On Sun, Jan 18, 2015 at 1:10 AM, meekerdb <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 1/17/2015 9:17 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sat, Jan 17, 2015 at 5:56 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 1/17/2015 3:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sat, Jan 17, 2015 at 2:29 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 1/17/2015 2:12 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Fri, Jan 16, 2015 at 3:32 AM, LizR <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
Clearly one cannot disbelieve in God without knowing,
or at
least having an idea of, what God is.
I would go further and say one cannot disbelieve in God
without
knowing, or at least having an idea of what reality is, for
unless one claims to know the extent of reality, how can one
suppose to know what it does or doesn't contain?
You can easily know that things with self contradictory
properties are not in reality.
I agree with that.
If something has properties that are inconsistent with
observation that is fairly strong evidence it doesn't exist.
"Either God wants to abolish evil and cannot; or he can, but
does not want to; or he cannot, and does not want to. If he
wants to, but cannot, he is impotent. If he can, but does
not
want to, he is wicked. If he neither can, nor wants to, he
is
both powerless and wicked. But if God can abolish evil, and
wants
to, then how comes evil in the world?'"
--- Epicurus
That's a nice example of an application of rational thought
towards
the advancement of theology. You've proven that an omnipotent
God
with the power and desire to prevent any bad thing from
happening
does not exist.
What else might we have been able to prove or disprove if
theology
had remained open to free inquiry over the past several
millennia?
And then there are things that are consistent with both
logic
and observation, but are very unlikely on our best theories
of
how the world works, e.g. teapots orbiting Jupiter. Are you
"agnostic" about the teapot orbiting Jupiter?
To disbelieve in a particular thing orbiting Jupiter requires a
working theory of our solar system.
To disbelieve in a particular thing existing at all (neither in
this
universe, nor in any other place in reality) requires a working
theory of reality. What is yours?
Does "agnostic" just mean "I don't know for certain" or
does it
mean "I'm equally disposed to believe or disbelieve." or "I
think it's impossible to decide the question."
That's a good question. I think a definitive answer can be drawn
from one's working theory of reality, but I don't know if an
answer
to that question is decidable or not, though perhaps it's
possible
to accumulate evidence towards one. So far I think man has made
little progress in this endeavor, but Bruno and Tegmark seem to
be
farther ahead than most towards developing one. Working under
those
theories, I might say I am more of a "rational theist" in the
sense
that I can identify at least three things one might call god
within
those ontologies. However, as to which theory of reality is
correct,
I might call myself agnostic (even though I might be in the high
90's percentage wise leaning towards it, I could never be
certain).
Personally I don't disbelieve in God, I merely find the
idea highly unlikely
Why do you find it highly unlikely (what is the conception
you
are assuming here?),
When I write "God" with caps, I mean a god who is a
superpowerful person and who wants to be worshipped; not
some
abstract organizing principle or the set of true
propositions.
Subtract "and who wants to be worshiped" then re-answer that
question. Why should we suppose that super-powerful minds are
not
likely to exist in reality?
There's a difference between "super-powerful minds" and "a
superpowerful person". By superpowerful person I meant one who
could
transcend physical laws, i.e. perform miracles.
A super powerful mind (or person) simulating some reality could of
course
cause the simulation to deviate from its "physical laws".
But in a simulation, not in reality.
The simulation is as much "reality" to those in the simulation as our
reality
is to us, to the point where it's impossible for anyone to know whether
they're in a simulation or not.
By the very definition of miracles these are not reliably
observed
and so the empirical evidence makes their existence very
unlikely.
You could only draw this conclusion if you believed it highly
likely that
should any miracle have occurred in this universe, humankind would
have
observed it.
No, I only have to assume that human observations are a fair sample
of the
world I'm trying to draw conclusions about. Since this is the world
that
humans experience, that condition is fulfilled.
This alone would be highly dubious given how small an extent in
time and
space (compared to the universe as a whole) humanity has kept
reliable
records.
You seem to think one needs to have positive evidence against every
alternative theory in order to believe one theory is more likely
than the
alternatives.
I was only pointing out that lack of evidence is not evidence to the
contrary
unless it is likely that evidence would exist given the range of
observations
collected. Is our lack of observance of alien life evidence strong
against
alien life in this universe? Certainly not, since we're only familiar
with an
infinitesimal part of the universe and have only been watching the
skies for a
very short time. It's also arguable that interventions in the physical
world
would be undetectable, since if the universe could be wholesale
modified, it
might as well be modified into a consistent way such that the
modification
appeared consistent.
A superpowerful mind might just be a human mind implemented in
an
electronic medium so that it was millions of times faster - but
was
still a Turing machine. It couldn't do miracles.
It could for the beings within the realities it simulates /
instantiates.
So I can do miracles too because I can write simulations - thus
draining
"miracle" of all meaning.
You would also be a theistic God to those creatures inside your
simulation.
Hopefully you would be a good one.
also, to what degree do you hold the main idea the
everything
list is meant to discuss, to be true (or likely)?
I'm evenly divided on that question.
So then would you not also be evenly divided on the existence of
"superpoweful people who want to be worshipped"
No, see above on "superpowerful people".
See above on realities simulated by super-powerful people.
(assuming the two are not mutually exclusive properties and
hence
not logically impossible) then if every possible universe
exists,
some are sure to contain "superpoweful people who want to be
worshipped".
and don't find that it contributes anything to
discussions
such as "why is there something rather than nothing?"
But "god" is the supposed answer to that very question.
"God" is also supposed to answer the question, "How should
humans behave?"
Yes, and the conception of God as the one mind to which we are
all a
part does provide a foundation for an ethical framework (not
unlike
the golden rule or karma).
Yes, and the conception of God as a tyrannical patriarch
dictating
behavior also provides a framework for ethics - one that has
been
widely employed. Does that prove that both concepts of God are
realized?
No. That is what theology is for.
and "Who will save me from death or disaster?"
The conception of God-like entities with the power to
computationally simulate worlds and galaxies can "save you" by
providing you a computational afterlife.
And providing they exist and that "I" can experience it.
By arithmetical realism they exist, and by computationalism you can
That's the speculation of Bruno's theory.
It's also presently the leading theory of mind, and for good reason.
But why should I assume arithmetical realism,
Because 2+2=4, and there's nothing you (or anyone/anything) can do to
change that.
and why should I identify mathematical proof with belief?
I don't know that you should.
The question is not is there an answer or isn't there (of
course there is since we are here),
That doesn't follow. Conceivably there is no "reason".
Only in an fundamentally non-deterministic universe, which I
personally have great difficulty conceiving.
I don't. The current, best theory of this universe is
non-deterministic.
It's not fundamentally non-deterministic, only apparently so (and
this
was explained by Everett, who provided the only mathematical and
complete
theory of QM and the illusion of collapse).
Everett explained that other universes split off, but it's not
entirely
clear what this means. And it leaves the universe of which we are
conscious as indeterministic.
I have no conceptual problem with subjective non-determinacy.
