On Wed, Feb 11, 2015 at 12:23 AM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> On 2/10/2015 10:11 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > On Wed, Feb 11, 2015 at 12:03 AM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > >> On 2/10/2015 9:40 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> >> >> On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 8:35 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: >> >>> On 2/10/2015 5:29 PM, LizR wrote: >>> >>> On 5 February 2015 at 09:19, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: >>> >>>> On 2/4/2015 11:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> On 03 Feb 2015, at 20:13, Jason Resch wrote: >>>> >>>> I agree with John. If consciousness had no third-person observable >>>> effects, it would be an epiphenomenon. And then there is no way to explain >>>> why we're even having this discussion about consciousness. >>>> >>>> >>>> So we all agree on this. >>>> >>>> >>>> ?? Why aren't first person observable effects enough to discuss? >>>> >>> >>> I guess because if there are no third-person observable effects of >>> consciousness, then I can't detect any other conscious entities to discuss >>> the effects with... >>> >>> >>> The epiphenomenon model says there are third-person observable effects >>> of the phenomenon, which suffice for detecting other entities. Whether the >>> other entities are really conscious or just faking it is a matter of >>> inference. >>> >> >> Did you mean to say "The epiphenomenon model says there are *no* >> third-person observable effects of the phenomenon" ? >> >> >> Of course not. The phenomenon is what is observable, by definition. >> It's the epiphenomenon which is not third-person observable. >> > > But in the epiphenomenon model, consciousness is the epiphenomenon and > the phenomenal part of consciousness is its first-person aspect. > > > The statement was, "there are no third-person observable effects of > consciousness". > Yes this is the conventional meaning of epihenominalism (in philosophy of mind). > In the epiphenomenal theory of consciousness, I take the phenomenon to be > the observable behavior, neuron firings, etc. and consciousness the > corresponding epiphenomenon. > Okay. > Those phenomenon do have third person observable effects and in general > that's how we infer consciousness in others. > I agree. But I think epiphenominalism is false, because that it places consciousness outside the causal chain of physics, making it "extra physical" ineffectual, and for all intents and purposes, unnecessary (it declares no ability to ever move beyond solipsism as far as determining whether some other thing or process is conscious or not). Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
