On Sun, Jan 18, 2015 at 12:14 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 1/18/2015 12:16 AM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > On Sun, Jan 18, 2015 at 1:10 AM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On 1/17/2015 9:17 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> >> >> On Sat, Jan 17, 2015 at 5:56 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On 1/17/2015 3:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sat, Jan 17, 2015 at 2:29 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> On 1/17/2015 2:12 AM, Jason Resch wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Fri, Jan 16, 2015 at 3:32 AM, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Clearly one cannot disbelieve in God without knowing, or at least >>>>> having an idea of, what God is. >>>>> >>>> >>>> I would go further and say one cannot disbelieve in God without >>>> knowing, or at least having an idea of what reality is, for unless one >>>> claims to know the extent of reality, how can one suppose to know what it >>>> does or doesn't contain? >>>> >>>> >>>> You can easily know that things with self contradictory properties are >>>> not in reality. >>>> >>> >>> I agree with that. >>> >>> >>>> If something has properties that are inconsistent with observation that >>>> is fairly strong evidence it doesn't exist. >>>> >>>> "Either God wants to abolish evil and cannot; or he can, but >>>> does not want to; or he cannot, and does not want to. If he >>>> wants to, but cannot, he is impotent. If he can, but does not >>>> want to, he is wicked. If he neither can, nor wants to, he is >>>> both powerless and wicked. But if God can abolish evil, and wants >>>> to, then how comes evil in the world?'" >>>> --- Epicurus >>>> >>> >>> That's a nice example of an application of rational thought towards >>> the advancement of theology. You've proven that an omnipotent God with the >>> power and desire to prevent any bad thing from happening does not exist. >>> >>> What else might we have been able to prove or disprove if theology had >>> remained open to free inquiry over the past several millennia? >>> >>> >>>> >>>> And then there are things that are consistent with both logic and >>>> observation, but are very unlikely on our best theories of how the world >>>> works, e.g. teapots orbiting Jupiter. Are you "agnostic" about the teapot >>>> orbiting Jupiter? >>>> >>> >>> To disbelieve in a particular thing orbiting Jupiter requires a >>> working theory of our solar system. >>> >>> To disbelieve in a particular thing existing at all (neither in this >>> universe, nor in any other place in reality) requires a working theory of >>> reality. What is yours? >>> >>> >>>> Does "agnostic" just mean "I don't know for certain" or does it mean >>>> "I'm equally disposed to believe or disbelieve." or "I think it's >>>> impossible to decide the question." >>>> >>> >>> That's a good question. I think a definitive answer can be drawn from >>> one's working theory of reality, but I don't know if an answer to that >>> question is decidable or not, though perhaps it's possible to accumulate >>> evidence towards one. So far I think man has made little progress in this >>> endeavor, but Bruno and Tegmark seem to be farther ahead than most towards >>> developing one. Working under those theories, I might say I am more of a >>> "rational theist" in the sense that I can identify at least three things >>> one might call god within those ontologies. However, as to which theory of >>> reality is correct, I might call myself agnostic (even though I might be in >>> the high 90's percentage wise leaning towards it, I could never be certain). >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Personally I don't disbelieve in God, I merely find the idea highly >>>>> unlikely >>>>> >>>> >>>> Why do you find it highly unlikely (what is the conception you are >>>> assuming here?), >>>> >>>> >>>> When I write "God" with caps, I mean a god who is a superpowerful >>>> person and who wants to be worshipped; not some abstract organizing >>>> principle or the set of true propositions. >>>> >>> >>> Subtract "and who wants to be worshiped" then re-answer that >>> question. Why should we suppose that super-powerful minds are not likely >>> to exist in reality? >>> >>> >>> There's a difference between "super-powerful minds" and "a >>> superpowerful person". By superpowerful person I meant one who could >>> transcend physical laws, i.e. perform miracles. >>> >> >> >> A super powerful mind (or person) simulating some reality could of >> course cause the simulation to deviate from its "physical laws". >> >> >> But in a simulation, not in reality. >> >> > The simulation is as much "reality" to those in the simulation as our > reality is to us, to the point where it's impossible for anyone to know > whether they're in a simulation or not. > > >> >> >>> By the very definition of miracles these are not reliably observed and >>> so the empirical evidence makes their existence very unlikely. >>> >> >> You could only draw this conclusion if you believed it highly likely >> that should any miracle have occurred in this universe, humankind would >> have observed it. >> >> >> No, I only have to assume that human observations are a fair sample of >> the world I'm trying to draw conclusions about. Since this is the world >> that humans experience, that condition is fulfilled. >> >> This alone would be highly dubious given how small an extent in time >> and space (compared to the universe as a whole) humanity has kept reliable >> records. >> >> >> You seem to think one needs to have positive evidence against every >> alternative theory in order to believe one theory is more likely than the >> alternatives. >> > > I was only pointing out that lack of evidence is not evidence to the > contrary unless it is likely that evidence would exist given the range of > observations collected. Is our lack of observance of alien life evidence > strong against alien life in this universe? Certainly not, since we're only > familiar with an infinitesimal part of the universe and have only been > watching the skies for a very short time. It's also arguable that > interventions in the physical world would be undetectable, since if the > universe could be wholesale modified, it might as well be modified into a > consistent way such that the modification appeared consistent. > > >> >> >> >>> A superpowerful mind might just be a human mind implemented in an >>> electronic medium so that it was millions of times faster - but was still a >>> Turing machine. It couldn't do miracles. >>> >>> >> It could for the beings within the realities it simulates / >> instantiates. >> >> >> So I can do miracles too because I can write simulations - thus draining >> "miracle" of all meaning. >> > > > You would also be a