On Sun, Jan 18, 2015 at 1:10 AM, meekerdb <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 1/17/2015 9:17 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sat, Jan 17, 2015 at 5:56 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 1/17/2015 3:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sat, Jan 17, 2015 at 2:29 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 1/17/2015 2:12 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Fri, Jan 16, 2015 at 3:32 AM, LizR <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
Clearly one cannot disbelieve in God without knowing, or at
least having an idea of, what God is.
I would go further and say one cannot disbelieve in God without
knowing, or at least having an idea of what reality is, for
unless
one claims to know the extent of reality, how can one suppose to
know what it does or doesn't contain?
You can easily know that things with self contradictory
properties
are not in reality.
I agree with that.
If something has properties that are inconsistent with
observation
that is fairly strong evidence it doesn't exist.
"Either God wants to abolish evil and cannot; or he can, but
does not want to; or he cannot, and does not want to. If he
wants to, but cannot, he is impotent. If he can, but does not
want to, he is wicked. If he neither can, nor wants to, he is
both powerless and wicked. But if God can abolish evil, and
wants
to, then how comes evil in the world?'"
--- Epicurus
That's a nice example of an application of rational thought towards
the
advancement of theology. You've proven that an omnipotent God with
the
power and desire to prevent any bad thing from happening does not
exist.
What else might we have been able to prove or disprove if theology
had
remained open to free inquiry over the past several millennia?
And then there are things that are consistent with both logic
and
observation, but are very unlikely on our best theories of how
the
world works, e.g. teapots orbiting Jupiter. Are you "agnostic"
about
the teapot orbiting Jupiter?
To disbelieve in a particular thing orbiting Jupiter requires a
working
theory of our solar system.
To disbelieve in a particular thing existing at all (neither in this
universe, nor in any other place in reality) requires a working
theory of
reality. What is yours?
Does "agnostic" just mean "I don't know for certain" or does it
mean
"I'm equally disposed to believe or disbelieve." or "I think
it's
impossible to decide the question."
That's a good question. I think a definitive answer can be drawn
from
one's working theory of reality, but I don't know if an answer to
that
question is decidable or not, though perhaps it's possible to
accumulate
evidence towards one. So far I think man has made little progress
in this
endeavor, but Bruno and Tegmark seem to be farther ahead than most
towards developing one. Working under those theories, I might say I
am
more of a "rational theist" in the sense that I can identify at
least
three things one might call god within those ontologies. However,
as to
which theory of reality is correct, I might call myself agnostic
(even
though I might be in the high 90's percentage wise leaning towards
it, I
could never be certain).
Personally I don't disbelieve in God, I merely find the idea
highly unlikely
Why do you find it highly unlikely (what is the conception you
are
assuming here?),
When I write "God" with caps, I mean a god who is a
superpowerful
person and who wants to be worshipped; not some abstract
organizing
principle or the set of true propositions.
Subtract "and who wants to be worshiped" then re-answer that question.
Why should we suppose that super-powerful minds are not likely to exist
in reality?
There's a difference between "super-powerful minds" and "a
superpowerful
person". By superpowerful person I meant one who could transcend
physical
laws, i.e. perform miracles.
A super powerful mind (or person) simulating some reality could of
course
cause the simulation to deviate from its "physical laws".
But in a simulation, not in reality.
The simulation is as much "reality" to those in the simulation as our
reality is to
us, to the point where it's impossible for anyone to know whether they're
in a
simulation or not.
By the very definition of miracles these are not reliably
observed and
so the empirical evidence makes their existence very unlikely.
You could only draw this conclusion if you believed it highly likely
that
should any miracle have occurred in this universe, humankind would have
observed it.
No, I only have to assume that human observations are a fair sample of
the
world I'm trying to draw conclusions about. Since this is the world
that
humans experience, that condition is fulfilled.
This alone would be highly dubious given how small an extent in time
and space
(compared to the universe as a whole) humanity has kept reliable
records.
You seem to think one needs to have positive evidence against every
alternative
theory in order to believe one theory is more likely than the
alternatives.
I was only pointing out that lack of evidence is not evidence to the
contrary
unless it is likely that evidence would exist given the range of
observations
collected. Is our lack of observance of alien life evidence strong against
alien
life in this universe? Certainly not, since we're only familiar with an
infinitesimal part of the universe and have only been watching the skies
for a very
short time. It's also arguable that interventions in the physical world
would be
undetectable, since if the universe could be wholesale modified, it might
as well
be modified into a consistent way such that the modification appeared
consistent.
A superpowerful mind might just be a human mind implemented in an
electronic medium so that it was millions of times faster - but was
still
a Turing machine. It couldn't do miracles.
It could for the beings within the realities it simulates /
instantiates.
So I can do miracles too because I can write simulations - thus draining
"miracle" of all meaning.
You would also be a theistic God to those creatures inside your simulation.
Hopefully you would be a good one.
also, to what degree do you hold the main idea the everything
list
is meant to discuss, to be true (or likely)?
I'm evenly divided on that question.
So then would you not also be evenly divided on the existence of
"superpoweful people who want to be worshipped"
No, see above on "superpowerful people".
See above on realities simulated by super-powerful people.
(assuming the two are not mutually exclusive properties and hence
not
logically impossible) then if every possible universe exists, some
are
sure to contain "superpoweful people who want to be worshipped".
and don't find that it contributes anything to discussions
such
as "why is there something rather than nothing?"
But "god" is the supposed answer to that very question.
"God" is also supposed to answer the question, "How should
humans
behave?"
Yes, and the conception of God as the one mind to which we are all
a part
does provide a foundation for an ethical framework (not unlike the
golden
rule or karma).
Yes, and the conception of God as a tyrannical patriarch dictating
behavior also provides a framework for ethics - one that has been
widely
employed. Does that prove that both concepts of God are realized?
No. That is what theology is for.
and "Who will save me from death or disaster?"
The conception of God-like entities with the power to
computationally
simulate worlds and galaxies can "save you" by providing you a
computational afterlife.
And providing they exist and that "I" can experience it.
By arithmetical realism they exist, and by computationalism you can
That's the speculation of Bruno's theory.
It's also presently the leading theory of mind, and for good reason.
But why should I assume arithmetical realism,
Because 2+2=4, and there's nothing you (or anyone/anything) can do to
change that.
and why should I identify mathematical proof with belief?
I don't know that you should.
The question is not is there an answer or isn't there (of course
there is since we are here),
That doesn't follow. Conceivably there is no "reason".
Only in an fundamentally non-deterministic universe, which I
personally
have great difficulty conceiving.
I don't. The current, best theory of this universe is
non-deterministic.
It's not fundamentally non-deterministic, only apparently so (and this
was
explained by Everett, who provided the only mathematical and complete
theory
of QM and the illusion of collapse).
Everett explained that other universes split off, but it's not entirely
clear
what this means. And it leaves the universe of which we are conscious as
indeterministic.
I have no conceptual problem with subjective non-determinacy.
