On 19 Jan 2015, at 04:44, meekerdb wrote:
On 1/18/2015 7:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, Jan 18, 2015 at 12:14 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net>
wrote:
On 1/18/2015 12:16 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, Jan 18, 2015 at 1:10 AM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net>
wrote:
On 1/17/2015 9:17 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sat, Jan 17, 2015 at 5:56 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net>
wrote:
On 1/17/2015 3:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sat, Jan 17, 2015 at 2:29 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net>
wrote:
On 1/17/2015 2:12 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Fri, Jan 16, 2015 at 3:32 AM, LizR <lizj...@gmail.com> wrote:
Clearly one cannot disbelieve in God without knowing, or at
least having an idea of, what God is.
I would go further and say one cannot disbelieve in God without
knowing, or at least having an idea of what reality is, for
unless one claims to know the extent of reality, how can one
suppose to know what it does or doesn't contain?
You can easily know that things with self contradictory
properties are not in reality.
I agree with that.
If something has properties that are inconsistent with
observation that is fairly strong evidence it doesn't exist.
"Either God wants to abolish evil and cannot; or he can, but
does not want to; or he cannot, and does not want to. If he
wants to, but cannot, he is impotent. If he can, but does not
want to, he is wicked. If he neither can, nor wants to, he is
both powerless and wicked. But if God can abolish evil, and wants
to, then how comes evil in the world?'"
--- Epicurus
That's a nice example of an application of rational thought
towards the advancement of theology. You've proven that an
omnipotent God with the power and desire to prevent any bad
thing from happening does not exist.
What else might we have been able to prove or disprove if
theology had remained open to free inquiry over the past several
millennia?
And then there are things that are consistent with both logic
and observation, but are very unlikely on our best theories of
how the world works, e.g. teapots orbiting Jupiter. Are you
"agnostic" about the teapot orbiting Jupiter?
To disbelieve in a particular thing orbiting Jupiter requires a
working theory of our solar system.
To disbelieve in a particular thing existing at all (neither in
this universe, nor in any other place in reality) requires a
working theory of reality. What is yours?
Does "agnostic" just mean "I don't know for certain" or does it
mean "I'm equally disposed to believe or disbelieve." or "I
think it's impossible to decide the question."
That's a good question. I think a definitive answer can be drawn
from one's working theory
of
reality, but I don't know if an answer to that question is
decidable or not, though perhaps it's possible to accumulate
evidence towards one. So far I think man has made little
progress in this endeavor, but Bruno and Tegmark seem to be
farther ahead than most towards developing one. Working under
those theories, I might say I am more of a "rational theist" in
the sense that I can identify at least three things one might
call god within those ontologies. However, as to which theory of
reality is correct, I might call myself agnostic (even though I
might be in the high 90's percentage wise leaning towards it, I
could never be certain).
Personally I don't disbelieve in God, I merely find the idea
highly unlikely
Why do you find it highly unlikely (what is the conception you
are assuming here?),
When I write "God" with caps, I mean a god who is a
superpowerful person and who wants to be worshipped; not some
abstract organizing principle or the set of true propositions.
Subtract "and who wants to be worshiped" then re-answer that
question. Why should we suppose that super-powerful minds are
not likely to exist in reality?
There's a difference between "super-powerful minds" and "a
superpowerful person". By superpowerful person I meant one who
could transcend physical laws, i.e. perform miracles.
A super powerful mind (or person) simulating some reality could
of course cause the simulation to deviate from its "physical laws".
But in a simulation, not in reality.
The simulation is as much "reality" to those in the simulation as
our reality is to us, to the point where it's impossible for
anyone to know whether they're in a simulation or not.
By the very definition of miracles these are not reliably
observed and so the empirical evidence makes their existence very
unlikely.
You could only draw this conclusion if you believed it highly
likely that should any miracle have occurred in this universe,
humankind would have observed it.
No, I only have to assume that human observations are a fair
sample of the world I'm trying to draw conclusions about. Since
this is the world that humans experience, that condition is
fulfilled.
This alone would be highly dubious given how small an extent in
time and space (compared to the universe as a whole) humanity has
kept reliable records.
You seem to think one needs to have positive evidence against
every alternative theory in order to believe one theory is more
likely than the alternatives.
I was only pointing out that lack of evidence is not evidence to
the contrary unless it is likely that evidence would exist given
the range of observations collected. Is our lack of observance of
alien life evidence strong against alien life in this universe?
Certainly not, since we're only familiar with an infinitesimal
part of the universe and have only been watching the skies for a
very short time. It's also arguable that interventions in the
physical world would be undetectable, since if the universe could
be wholesale modified, it might as well be modified into a
consistent way such that the modification appeared consistent.
A superpowerful mind might just be a human mind implemented in
an electronic medium so that it was millions of times faster -
but was still a Turing machine. It couldn't do miracles.
