On Sun, Jan 18, 2015 at 1:10 AM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> On 1/17/2015 9:17 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > On Sat, Jan 17, 2015 at 5:56 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > >> On 1/17/2015 3:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> >> >> On Sat, Jan 17, 2015 at 2:29 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: >> >>> On 1/17/2015 2:12 AM, Jason Resch wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Fri, Jan 16, 2015 at 3:32 AM, LizR <lizj...@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>>> Clearly one cannot disbelieve in God without knowing, or at least >>>> having an idea of, what God is. >>>> >>> >>> I would go further and say one cannot disbelieve in God without >>> knowing, or at least having an idea of what reality is, for unless one >>> claims to know the extent of reality, how can one suppose to know what it >>> does or doesn't contain? >>> >>> >>> You can easily know that things with self contradictory properties are >>> not in reality. >>> >> >> I agree with that. >> >> >>> If something has properties that are inconsistent with observation that >>> is fairly strong evidence it doesn't exist. >>> >>> "Either God wants to abolish evil and cannot; or he can, but >>> does not want to; or he cannot, and does not want to. If he >>> wants to, but cannot, he is impotent. If he can, but does not >>> want to, he is wicked. If he neither can, nor wants to, he is >>> both powerless and wicked. But if God can abolish evil, and wants >>> to, then how comes evil in the world?'" >>> --- Epicurus >>> >> >> That's a nice example of an application of rational thought towards the >> advancement of theology. You've proven that an omnipotent God with the >> power and desire to prevent any bad thing from happening does not exist. >> >> What else might we have been able to prove or disprove if theology had >> remained open to free inquiry over the past several millennia? >> >> >>> >>> And then there are things that are consistent with both logic and >>> observation, but are very unlikely on our best theories of how the world >>> works, e.g. teapots orbiting Jupiter. Are you "agnostic" about the teapot >>> orbiting Jupiter? >>> >> >> To disbelieve in a particular thing orbiting Jupiter requires a working >> theory of our solar system. >> >> To disbelieve in a particular thing existing at all (neither in this >> universe, nor in any other place in reality) requires a working theory of >> reality. What is yours? >> >> >>> Does "agnostic" just mean "I don't know for certain" or does it mean >>> "I'm equally disposed to believe or disbelieve." or "I think it's >>> impossible to decide the question." >>> >> >> That's a good question. I think a definitive answer can be drawn from >> one's working theory of reality, but I don't know if an answer to that >> question is decidable or not, though perhaps it's possible to accumulate >> evidence towards one. So far I think man has made little progress in this >> endeavor, but Bruno and Tegmark seem to be farther ahead than most towards >> developing one. Working under those theories, I might say I am more of a >> "rational theist" in the sense that I can identify at least three things >> one might call god within those ontologies. However, as to which theory of >> reality is correct, I might call myself agnostic (even though I might be in >> the high 90's percentage wise leaning towards it, I could never be certain). >> >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>>> Personally I don't disbelieve in God, I merely find the idea highly >>>> unlikely >>>> >>> >>> Why do you find it highly unlikely (what is the conception you are >>> assuming here?), >>> >>> >>> When I write "God" with caps, I mean a god who is a superpowerful >>> person and who wants to be worshipped; not some abstract organizing >>> principle or the set of true propositions. >>> >> >> Subtract "and who wants to be worshiped" then re-answer that question. >> Why should we suppose that super-powerful minds are not likely to exist in >> reality? >> >> >> There's a difference between "super-powerful minds" and "a >> superpowerful person". By superpowerful person I meant one who could >> transcend physical laws, i.e. perform miracles. >> > > > A super powerful mind (or person) simulating some reality could of > course cause the simulation to deviate from its "physical laws". > > > But in a simulation, not in reality. > > The simulation is as much "reality" to those in the simulation as our reality is to us, to the point where it's impossible for anyone to know whether they're in a simulation or not. > > >> By the very definition of miracles these are not reliably observed and >> so the empirical evidence makes their existence very unlikely. >> > > You could only draw this conclusion if you believed it highly likely > that should any miracle have occurred in this universe, humankind would > have observed it. > > > No, I only have to assume that human observations are a fair sample of the > world I'm trying to draw conclusions about. Since this is the world that > humans experience, that condition is fulfilled. > > This alone would be highly dubious given how small an extent in time > and space (compared to the universe as a whole) humanity has kept reliable > records. > > > You seem to think one needs to have positive evidence against every > alternative theory in order to believe one theory is more likely than the > alternatives. > I was only pointing out that lack of evidence is not evidence to the contrary unless it is likely that evidence would exist given the range of observations collected. Is our lack of observance of alien life evidence strong against alien life in this universe? Certainly not, since we're only familiar with an infinitesimal part of the universe and have only been watching the skies for a very short time. It's