the existence of god or not, or here of the physical universe or not. Bruno -----Original Message----- From: Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com> Sent: Sat, Oct 18, 2014 9:23 am Subject: Re: Are We Really Conscious? (NYT Article today) On 17 October 2014 09:40, David Nyman <da...@davidnyman.com> wrote: > On 16 October 2014 19:54, Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> A necessary side-effect roughly equates to the idea of weak emergence. > > > Weak emergence of what, precisely? And in what way could this emergent > something be distinguishable from the physical processes constituting it? Weak emergence of consciousness. The emergent phenomenon is distinguishable from the physical processes constituting it in the way any system is distinguishable from its parts, while still being fundamentally nothing more than its parts. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