It could for the beings within the realities it simulates /
instantiates.
So I can do miracles too because I can write simulations - thus
draining "miracle" of all meaning.
You would also be a theistic God to those creatures inside your
simulation. Hopefully you would be a good one.
also, to what degree do you hold the main idea the everything
list is meant to discuss,
to be
true (or likely)?
I'm evenly divided on that question.
So then would you not also be evenly divided on the existence of
"superpoweful people
who
want to be worshipped"
No, see above on "superpowerful people".
See above on realities simulated by super-powerful people.
(assuming the two are not mutually exclusive properties and
hence not logically
impossible
) then
if every possible universe exists, some are sure to contain
"superpoweful people who want to be worshipped".
and don't find that it contributes anything to discussions such
as "why is there something rather than nothing?"
But "god" is the supposed answer to that very question.
"God" is also supposed to answer the question, "How should
humans behave?"
Yes, and the conception of God as the one mind to which we are
all a part does provide a foundation for an ethical framework
(not unlike the golden rule or karma).
Yes, and the conception of God as a tyrannical patriarch
dictating behavior also provides a framework for ethics - one
that has been widely employed. Does that prove that both
concepts of God are realized?
No. That is what theology is for.
and "Who will save me from death or disaster?"
The conception of God-like entities with the power to
computationally simulate worlds and galaxies can "save you" by
providing you a computational afterlife.
And providing they exist and that "I" can experience it.
By arithmetical realism they exist, and by computationalism you can
That's the speculation of Bruno's theory.
It's also presently the leading theory of mind, and for good reason.
But why should I assume arithmetical realism,
Because 2+2=4, and there's nothing you (or anyone/anything) can do
to change that.
Sure there is. 2+2=0 in mod 4 arithmetic - which is good for
describing some things.
Very clever, but you get my point. Try to make 7 a composite.
and why should I identify mathematical proof with belief?
I don't know that you should.
The question is not is there an answer or isn't there (of
course there is since we are here),
That doesn't follow. Conceivably there is no "reason".
Only in an fundamentally non-deterministic universe, which I
personally have great difficulty conceiving.
I don't. The current, best theory of this universe is non-
deterministic.
It's not fundamentally non-deterministic, only apparently so (and
this was explained by Everett, who provided the only mathematical
and complete theory of QM and the illusion of collapse).
Everett explained that other universes split off, but it's not
entirely clear what this means. And it leaves the universe of
which we are conscious as indeterministic.
I have no conceptual problem with subjective non-determinacy.
But you think a simulation is just a different reality, so you
should have no problem with objective non-determinancy since it
can be produced in a simulation.
My only problem was with fundamental non-determinism.
So now you're going to draw a distinction between simulation and
reality; the former isn't fundamental.
In the major religions the "reason" is that a supernatural
immortal person willed or caused it. "Reason" referred to what
humans mean when they ask one another for a reason. Physical
causes are not reasons in that sense (although Aristotle thought
they were).
the question is what is the nature, and what are the
properties, of that thing,
Now you assume it's a thing or object. Are the equations of
quantum field theory a thing?
Yes, but are they the ultimate explanation for their own
existence or not?
I don't think existence needs an explanation.
It sounds like you've given up on that line of inquiry.
It seems that any explanation of existence is either going to be
circular (which I like) or an infinite regress or non-existent.
You left out: first-cause(s) -- a self-existent thing which
accounts for both its own existence and other things which follow
from it.
But that's a cop-out. If something can be self-existent then it
might as well be the universe.
But not necessarily. The universe might be derivative of something
else which is self-existent.
Sure. But it might not be. So there's no logical inference to
"something else".
If everything needs an explanation then the putative "first-
cause" needs one too (unless you want to give up that line of
inquiry).
A first-cause can have an explanation, just not a cause. For
example, I find the existence of computations as a
consequence of self-existent mathematical truth to be an
explanation, but one concerning something which has no cause.
OK, what's your explanation of mathematical truths. And how do
mathematical truths cause anything?
This is the subject of all my work, except that with computationalism,
we need only arithmetical (sigma_1, even) truth, which is not
problematical even for intuitionists. And arithmetical truth does not
cause anything, in a physical sense, but explains exactly where the
illusion of the physical comes from, and this with enough precision to
prove that they obey a quantum logic. There are no other explanation
in the literature, which assumes nothing more than addition and
multiplication of positive integer.
Bruno
What part do those equations play in the relation to everything
else that may exist?
They are constraining descriptions we invented.
But do they describe everything that can exist, or might they
only describe the reality in which we are embedded?
Of course we invent descriptions to fit what we observe. Any
other "reality" is speculative.
All theories in science are speculative,
But they propose to describe the same reality, the one that is the
object of subjective agreement.
Only according to the other figments of your imagination ;-)
Including you. "Intersubjective agreement" is the only operational
definition of "objective" that I'm aware of.
Brent
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