theistic God to those creatures inside your > simulation. Hopefully you would be a good one. > > >> >> >> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> also, to what degree do you hold the main idea the everything list >>>> is meant to discuss, to be true (or likely)? >>>> >>>> >>>> I'm evenly divided on that question. >>>> >>> >>> So then would you not also be evenly divided on the existence of >>> "superpoweful people who want to be worshipped" >>> >>> >>> No, see above on "superpowerful people". >>> >> >> See above on realities simulated by super-powerful people. >> >> >>> >>> (assuming the two are not mutually exclusive properties and hence not >>> logically impossible) then if every possible universe exists, some are sure >>> to contain "superpoweful people who want to be worshipped". >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> and don't find that it contributes anything to discussions such as >>>>> "why is there something rather than nothing?" >>>>> >>>> >>>> But "god" is the supposed answer to that very question. >>>> >>>> >>>> "God" is also supposed to answer the question, "How should humans >>>> behave?" >>>> >>> >>> Yes, and the conception of God as the one mind to which we are all a >>> part does provide a foundation for an ethical framework (not unlike the >>> golden rule or karma). >>> >>> >>> Yes, and the conception of God as a tyrannical patriarch dictating >>> behavior also provides a framework for ethics - one that has been widely >>> employed. Does that prove that both concepts of God are realized? >>> >> >> No. That is what theology is for. >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>>> and "Who will save me from death or disaster?" >>>> >>> >>> The conception of God-like entities with the power to computationally >>> simulate worlds and galaxies can "save you" by providing you a >>> computational afterlife. >>> >>> >>> And providing they exist and that "I" can experience it. >>> >> >> By arithmetical realism they exist, and by computationalism you can >> >> >> That's the speculation of Bruno's theory. >> > > It's also presently the leading theory of mind, and for good reason. > > >> But why should I assume arithmetical realism, >> > > Because 2+2=4, and there's nothing you (or anyone/anything) can do to > change that. > > > Sure there is. 2+2=0 in mod 4 arithmetic - which is good for describing > some things. > Very clever, but you get my point. Try to make 7 a composite. > > > > >> and why should I identify mathematical proof with belief? >> >> > I don't know that you should. > > >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> The question is not is there an answer or isn't there (of course >>>> there is since we are here), >>>> >>>> >>>> That doesn't follow. Conceivably there is no "reason". >>>> >>> >>> Only in an fundamentally non-deterministic universe, which I >>> personally have great difficulty conceiving. >>> >>> >>> I don't. The current, best theory of this universe is >>> non-deterministic. >>> >> >> It's not fundamentally non-deterministic, only apparently so (and this >> was explained by Everett, who provided the only mathematical and complete >> theory of QM and the illusion of collapse). >> >> >> Everett explained that other universes split off, but it's not entirely >> clear what this means. And it leaves the universe of which we are conscious >> as indeterministic. >> > > I have no conceptual problem with subjective non-determinacy. > > > But you think a simulation is just a different reality, so you should have > no problem with objective non-determinancy since it can be produced in a > simulation. > My only problem was with fundamental non-determinism. > > > >> >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>>> In the major religions the "reason" is that a supernatural immortal >>>> person willed or caused it. "Reason" referred to what humans mean when >>>> they ask one another for a reason. Physical causes are not reasons in that >>>> sense (although Aristotle thought they were). >>>> >>>> the question is what is the nature, and what are the properties, of >>>> that thing, >>>> >>>> >>>> Now you assume it's a thing or object. Are the equations of quantum >>>> field theory a thing? >>>> >>> >>> Yes, but are they the ultimate explanation for their own existence or >>> not? >>> >>> >>> I don't think existence needs an explanation. >>> >> >> It sounds like you've given up on that line of inquiry. >> >> >> It seems that any explanation of existence is either going to be >> circular (which I like) or an infinite regress or non-existent. >> >> > You left out: first-cause(s) -- a self-existent thing which accounts for > both its own existence and other things which follow from it. > > > But that's a cop-out. If something can be self-existent then it might as > well be the universe. > But not necessarily. The universe might be derivative of something else which is self-existent. > If everything needs an explanation then the putative "first-cause" needs > one too (unless you want to give up that line of inquiry). > A first-cause can have an explanation, just not a cause. For example, I find the existence of computations as a consequence of self-existent mathematical truth to be an explanation, but one concerning something which has no cause. > > > > >> >> >>> >>> What part do those equations play in the relation to everything else >>> that may exist? >>> >>> >>> They are constraining descriptions we invented. >>> >> >> >> But do they describe everything that can exist, or might they only >> describe the reality in which we are embedded? >> >> >> Of course we invent descriptions to fit what we observe. Any other >> "reality" is speculative. >> >> > All theories in science are speculative, > > > But they propose to describe the same reality, the one that is the object > of subjective agreement. > Only according to the other figments of your imagination ;-) Jason > > but many imply the existence of things that cannot be directly > observed. Nonetheless they are scientific and plausible, and we can > accumulate evidence for them if the theory that implies them is testable > and passes those tests. > > >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> that object, that answer to the question of why reality exists. >>>> >>>> >>>> That's easy. If it didn't exist it wouldn't be reality, would it? >>>> >>> >>> That might be true, but it's not an answer to the question of why this >>> reality exists. >>> >>> >>> Why not? Because it's not elaborate enough? >>> >> >> Yes, its unsatisfactory and vapid. >> >> >> OK, let's say it arose out of aperion. >> >> > That's as good a place to start as any. Now let's see where it leads and > what fruit it might bear. > > > We did. Galileo took up where the pre-Socratics left off. > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
