On Wed, Feb 11, 2015 at 1:43 AM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 2/10/2015 10:38 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > On Wed, Feb 11, 2015 at 12:23 AM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On 2/10/2015 10:11 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> >> >> On Wed, Feb 11, 2015 at 12:03 AM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On 2/10/2015 9:40 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 8:35 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> On 2/10/2015 5:29 PM, LizR wrote: >>>> >>>> On 5 February 2015 at 09:19, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 2/4/2015 11:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>> On 03 Feb 2015, at 20:13, Jason Resch wrote: >>>>> >>>>> I agree with John. If consciousness had no third-person observable >>>>> effects, it would be an epiphenomenon. And then there is no way to explain >>>>> why we're even having this discussion about consciousness. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> So we all agree on this. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ?? Why aren't first person observable effects enough to discuss? >>>>> >>>> >>>> I guess because if there are no third-person observable effects of >>>> consciousness, then I can't detect any other conscious entities to discuss >>>> the effects with... >>>> >>>> >>>> The epiphenomenon model says there are third-person observable effects >>>> of the phenomenon, which suffice for detecting other entities. Whether the >>>> other entities are really conscious or just faking it is a matter of >>>> inference. >>>> >>> >>> Did you mean to say "The epiphenomenon model says there are *no* >>> third-person observable effects of the phenomenon" ? >>> >>> >>> Of course not. The phenomenon is what is observable, by definition. >>> It's the epiphenomenon which is not third-person observable. >>> >> >> But in the epiphenomenon model, consciousness is the epiphenomenon and >> the phenomenal part of consciousness is its first-person aspect. >> >> >> The statement was, "there are no third-person observable effects of >> consciousness". >> > > Yes this is the conventional meaning of epihenominalism (in philosophy > of mind). > > >> In the epiphenomenal theory of consciousness, I take the phenomenon to >> be the observable behavior, neuron firings, etc. and consciousness the >> corresponding epiphenomenon. >> > > Okay. > > >> Those phenomenon do have third person observable effects and in general >> that's how we infer consciousness in others. >> > > I agree. But I think epiphenominalism is false, because that it places > consciousness outside the causal chain of physics, making it "extra > physical" ineffectual, and for all intents and purposes, unnecessary (it > declares no ability to ever move beyond solipsism as far as determining > whether some other thing or process is conscious or not). > > > Those sound like reasons you don't like it, not reasons it's false. Are > you echoing JKC's line that if consciousness is not effacious evolution > would have removed it? > I think that is a valid criticism. If it has no effects, then maybe I'm just 1 in a billion that has the right combination of genes to be conscious, while everyone I've ever met is a zombie. You might protest that you're also one of the one in a billion who is also conscious, but unfortunately all zombies have that nasty habit, so I can't take your word for it. > If consciousness were unnecessary it would not be an epiphenomenon, i.e. > something that NECESSARILY accompanies the phenomena of thoughts. Is heat > necessary to random molecular motion? > As I and others have pointed out earlier, you are describing emergence, not epiphenomenalism (which is a dualist theory of mind made up when Descartes interactionism was shown to be incompatible with the laws of motion). Nothing inherent to epiphenominalism implies that consciousness must follow from the physics beyond your insistence that it does. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