also arguable that interventions in the physical world would be undetectable, since if the universe could be wholesale modified, it might as well be modified into a consistent way such that the modification appeared consistent. > > > >> A superpowerful mind might just be a human mind implemented in an >> electronic medium so that it was millions of times faster - but was still a >> Turing machine. It couldn't do miracles. >> >> > It could for the beings within the realities it simulates / instantiates. > > > So I can do miracles too because I can write simulations - thus draining > "miracle" of all meaning. > You would also be a theistic God to those creatures inside your simulation. Hopefully you would be a good one. > > > >> >> >>> >>> also, to what degree do you hold the main idea the everything list is >>> meant to discuss, to be true (or likely)? >>> >>> >>> I'm evenly divided on that question. >>> >> >> So then would you not also be evenly divided on the existence of >> "superpoweful people who want to be worshipped" >> >> >> No, see above on "superpowerful people". >> > > See above on realities simulated by super-powerful people. > > >> >> (assuming the two are not mutually exclusive properties and hence not >> logically impossible) then if every possible universe exists, some are sure >> to contain "superpoweful people who want to be worshipped". >> >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>>> and don't find that it contributes anything to discussions such as >>>> "why is there something rather than nothing?" >>>> >>> >>> But "god" is the supposed answer to that very question. >>> >>> >>> "God" is also supposed to answer the question, "How should humans >>> behave?" >>> >> >> Yes, and the conception of God as the one mind to which we are all a >> part does provide a foundation for an ethical framework (not unlike the >> golden rule or karma). >> >> >> Yes, and the conception of God as a tyrannical patriarch dictating >> behavior also provides a framework for ethics - one that has been widely >> employed. Does that prove that both concepts of God are realized? >> > > No. That is what theology is for. > > >> >> >> >>> and "Who will save me from death or disaster?" >>> >> >> The conception of God-like entities with the power to computationally >> simulate worlds and galaxies can "save you" by providing you a >> computational afterlife. >> >> >> And providing they exist and that "I" can experience it. >> > > By arithmetical realism they exist, and by computationalism you can > > > That's the speculation of Bruno's theory. > It's also presently the leading theory of mind, and for good reason. > But why should I assume arithmetical realism, > Because 2+2=4, and there's nothing you (or anyone/anything) can do to change that. > and why should I identify mathematical proof with belief? > > I don't know that you should. > > >> >> >> >>> >>> The question is not is there an answer or isn't there (of course >>> there is since we are here), >>> >>> >>> That doesn't follow. Conceivably there is no "reason". >>> >> >> Only in an fundamentally non-deterministic universe, which I personally >> have great difficulty conceiving. >> >> >> I don't. The current, best theory of this universe is non-deterministic. >> > > It's not fundamentally non-deterministic, only apparently so (and this > was explained by Everett, who provided the only mathematical and complete > theory of QM and the illusion of collapse). > > > Everett explained that other universes split off, but it's not entirely > clear what this means. And it leaves the universe of which we are conscious > as indeterministic. > I have no conceptual problem with subjective non-determinacy. > > > >> >> >> >>> In the major religions the "reason" is that a supernatural immortal >>> person willed or caused it. "Reason" referred to what humans mean when >>> they ask one another for a reason. Physical causes are not reasons in that >>> sense (although Aristotle thought they were). >>> >>> the question is what is the nature, and what are the properties, of >>> that thing, >>> >>> >>> Now you assume it's a thing or object. Are the equations of quantum >>> field theory a thing? >>> >> >> Yes, but are they the ultimate explanation for their own existence or >> not? >> >> >> I don't think existence needs an explanation. >> > > It sounds like you've given up on that line of inquiry. > > > It seems that any explanation of existence is either going to be circular > (which I like) or an infinite regress or non-existent. > > You left out: first-cause(s) -- a self-existent thing which accounts for both its own existence and other things which follow from it. > > >> >> What part do those equations play in the relation to everything else >> that may exist? >> >> >> They are constraining descriptions we invented. >> > > > But do they describe everything that can exist, or might they only > describe the reality in which we are embedded? > > > Of course we invent descriptions to fit what we observe. Any other > "reality" is speculative. > > All theories in science are speculative, but many imply the existence of things that cannot be directly observed. Nonetheless they are scientific and plausible, and we can accumulate evidence for them if the theory that implies them is testable and passes those tests. > > >> >> >> >>> >>> that object, that answer to the question of why reality exists. >>> >>> >>> That's easy. If it didn't exist it wouldn't be reality, would it? >>> >> >> That might be true, but it's not an answer to the question of why this >> reality exists. >> >> >> Why not? Because it's not elaborate enough? >> > > Yes, its unsatisfactory and vapid. > > > OK, let's say it arose out of aperion. > > That's as good a place to start as any. Now let's see where it leads and what fruit it might bear. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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